



Inquiry into the procurement and delivery of MyWay+

Answer to question taken on notice

Asked by: Ms Jo Clay MLA

Addressed to: Chris Steel MLA, Minister for Transport

In relation to: Review all answers provided to the committee (re Risk Management)

Hearing: **03/07/2025**

Uncorrected Proof Transcript **UPT 03/07/2025, pp 21-22**

Transcript provided: **10/07/2025**

Answer Due: **17/07/2025**

Chris Steel MLA, Minister for Transport took on notice the following question:

Can TCCS go back and review all the answers provided to the Committee in regards to how risks were managed, and when things were set down as unlikely whether those things happened, and what was told to this Committee and let us know if there's anything that needs to be clarified. Include any additional information about things that clearly happened, as well as lessons learned.

THE CHAIR: No, that is great. There is another one that I have gotten very confused about and we have now published the risk registers. They were not public before but they are on our website now so everybody can have a look at them. We had a chat, and we have done this in questions on notice and in hearings. There were lots of things listed as unlikely risks in September before the thing was launched, and things like disability compliance, but a whole lot of things that I think now it is unquestioned that these things did actually happen, and they were all listed as unlikely.

I asked, at the time of launch, and as of March 2025 how many unlikely risks happened. The answer came back, "None of these". Then when we had a chat in hearings with Mr White—he may or may not remember. You do not have the transcript in front of you. I do understand that. You can take anything on notice if you need to.

I said, "How come we got the answer that none of these things had happened", and the answer was, "Because none of them had happened in September". The question was not. Do you think maybe it was bit confusing for the committee to tell us that these things were—we were trying to work out why the risk was highlighted as so unlikely, why it was managed so badly, and we were told none of these things happened, and then we were told, "We meant in March".

Mr McHugh: Chair, can you just clarify your actual question because I think we will take it on notice because—

THE CHAIR: You are welcome to take it on notice. I think the most useful thing, Mr McHugh, to take on notice is can you go back and look at all of the answers you have given to this committee in relation to how risk was managed, and when things were set down as unlikely, whether those things happened—

Mr McHugh: And when they changed.

THE CHAIR: —and what was told to this committee, and can you just come back and let us know if there is anything that you need to clarify.

Mr McHugh: Absolutely.

THE CHAIR: We are just trying to write a report it is really really difficult for us to get a clear thread on these things.

Mr McHugh: Absolutely.

THE CHAIR: If you have got any additional information about why things that clearly happened were identified as unlikely, that strikes me as not very good risk management. By all means, pop some extra information in there and any lessons learned, that would also be useful, but at the moment I am just trying to track what we have been told because it is really hard to follow.

Chris Steel MLA, Minister for Transport: The answer to the Member’s question is as follows:

The Government’s responses relating to risk management in the MyWay+ procurement and delivery are as listed in the below table.

| Hearing Date | QTON/QON Number | Summary |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|---|
| 13 March 2025 (in-camera) | QTON 01 | The following documents were provided to the Committee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Risk Management Plan - Next Generation Ticketing and Real Time Passenger Information Solution • MyWay+ Program Risk Management Plan • TCCS Risk Management Framework and Plan • ACT Government Risk Management Policy • MyWay+ Risk Register (extract as at 11.09.2024) • TCCS MyWay+ System Security Plan • CyberCX Assessment - BusTicketingService-MAAS-MyWay+ |
| 27 March 2025 | QON 04 | The response provides clarification on the types of risks identified in the Risk Register extract (11.09.24) and information on implemented treatments for certain risks as raised in the specific matters of the question. |
| | QON 11 | The response, from the Minister for Finance as the responsible portfolio Minister, outline the ACT Government’s policy and approach to the management of cybersecurity risks. |
| | QON 14 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |

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| Hearing Date | QTON/QON Number | Summary |
|-------------------|-------------------------|---|
| | QON 16 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |
| | QON 20 | The response provided summary information on changes to assessed risks between launch day, 27 November 2024, and 12 March 2025. Given the multi-faceted nature of the question and the response, I believe the responses to parts 1 are the subject of this question. I will provide the requested clarification below. |
| | QON 21 | The section on page 5 of the attached brief (S2024/01729) under the heading “Contingency Planning” (provided in confidence and for restricted use by the Committee) includes information about how the MyWay+ system would respond to issues of cyber security breaches and system and hardware failures. |
| | QON 22 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |
| | QON 23 | The response provides information on cybersecurity risk management, including in relation to the CyberCX Assessment. |
| | QON 24 | The response provides information on cybersecurity risk management, including action in relation to the ACT Government Encryption Standard. |
| 1 May 2025 | QTON 10 | The response clarifies the <u>Delivery Risk Register</u> extract (as at 11.09.2024) was not the same as the undated <u>Procurement Risk Management Plan</u> , which appears to be the premise of that question. |
| | QTON 11 | The response clarifies the program operates multiple risk registers and that are dynamic in nature due to regular review and assessment. Subsequently, a requested Program Control Group (PCG) level risk register for the specific time (mid-October) was unable to be provided, instead, extracts from the relevant time’s PCG minutes were provided showing risks were discussed and assessed. |
| | QTON 18 | Independent Assurance Review of the MyWay+ Program, performed by Projects Assured, provided with the response. |
| | QTON 20 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |
| | QTON 21 | The response provided further information on individual risks referenced in the summary of changes to assessed risks, between launch day, 27 November 2024, and 12 March 2025, in the response to QON 20 from the 27 March 2025 hearings. |
| | QTON 22 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |

| Hearing Date | QTON/QON Number | Summary |
|--------------|-------------------------|--|
| | QTON 23 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility, response provided Scope of Work Statement from Get Skilled Access (GSA) for their engagement with NEC Australia. |
| | QON 33 | TCCS Data Breach Policy provided with the response. |
| | QON 37 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility, response also highlighted information provided in the ACT Government submission to the inquiry regarding communication activities targeted at the seniors' cohort and with COTA ACT. |
| | QON 40 | Question related to risks regarding system accessibility. |
| | QON 41 | <p>The response sought to provide further clarity regarding the response to QON 20 from the 27 March 2025 hearing, and subsequently the response to QTON 21 from the 1 May 2025 hearing, whereby concerns were raised.</p> <p>In responding to parts 1-3 of the question, I confirmed:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. That there was no misalignment between my statement and Mr White's. 2. I had no further information to provide to ensure that this or other evidence given by myself or officers was misleading, and 3. Similarly, I had no further information to provide about how I and my officials have answered questions about risk management, given that there was considerable information provided to the committee, to date (references included in that response) that demonstrated that the procurement and delivery of MyWay+ utilised the best available risk management practices, as well as strong program management and governance, procurement and community engagement. 4. Regarding the response to part 4 of the question, I acknowledge the aspects of the questions about other risk domains (being privacy, transition risks, security and other risks we would like to provide information about) were not answered thoroughly. This question was also being asked relating to the status of each of these, at differing times: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. As of 27 November 2024 (go live day); b. As of 12 March 2025; and c. As at today (1 May 2025). |
| 3 July 2025 | QON 48 | The response provided further information on the assessment of "Risk 1139", identified in the MyWay+ Risk Register (extract as at 11.09.2024), in consideration of the CyberCX Assessment. |

| Hearing Date | QTON/QON Number | Summary |
|--------------|-----------------|--|
| | QTON 35 | The response provides further information on TCCS' response to recommendations identified in the Independent Assessment by Projects Assured on 23 November 2024, prior to Go Live. |

The following information is provided to assist in clarifying the matters identified in the bolded parts of the above table, regarding Part (1) of QON 20 from the 27 March 2025 hearing and Part (4) of QON 41 from the 1 May 2025 hearing.

Supplemental to the response to QON 20 (27 March 2025 hearing)

Transport Canberra has reviewed previous answers to provide the Committee with confirmation that risks identified as “unlikely” in the MyWay+ Risk Register (extract as at 11.09.2025) occurred on go-live date.

The answer provided in the original response responded “0” as, upon occurrence, these risks change their likelihood rating due to empirical information, making them no longer unlikely. Additionally, some of these risks manifested a day or days after go-live.

In reviewing the previous answer, Transport Canberra acknowledges that this response was pedantic, and was not my, or the officers’ responsible for the production of this response, intent.

To help clarify the previous answer to the Committee, the following updated table is provided in response to questions 1 and 2, and supersedes the table provided in the original response signed 9 April 2025.

| | (a) as at Launch day 27 November 2024 | (b) as at 12 March 2025 |
|--|--|----------------------------|
| 1. Risks identified as ‘unlikely’ | 9 | 6 |
| 1. Risks identified as ‘unlikely’ which occurred | 9 | 0 |
| 1. Risks identified as ‘unlikely’ treated/mitigated as recommended in the risk register | 9 | 6 |
| 2. Risks identified as having a consequence that was ‘major’ | 2 | 0 |
| 2. Risks identified as having a consequence that was ‘major’ which occurred | 2 | n/a |
| 2. Risks identified as having a consequence that was ‘major’ that were treated/mitigated as recommended in the risk register | 2 | n/a |

The following information is also provided in response to the above as an addendum to parts (1) and (2) of the original response signed 20 May 2025.

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The risks identified as having a current/inherent likelihood as “unlikely” in the MyWay+ Risk Register (extract as at 11.09.2025), and occurred on or on the day/s after go-live were:

| RISK ID | Summary description of risk |
|---------|---|
| 1129 | Schedule risk: Planned milestones not being met due to unforeseen delays, such as resourcing, time for approvals or supply chain interruption. As the MyWay+ Program is in its final phase (Contract Fulfilment phase), scheduled activities and milestones are now solely based on NEC's plan for contract fulfilment. Program tasks and activities, mainly focussed on coordination) are combined into an integrated schedule which will operate as the primary (risk) control for this work. |
| 1131 | Requirements risk: The MyWay+ product (service) does not meet the functional and non-functional requirements for Transport Canberra due to these not being clearly articulated, captured or provided to NEC or due to an emergence of hidden or unforeseen design limitations. |
| 1134 | Integration risk: Unanticipated integrated system/asset compatibility issues experienced during installation/testing. |
| 1135 | Adoption risk: Failure to effectively achieve program benefits, including low rates of adoption or uptake of new technology resulting in negligible increase in patronage or suboptimal improvement to customer experience (consumer/patronage risk) Underpinned by Opportunity: ACT Digital Account provides increased opportunity to capture, store and report data to inform consumer behaviours to enable targeted (strategic) transport planning decisions, improve performance outcomes and assist in development of strategic and wellbeing indicators. |
| 1136 | Adoption risk: Poor uptake or confusion over roles and responsibilities for MyWay+ due to inadequate communications and change management through program delivery or unclear communications and operational handover. (internal TCO risk) |
| 1137 | Support risk: The managed services contract that supports MyWay+ is not sufficiently flexible to meet changing needs or shifts in technology and community sentiment. |
| 1139 | Cybersecurity risk: Personal information is accessed due to it not being appropriately secured, stored or managed in MyWay+ |
| 1140 | Implementation risk: If during installation hardware or systems damage occurs to current operations, due to carelessness or unforeseen consequences. |
| 1142 | Implementation Risk: If unable to complete works within time schedule due to unforeseen conditions or delays, including approvals from NCA |

| RISK ID | Summary description of risk |
|---------|---|
| 1154 | Integration risk: Should the Systems Integration Platform (SIP) not perform to the expected quality and availability expected of it, integrating data feeds could be corrupted or unstable leading to sub-optimal MyWay+ performance. This risk is magnified as the supplier of the SIP is the ACT Government's DDTS and outside of usual warranty and back-to-back vendor warranty, it is not under any formal performance agreement between directorates. |

Information on the ongoing management and implementation of treatment plans for all these risks has been provided in the responses listed in the table earlier in this QON.

Supplemental to the response to QON 41 (1 May 2025 hearing), second part of part 4 of the question

The second part, not previously answered reads: *“Do you have any further information you would like to provide about how you managed risks and how you documented risk management related to ... privacy risks and poorly executed transition risks and security risks and security and privacy assessment risks and any other risks you would like to provide information about?”*

- a) as of launch day; and*
- b) as of 12 March; and*
- c) as of today?”*

The following information is provided in response to the above as an addendum to part (4) of the original response signed 20 May 2025.

Regarding Privacy risks, refer to the response in QON 04 from the 27 March 2025 hearing (risk references 1139 and 1272):

- a. As of 27 November 2024, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as unlikely and consequence as moderate.
- b. As of 12 March 2025, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.
- c. As of 1 May 2025, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.

Regarding Transition risks, please refer to the response in QON 04 from the 27 March 2025 hearing (risk references 1129, 1135 and 1136) as well as the risk assessment conducted as part of the review of the multi-phase delivery (Transition In) plan (see section (e) of the ACT Government Submission to the Inquiry):

- a. As of 27 November 2024, these risks were mostly rated as Medium or below, with likelihood as unlikely and consequence as minor.

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- b. As of 12 March 2025, these risks were mostly rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.
- c. As of 1 May 2025, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.

Regarding Cybersecurity risks, refer to the response in QON 04 from the 27 March 2025 hearing (risk references 1139):

- a. As of 27 November 2024, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as unlikely and consequence as moderate.
- b. As of 12 March 2025, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.
- As of 1 May 2025, these risks were rated as Medium, with likelihood as likely and consequence as moderate.

Approved for circulation to the Standing Committee on Environment, Planning, Transport and City Services.

Signature:



By Chris Steel MLA, Minister for Transport

Date:

17 / 7 / 25