

# ACT Electoral Commission

## Report on the ACT Legislative Assembly Election 2024



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### Acknowledgement of Country

The ACT Electoral Commission acknowledges the Ngunnawal people as the traditional custodians of the ACT and recognises any other people or families with connection to the lands of the ACT and region. We acknowledge and respect their continuing culture and the contribution they make to the life of this city and this region.

Mr Mark Parton MLA  
Speaker  
ACT Legislative Assembly  
London Circuit  
Canberra ACT 2601

Dear Mr Speaker

This report on the conduct of the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election is presented to you under section 10A of the *Electoral Act 1992* (Electoral Act).

Section 10A(2) of the Electoral Act requires you to present a copy of this report to the Legislative Assembly on the next sitting day after receiving the report.


Under section 10A(3) of the Electoral Act the responsible Minister must present a written response to this report to the Legislative Assembly within three months after the day the report was presented to the Legislative Assembly.

As you are aware, the ACT Legislative Assembly agreed on 4 December 2024 that the Standing Committee on the Integrity Commission and Statutory Office Holders would inquire into the operation of the 2024 ACT election and the Electoral Act. This report also serves as the Electoral Commission's submission to that inquiry.

Yours Sincerely



**David Kalisch**  
Chairperson



**Damian Cantwell AM CSC**  
Electoral Commissioner



**Ed Killesteyn PSM**  
Member

30 June 2025

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# Glossary

| Term                       | Description                                                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ABS                        | Australian Bureau of Statistics                                                                                                                                                   |
| ACSC                       | Australian Cyber Security Centre                                                                                                                                                  |
| ACAT                       | ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal                                                                                                                                             |
| ACT                        | Australian Capital Territory                                                                                                                                                      |
| AEC                        | Australian Electoral Commission                                                                                                                                                   |
| BVI                        | Blind and Visually Impaired                                                                                                                                                       |
| Commission                 | ACT Electoral Commission                                                                                                                                                          |
| Commissioner               | ACT Electoral Commissioner                                                                                                                                                        |
| Commonwealth Electoral Act | <i>Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918</i> (Commonwealth)                                                                                                                             |
| DDTS                       | Digital Data and Technology Solutions – The ACT Government information technology management agency                                                                               |
| EAAC                       | Elections ACT's Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee                                                                                                                        |
| ECANZ                      | The Electoral Council of Australia and New Zealand                                                                                                                                |
| ECSA                       | Electoral Commission of South Australia                                                                                                                                           |
| EEP                        | Eligible Elector Population (an estimate of the number of persons who are eligible to be enrolled at a particular point in time). Also known as the enrolment participation rate. |
| EIAP                       | Elections ACT's Electoral Integrity Advisory Panel                                                                                                                                |
| Elections ACT              | The office of the Electoral Commissioner and the staff appointed to assist the Commissioner                                                                                       |
| Electoral Act              | <i>Electoral Act 1992</i>                                                                                                                                                         |
| eVACS®                     | Electronic Voting and Counting System                                                                                                                                             |
| FDEU                       | Federal Direct Enrolment and Update program                                                                                                                                       |
| Hare-Clark                 | The proportional representation electoral system used in the ACT                                                                                                                  |
| Joint roll                 | The common ACT and Commonwealth electoral roll maintained under a formal government-to-government arrangement                                                                     |
| LAPPERDS                   | Legislative Assembly Polling Place and Election Results Display System                                                                                                            |
| MLA                        | Member of the ACT Legislative Assembly                                                                                                                                            |
| non-voter                  | A person listed on the electoral roll for an election who apparently did not vote at that election                                                                                |
| PAMs                       | Polling Area Managers                                                                                                                                                             |
| OIC                        | Officer in charge of a polling place or early voting centre                                                                                                                       |
| Party                      | A political party registered under the Electoral Act                                                                                                                              |
| Redistribution             | A redistribution of electoral boundaries                                                                                                                                          |
| 2IC                        | Second in charge of a polling place or early voting centre                                                                                                                        |
| UNG                        | Ungrouped candidates / non-party candidates                                                                                                                                       |



# Introduction

## Overview

**This report by the ACT Electoral Commission (the Commission) reviews the conduct of the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election, held between 30 September to 19 October 2024. It aims to highlight areas for improvement and recommends changes to the *Electoral Act 1992* in preparation for future elections.**

The election was successfully conducted in accordance with the *Electoral Act 1992* (the Act) and the Commission's first strategic priority of delivering trusted, transparent, secure and accessible electoral services.

At each election the Commission aims to enhance its services to voters, candidates, political parties and other stakeholders. For the 2024 election, the Commission built on the successes of previous elections, particularly the COVID-impacted 2020 election. Key advancements included upgrades to the electronic voting and counting system (eVACS®) and the polling place management system (LAPPERDS), an extensive training program for polling officials, and implementation of new legislation against misleading electoral advertising. The Commission also implemented legislation related to bans on donations from property developers and foreign donors, and the mandated seven-day reporting of gifts by political entities.

The Commissioner published a Service Delivery Plan in June 2024 as a key means of providing all election participants and stakeholders with early advice on how the election was to be delivered by Elections ACT on behalf of the Commission, and the guiding principles underpinning preparations.

The election was conducted under increasing risks to electoral integrity and rising community expectations of electoral services. To mitigate these risks the Commission conducted extensive integrity assurance measures and proactive community and stakeholder engagement. The innovative Low Sensory Voting Centre for neurodivergent electors exemplified our commitment to accessibility and inclusiveness.

Despite being conducted over a two-week voting period, reduced from the previous three weeks that had applied at all previous ACT elections, this election saw high early voting numbers. Nearly 59% of electors voted early in

2024, a decrease from the extraordinary 70% during the COVID-impacted 2020 election, but with 10 fewer voting days, five fewer early voting centres, and fewer polling hours than in 2020, demonstrating the efficiency and effectiveness of the Commission's planning and execution.

The election also saw a notably low level of informal voting, reflecting the success of voter education initiatives and the clarity of the voting process. The early finalisation of results was another highlight, providing timely and accurate outcomes that reinforced public confidence in the electoral system. However, the challenge of delivering overseas voting remained significant, requiring significant effort and resources to ensure that all eligible voters, regardless of location, could participate in the democratic process.

## Scope and structure

The scope of this report reflects the established principles of election service delivery as noted in the Commission's Corporate Plan 2023-2027:


- successfully deliver electoral events in accordance with the Act and other relevant legislation
- ensure high levels of functionality, security, integrity and reliability of electoral ICT systems and processes
- maximise opportunities for electoral participation by all eligible electors
- undertake formal evaluations of the conduct of elections to identify key areas for improvement in delivery of services.

The report is structured in four parts aligned with the guiding principles listed above and broadly reflects a logical sequence of election planning, delivery and post-election considerations. It should be read in conjunction with the following reports:


- *Election Statistics: ACT Legislative Assembly election 2024*
- the Commission's annual reports for 2023-2024 and 2024-2025.

# Election highlights

## Votes cast




## Voter turnout\*




## Candidates nominated




## Early votes




## Electronic votes




## Elected members



## Enrolled electors




## Informal votes




## Postal votes issued




## Voter satisfaction with electoral services



## Public funding



## Cost per vote





## Other notable features of the 2024 election

### Notable features of the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election included:

- Successful delivery of early voting facilities during a two-week early voting period (reduced from three-weeks at all previous ACT elections).
- Deployed a door-to-door international courier service for overseas based postal voters, facilitating the inclusion of overseas votes otherwise unlikely to have been returned in time to be admitted to the count under standard postal services.
- Successfully implemented misleading electoral advertising legislation, introduced by the Assembly following the 2020 ACT election.
- Successfully implemented 7-day 'real time' gift reporting legislation.
- Successfully deployed unassisted and secret telephone voting facilities for blind and sight-impaired electors as well as in-person blind and vision impaired voting terminals in each early voting centre.
- Successfully introduced a Low Sensory Voting Centre for neurodivergent electors.
- Conducted an extensive public information campaign, combining traditional media and online advertising with public relations activities and social media platforms.
- Finalised the election result seven days after polling day as a result of combining the scanning of paper ballots with electronic voting and the eVACS® counting system.

# Recommendations

The Commission makes the following recommendations in this Report to the ACT Legislative Assembly on the 2024 election (in order of appearance within the report).

The Commission recommends:

## Recommendation 1

The Commission **recommends** a review of the Regulation for the purpose of reassessing the appropriateness of the prescribed authorities currently listed as requiring access to the electoral roll (see Access to the electoral roll on page 30).

## Recommendation 2

The Commission **recommends** amending the Regulation to include a minimum set of security standards and requirements for any agency receiving access to the ACT electoral roll. The ACSC Essential Eight model may be appropriate to establish a baseline set of security standards (see Access to the electoral roll on page 30).

## Recommendation 3

The Commission **recommends** that section 37 of the Electoral Act be amended to provide for the commencement of the next redistribution process 25 months prior to when the next ordinary election is due to be held (See Redistribution of electoral boundaries on page 31)

## Recommendation 4

The Commission **recommends** amending section 95(3) of the Electoral Act to allow applications for changing the address of a registered party's secretary, exempting the applications from the requirements for notification and objection in sections 91 and 91A (See Changes to party secretary address on page 35).

## Recommendation 5

To support privacy measures, the Commission **recommends** reviewing the definition of *address* under Part 7 of the Electoral Act with the aim of limiting the potential to publish the personal residential address of a party's registered officer or secretary (See Privacy for home address details on page 35).

## Recommendation 6

To prevent ongoing issues and reduce the potential for fraudulent activity, the Commission **recommends** that all aspiring registered political parties be required to maintain records of signed party membership forms. This would serve as the minimum basis for establishing membership status. The Commission suggests legislating this provision by introducing a definition of "member" in Part 7 of the Electoral Act. This definition would specify that a member is an individual who has physically or digitally signed a party membership form and whose membership remains active. The Commissioner should then be empowered to require the party to provide the completed membership forms under section 97A (See Party membership on page 36).

## Recommendation 7

The Commission **recommends** fixing what appears to be a drafting error by amending Schedule 5 of the Electoral Act to include, under column 2 "93(1) or (2)", under column 3 "refuse an application for the registration of a political party" and under column 4 "applicant for registration" (See Internally reviewable decisions on page 36).

## Recommendation 8

Emerging AI technology if misapplied can bring significant risks to the conduct of elections and democracy more generally. To address the regulatory gaps and respond effectively to the use of AI in electoral processes, the Commission **recommends** that the Assembly undertake a review of potential regulatory responses to AI-generated political deepfake content for legislative implementation before the 2028 ACT election (See The threat of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on democracy on page 41).

## Recommendation 9

The Commission **recommends** amending the Electoral Act to remove section 226, which requires broadcasters and publishers to lodge returns following an election (See Election returns on page 44).

### **Recommendation 10**

The Commission **recommends** that the Assembly committee investigate means to limit the potential for public funding received by a political party or candidate to exceed the amount of electoral expenditure incurred. This could be achieved either by introducing a reimbursement scheme similar to those in place in other jurisdictions or by reviewing the definition of electoral expenditure (See Comparison of public funding received against election campaign expenditure on page 46).

### **Recommendation 11**

In light of recent amendments to the federal financial disclosure scheme, and to further strengthen both the real and perceived integrity and transparency of the Territory's electoral system—particularly regarding the potential undue influence of private money in ACT elections—the Commission **recommends** that the Assembly review the former legislation imposing a cap on political donations, with a view to introducing a similar provision or one aligned with the new federal donation cap framework. (See Limiting private funding on page 47).

### **Recommendation 12**

The Commission **recommends** amending Part 14 of the Electoral Act to introduce the concept of a 'prospective registered political party' and set the relevant period to the commencement of the capped expenditure period. By introducing this concept within Part 14 of the Act, the financial transactions that occur from 1 January in an election year for a political entity that ultimately forms a registered political party would be considered incurred or received by the political party once registered. (See Prospective registered party on page 48).

### **Recommendation 13**

The Commission **recommends** provisioning of funds through government budget processes for the appointment of a Procurement Manager in Elections ACT to ensure that procurement processes are handled with the necessary expertise and focus, thereby streamlining operations and allowing other staff members to concentrate on their core responsibilities (See Procurement on page 50).

### **Recommendation 14**

The Commission **recommends** amending section 297A of the Electoral Act to introduce an applicable definition of *Electoral advertisement*. The Commission recommends that the chosen definition appropriately defines the scope of the meaning of advertisement to explicitly identify the types of broadcasts and publications that are to be captured (See Misleading electoral advertising complaints on page 55).

### **Recommendation 15**

The Commission **recommends** the Government provide funding to support the ongoing administration of misleading electoral advertising legislation for future elections, consistent with the funding provided for the 2024 Legislative Assembly Elections. (See Misleading electoral advertising complaints on page 55).

### **Recommendation 16**

To help address declining participation rates in the ACT, the Commission **recommends** that the penalty notice fine for failing to vote at ACT Legislative Assembly elections be increased. The Commission suggests the penalty for failing to vote be linked to a fraction of a penalty unit. The Commission further **recommends** that the penalty should be set at quarter of a penalty unit, rounded down to the nearest \$5 (See Compulsory voting on page 56).

### **Recommendation 17**

The Commission **recommends** legislation for the imposition of a non-voter infringement notice, linked to a penalty unit or a fraction of a penalty unit, to provide for a graduated increase in the penalty for failing to vote. The Commission further recommends amending the Electoral Act to remove direct prosecution through the courts if a non-voter does not sufficiently discharge their liability for the offence (See Enforcement of compulsory voting through the Magistrates Court on page 61).

### **Recommendation 18**

The Commission **recommends** that it be provided with ongoing assurance of the necessary capital funds to support the routine ICT modernisation projects that need to commence following the conclusion of each ACT election (See ICT system upgrades on page 65).

### **Recommendation 19**

The Commission **recommends** amending section 256 of the Electoral Act to safeguard the validity of election results where immaterial errors occur, whether procedural, technical or human. This would ensure that only errors capable of affecting the outcome of an election may be grounds for disputing its validity (See System integrity and reliability on page 69).

### **Recommendation 20**

To address the declining levels of civics understanding among Australian students and ensure that young people are well-prepared to participate in democratic processes, the Commission **recommends** that the Legislative Assembly undertake a review of ways in which civics and citizenship education can reach all Year 11 and 12 students (See Civics and citizenship education on page 76).

### **Recommendation 21**

To address the outdated nature of polling procedures for Antarctic electors as prescribed under Part 11 of the Electoral Act, the Commission **recommends** that Part 11 (Polling in Antarctica) be removed, and any necessary definitions or clauses be moved within Part 10 (See Antarctic electors on page 84).

### **Recommendation 22**

The Commission **recommends** that the Electoral Act be amended to grant the Electoral Commissioner the discretion to approve a telephone voting process for electors outside of Australia during the voting period. The Commission further recommends that the Commissioner be granted the discretion to use such a system for domestic-based electors outside of the ACT during the voting period. (See Overseas postal voting on page 86).

### **Recommendation 23**

The Commission **recommends** amending Schedule 3 of the Electoral Act to remove the requirement to examine the declaration voter's enrolment history for possible 'official error'. This will put the onus on the declaration voter to take the opportunity provided within each polling location to enrol before the legislated cut-off of 6 pm on election day for new electors (See Declaration voting on page 88).

### **Recommendation 24**

Notwithstanding concerns about ballot paper instructions, the Commission **recommends** maintaining the current ballot paper instructions detailed in Schedule 1 of the Electoral Act to support consistent voter behaviour, reduce unintended disenfranchisement and minimise ballot exhaustion. (See Formal vote survey on page 91).

### **Recommendation 25**

The Commission **recommends** amending Division 2.4 of the Electoral Act to mandate the holding of an NV1 security clearance or higher (See Security clearances for members of the Commission on page 104).

### **Recommendation 26**

The Electoral Commission **recommends** that the definition of the quota in clause 12 of Schedule 4 be changed to:

$TVA/2 + 0.000001$ , where TVA means the sum of the total votes allotted to the continuing candidates at the count, calculated to 6 decimal places (See Casual vacancy quota on page 104).

### **Recommendation 27**

The Electoral Commission **recommends** amending section 32(1)(a) of the Electoral Act as 'employ casual staff; or' to align with terminology within the Commonwealth's *Fair Work Act 2009* (See Temporary staff on page 104).

### **Recommendation 28**

The Electoral Commission **recommends** amending the Electoral Act to introduce a new offence under Part 17, limiting the filming or photographing of election officials if it is likely to cause the official to be intimidated or harassed. Implementing this legislation in the ACT would provide a clear legal framework to prevent unauthorised filming and photography within polling places. This would help to ensure that polling officials can perform their duties without fear of harassment (See Limitations on filming and photos in a polling location on page 105).

# Key facts about the 2024 election

The eleventh general election for the ACT Legislative Assembly was held between 30 September 2024 and 19 October 2024.

25 MLAs were elected to the Legislative Assembly.

A legislative amendment to the *Electoral Act 1992* (Electoral Act) in November 2023 reduced the attendance early voting period from three weeks to two weeks. For the 2024 election, early voting began on Tuesday, 8 October 2024, while postal voting spanned three weeks, starting on 30 September 2024.

This election permanently adopted a significant change first introduced temporarily in 2020, allowing all eligible ACT voters to vote early. Previously, only those unable to attend a polling place on election day could vote early.

Unlike most state and federal elections, ACT elections do not begin with the issuance of writs. Instead, section 100 of the Electoral Act mandates that a general election for the ACT Legislative Assembly must occur on the third Saturday of October in the fourth year following the previous election. The official pre-election period starts 36 days before polling day.

Table 1 outlines the key dates for the 2024 election.

**Table 1** Key election dates (including 2022-2023 redistribution)

| Event                                                                     | 2024                        |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Redistribution start date                                                 | 24 October 2022             |
| Redistribution report tabled                                              | 24 October 2023             |
| <i>Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023</i> effective | 29 November 2023            |
| Last day to lodge applications for party registration                     | 30 June 2024                |
| Close of register of political parties                                    | 12 September 2024           |
| Pre-election period commenced and nominations opened                      | 13 September 2024           |
| Preliminary rolls closed                                                  | 13 September 2024 (6 pm)    |
| Nominations closed                                                        | 24 September 2024 (12 noon) |
| Nominations declared and ballot paper order determined                    | 25 September 2024 (12 noon) |
| Postal voting commenced                                                   | 30 September 2024           |
| Attendance early voting commenced                                         | 8 October 2024              |
| Early voting concluded                                                    | 18 October 2024 (8 pm)      |
| Election day                                                              | 19 October 2024 (8 am–6 pm) |
| Last day for receipt of completed postal votes                            | 25 October 2024             |
| Election result announced                                                 | 26 October 2024             |
| Declaration of the poll                                                   | 30 October 2024 (11 am)     |
| Legislative Assembly formed                                               | 6 November 2024             |

The Register of Political Parties closed on 12 September 2024, with fifteen parties registered to participate in the election. However, only twelve of these parties contested the election. The Canberra Progressives,

Sustainable Australia Party – Stop Overdevelopment / Corruption, and The Community Action Party (ACT) did not nominate candidates. Table 2 lists the registered parties eligible to contest the election.

**Table 2** Registered political parties eligible to contest the 2024 election

| Registered party                                                       | Abbreviation: registered    | used in this report |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>Animal Justice Party</b>                                            | AJP                         | AJP                 |
| <b>Australian Labor Party (ACT Branch)</b>                             | ACT Labor                   | ALP                 |
| <b>Belco Party (ACT)</b>                                               | Belco Party                 | BEL                 |
| <b>Canberra Progressives</b>                                           | CP                          | CP                  |
| <b>Democratic Labour Party (DLP)</b>                                   | Labour DLP                  | DLP                 |
| <b>Family First Party (ACT)</b>                                        | Family First                | FFP                 |
| <b>Fiona Carrick Independent</b>                                       | Fiona Carrick               | FCI                 |
| <b>First Nation Party</b>                                              | First Nation                | FNP                 |
| <b>Independents for Canberra</b>                                       | IFC                         | IFC                 |
| <b>Liberal Party of Australia (A.C.T. Division)</b>                    | Canberra Liberals           | LIB                 |
| <b>Libertarian Party</b>                                               | Libertarians                | LP                  |
| <b>Strong Independents</b>                                             |                             | STR                 |
| <b>Sustainable Australia Party – Stop Overdevelopment / Corruption</b> | Sustainable Australia Party | SUST                |
| <b>The ACT Greens</b>                                                  | The Greens                  | GREEN               |
| <b>The Community Action Party (ACT)</b>                                | Community Action            | CAP                 |


A total of 149 candidates contested the 2024 election. Tables 3 and 4 set out the numbers of candidates nominated for each party for each electorate and the ACT.



**Graph 1** Candidates nominated by party and electorate

| <div>  <div> <b>Candidates<br/>nominated by party<br/>and electorate</b> </div> </div> |             |             |           |              |           |            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| Party                                                                                                                                                                   | Brindabella | Ginninderra | Kurrajong | Murrumbidgee | Yerrabi   | Total      |
| AJP                                                                                                                                                                     | 2           | 2           | 2         | 2            | 1         | 9          |
| ALP                                                                                                                                                                     | 5           | 5           | 5         | 5            | 5         | 25         |
| BEL                                                                                                                                                                     |             | 3           |           |              | 2         | 5          |
| CAP                                                                                                                                                                     |             |             |           |              |           | 0          |
| CP                                                                                                                                                                      |             |             |           |              |           | 0          |
| DLP                                                                                                                                                                     |             | 5           | 2         |              | 2         | 9          |
| FFP                                                                                                                                                                     | 2           | 3           | 2         | 2            | 2         | 11         |
| FCI                                                                                                                                                                     |             |             |           | 3            |           | 3          |
| FNP                                                                                                                                                                     | 3           |             | 5         |              | 5         | 13         |
| GREEN                                                                                                                                                                   | 3           | 4           | 5         | 4            | 3         | 19         |
| IFC                                                                                                                                                                     | 3           | 3           | 5         | 5            | 4         | 20         |
| LIB                                                                                                                                                                     | 5           | 4           | 5         | 5            | 5         | 24         |
| LP                                                                                                                                                                      |             | 2           |           |              |           | 2          |
| STR                                                                                                                                                                     |             |             | 2         |              |           | 2          |
| SUST                                                                                                                                                                    |             |             |           |              |           | 0          |
| Other                                                                                                                                                                   | 1           | 2           | 1         | 1            | 2         | 7          |
| <b>Total</b>                                                                                                                                                            | <b>24</b>   | <b>33</b>   | <b>34</b> | <b>27</b>    | <b>31</b> | <b>149</b> |

**Graph 2** Candidates elected by party and electorate



Tables 3–9 summarise the count of first preference votes for each electorate and the ACT.

**Table 3** Summary of first preference votes by electorate, ACT total

| Party/<br>Group | Brindabella   |        | Ginninderra   |        | Kurrajong     |        | Murrumbidgee  |        | Yerrabi       |        | Total          |        |
|-----------------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|---------------|--------|----------------|--------|
| AJP             | 958           | 1.64%  | 957           | 1.71%  | 644           | 1.32%  | 742           | 1.33%  | 402           | 0.73%  | 3,301          | 1.20%  |
| ALP             | 19,696        | 33.82% | 20,826        | 37.15% | 17,678        | 36.14% | 18,529        | 33.18% | 16,842        | 30.65% | 93,571         | 34.15% |
| BEL             | 0             | 0.00%  | 2,620         | 4.67%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 888           | 1.62%  | 3,508          | 1.28%  |
| DLP             | 0             | 0.00%  | 809           | 1.44%  | 160           | 0.33%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 1,314         | 2.39%  | 2,283          | 0.83%  |
| FCI             | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 7,303         | 13.08% | 0             | 0.00%  | 7,303          | 2.67%  |
| FFP             | 1,433         | 2.46%  | 2,594         | 4.63%  | 608           | 1.24%  | 892           | 1.60%  | 1,116         | 2.03%  | 6,643          | 2.42%  |
| FNP             | 746           | 1.28%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 1,323         | 2.70%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 1,517         | 2.76%  | 3,586          | 1.31%  |
| GREEN           | 5,259         | 9.03%  | 7,880         | 14.06% | 8,633         | 17.65% | 5,203         | 9.32%  | 6,393         | 11.63% | 33,368         | 12.18% |
| IFC             | 4,419         | 7.59%  | 4,229         | 7.54%  | 6,621         | 13.53% | 2,740         | 4.91%  | 5,320         | 9.68%  | 23,329         | 8.51%  |
| LIB             | 25,135        | 43.15% | 14,771        | 26.35% | 11,886        | 24.30% | 19,578        | 35.06% | 20,289        | 36.92% | 91,659         | 33.45% |
| LP              | 0             | 0.00%  | 399           | 0.71%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 399            | 0.15%  |
| STR             | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 1,131         | 2.31%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 0             | 0.00%  | 1,131          | 0.41%  |
| UNG             | 600           | 1.03%  | 967           | 1.73%  | 238           | 0.49%  | 862           | 1.54%  | 873           | 1.59%  | 3,942          | 1.44%  |
| Formal          | 58,246        | 97.63% | 56,052        | 97.98% | 48,922        | 98.49% | 55,849        | 98.36% | 54,954        | 98.05% | 274,023        | 98.09% |
| Informal        | 1,416         | 2.37%  | 1,156         | 2.02%  | 750           | 1.51%  | 930           | 1.64%  | 1,095         | 1.95%  | 5,347          | 1.91%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>59,662</b> |        | <b>57,208</b> |        | <b>49,672</b> |        | <b>56,779</b> |        | <b>56,049</b> |        | <b>279,370</b> |        |

**Table 4** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, ACT total

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes  |              | Early votes    |               | Declaration votes |              | Total          |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------|--------|
| AJP             | 1,534          | 1.39%         | 395           | 1.97%        | 1,742          | 1.23%         | 32                | 1.23%        | 3,703          | 1.35%  |
| ALP             | 38,507         | 34.98%        | 6,549         | 32.59%       | 47,687         | 33.76%        | 828               | 31.93%       | 93,571         | 34.15% |
| BEL             | 1,266          | 1.15%         | 290           | 1.44%        | 1,928          | 1.36%         | 24                | 0.93%        | 3,508          | 1.28%  |
| DLP             | 839            | 0.76%         | 121           | 0.60%        | 1,286          | 0.91%         | 37                | 1.43%        | 2,283          | 0.83%  |
| FCI             | 3,149          | 2.86%         | 516           | 2.57%        | 3,603          | 2.55%         | 35                | 1.35%        | 7,303          | 2.67%  |
| FFP             | 2,845          | 2.58%         | 428           | 2.13%        | 3,291          | 2.33%         | 79                | 3.05%        | 6,643          | 2.42%  |
| FNP             | 1,708          | 1.55%         | 218           | 1.08%        | 1,614          | 1.14%         | 46                | 1.77%        | 3,586          | 1.31%  |
| GREEN           | 15,585         | 14.16%        | 2,138         | 10.64%       | 15,167         | 10.74%        | 478               | 18.43%       | 33,368         | 12.18% |
| IFC             | 9,796          | 8.90%         | 1,727         | 8.59%        | 11,614         | 8.22%         | 192               | 7.40%        | 23,329         | 8.51%  |
| LIB             | 32,627         | 29.64%        | 7,286         | 36.26%       | 50,967         | 36.08%        | 779               | 30.04%       | 91,659         | 33.45% |
| LP              | 179            | 0.16%         | 15            | 0.07%        | 199            | 0.14%         | 6                 | 0.23%        | 399            | 0.15%  |
| STR             | 497            | 0.45%         | 110           | 0.55%        | 512            | 0.36%         | 12                | 0.46%        | 1,131          | 0.41%  |
| UNG             | 1,541          | 1.40%         | 303           | 1.51%        | 1,651          | 1.17%         | 45                | 1.74%        | 3,540          | 1.29%  |
| Formal          | 110,073        | 97.09%        | 20,096        | 98.14%       | 141,261        | 98.90%        | 2,593             | 96.32%       | 274,023        | 98.09% |
| Informal        | 3,295          | 2.91%         | 381           | 1.86%        | 1,572          | 1.10%         | 99                | 3.68%        | 5,347          | 1.91%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>113,368</b> | <b>40.58%</b> | <b>20,477</b> | <b>7.33%</b> | <b>142,833</b> | <b>51.13%</b> | <b>2,692</b>      | <b>0.96%</b> | <b>279,370</b> |        |

**Table 5** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, Brindabella

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes |              | Early votes   |               | Declaration votes |              | Total         |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP             | 392            | 1.67%         | 91           | 2.45%        | 468           | 1.53%         | 7                 | 1.63%        | 958           | 1.64%  |
| ALP             | 8,129          | 34.67%        | 1,178        | 31.77%       | 10,252        | 33.44%        | 137               | 31.86%       | 19,696        | 33.82% |
| FFP             | 657            | 2.80%         | 97           | 2.62%        | 662           | 2.16%         | 17                | 3.95%        | 1,433         | 2.46%  |
| FNP             | 364            | 1.55%         | 48           | 1.29%        | 324           | 1.06%         | 10                | 2.33%        | 746           | 1.28%  |
| GREEN           | 2,611          | 11.13%        | 296          | 7.98%        | 2,291         | 7.47%         | 61                | 14.19%       | 5,259         | 9.03%  |
| IFC             | 1,940          | 8.27%         | 287          | 7.74%        | 2,169         | 7.07%         | 23                | 5.35%        | 4,419         | 7.59%  |
| LIB             | 9,074          | 38.70%        | 1,670        | 45.04%       | 14,223        | 46.39%        | 168               | 39.07%       | 25,135        | 43.15% |
| UNG             | 282            | 1.20%         | 41           | 1.11%        | 270           | 0.88%         | 7                 | 1.63%        | 600           | 1.03%  |
| Formal          | 23,449         | 96.19%        | 3,708        | 98.04%       | 30,659        | 98.74%        | 430               | 94.92%       | 58,246        | 97.63% |
| Informal        | 929            | 3.81%         | 74           | 1.96%        | 390           | 1.26%         | 23                | 5.08%        | 1,416         | 2.37%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>24,378</b>  | <b>40.86%</b> | <b>3,782</b> | <b>6.34%</b> | <b>31,049</b> | <b>52.04%</b> | <b>453</b>        | <b>0.76%</b> | <b>59,662</b> |        |

**Table 6** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, Ginninderra

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes |              | Early votes   |               | Declaration votes |              | Total         |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP             | 401            | 1.77%         | 99           | 2.40%        | 447           | 1.55%         | 10                | 2.05%        | 957           | 1.71%  |
| ALP             | 8,697          | 38.34%        | 1,507        | 36.56%       | 10,454        | 36.35%        | 168               | 34.50%       | 20,826        | 37.15% |
| BEL             | 967            | 4.26%         | 227          | 5.51%        | 1,413         | 4.91%         | 13                | 2.67%        | 2,620         | 4.67%  |
| DLP             | 335            | 1.48%         | 26           | 0.63%        | 438           | 1.52%         | 10                | 2.05%        | 809           | 1.44%  |
| FFP             | 1,072          | 4.73%         | 133          | 3.23%        | 1,361         | 4.73%         | 28                | 5.75%        | 2,594         | 4.63%  |
| GREEN           | 3,693          | 16.28%        | 454          | 11.01%       | 3,636         | 12.64%        | 97                | 19.92%       | 7,880         | 14.06% |
| IFC             | 1,673          | 7.38%         | 326          | 7.91%        | 2,196         | 7.64%         | 34                | 6.98%        | 4,229         | 7.54%  |
| LIB             | 5,222          | 23.02%        | 1,241        | 30.11%       | 8,193         | 28.49%        | 115               | 23.61%       | 14,771        | 26.35% |
| LP              | 179            | 0.79%         | 15           | 0.36%        | 199           | 0.69%         | 6                 | 1.23%        | 399           | 0.71%  |
| UNG             | 442            | 1.95%         | 94           | 2.28%        | 425           | 1.48%         | 6                 | 1.23%        | 967           | 1.73%  |
| Formal          | 22,681         | 96.79%        | 4,122        | 97.70%       | 28,762        | 98.99%        | 487               | 96.82%       | 56,052        | 97.98% |
| Informal        | 751            | 3.21%         | 97           | 2.30%        | 292           | 1.01%         | 16                | 3.18%        | 1,156         | 2.02%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>23,432</b>  | <b>40.96%</b> | <b>4,219</b> | <b>7.37%</b> | <b>29,054</b> | <b>50.79%</b> | <b>503</b>        | <b>0.88%</b> | <b>57,208</b> |        |

**Table 7** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, Kurrajong

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes |              | Early votes   |               | Declaration votes |              | Total         |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP             | 276            | 1.31%         | 81           | 1.89%        | 279           | 1.22%         | 8                 | 1.16%        | 644           | 1.32%  |
| ALP             | 7,587          | 36.09%        | 1,439        | 33.63%       | 8,421         | 36.72%        | 231               | 33.48%       | 17,678        | 36.14% |
| DLP             | 68             | 0.32%         | 41           | 0.96%        | 48            | 0.21%         | 3                 | 0.43%        | 160           | 0.33%  |
| FFP             | 249            | 1.18%         | 52           | 1.22%        | 297           | 1.30%         | 10                | 1.45%        | 608           | 1.24%  |
| FNP             | 679            | 3.23%         | 91           | 2.13%        | 536           | 2.34%         | 17                | 2.46%        | 1,323         | 2.70%  |
| GREEN           | 4,184          | 19.90%        | 656          | 15.33%       | 3,615         | 15.76%        | 178               | 25.80%       | 8,633         | 17.65% |
| IFC             | 2,893          | 13.76%        | 532          | 12.43%       | 3,123         | 13.62%        | 73                | 10.58%       | 6,621         | 13.53% |
| LIB             | 4,492          | 21.37%        | 1,243        | 29.05%       | 5,997         | 26.15%        | 154               | 22.32%       | 11,886        | 24.30% |
| STR             | 497            | 2.36%         | 110          | 2.57%        | 512           | 2.23%         | 12                | 1.74%        | 1,131         | 2.31%  |
| UNG             | 95             | 0.45%         | 34           | 0.79%        | 105           | 0.46%         | 4                 | 0.58%        | 238           | 0.49%  |
| Formal          | 21,020         | 97.87%        | 4,279        | 98.50%       | 22,933        | 99.11%        | 690               | 97.05%       | 48,922        | 98.49% |
| Informal        | 457            | 2.13%         | 65           | 1.50%        | 207           | 0.89%         | 21                | 2.95%        | 750           | 1.51%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>21,477</b>  | <b>43.24%</b> | <b>4,344</b> | <b>8.75%</b> | <b>23,140</b> | <b>46.59%</b> | <b>711</b>        | <b>1.43%</b> | <b>49,672</b> |        |

**Table 8** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, Murrumbidgee

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes |              | Early votes   |               | Declaration votes |              | Total         |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP             | 316            | 1.36%         | 77           | 1.74%        | 346           | 1.25%         | 3                 | 0.64%        | 742           | 1.33%  |
| ALP             | 7,988          | 34.46%        | 1,366        | 30.78%       | 9,029         | 32.52%        | 146               | 31.06%       | 18,529        | 33.18% |
| FCI             | 3,149          | 13.59%        | 516          | 11.63%       | 3,603         | 12.98%        | 35                | 7.45%        | 7,303         | 13.08% |
| FFP             | 404            | 1.74%         | 66           | 1.49%        | 412           | 1.48%         | 10                | 2.13%        | 892           | 1.60%  |
| GREEN           | 2,473          | 10.67%        | 378          | 8.52%        | 2,285         | 8.23%         | 67                | 14.26%       | 5,203         | 9.32%  |
| IFC             | 1,217          | 5.25%         | 213          | 4.80%        | 1,288         | 4.64%         | 22                | 4.68%        | 2,740         | 4.91%  |
| LIB             | 7,217          | 31.14%        | 1,748        | 39.39%       | 10,438        | 37.60%        | 175               | 37.23%       | 19,578        | 35.06% |
| UNG             | 415            | 1.79%         | 74           | 1.67%        | 361           | 1.30%         | 12                | 2.55%        | 862           | 1.54%  |
| Formal          | 23,179         | 97.72%        | 4,438        | 98.03%       | 27,762        | 99.00%        | 470               | 96.11%       | 55,849        | 98.36% |
| Informal        | 541            | 2.28%         | 89           | 1.97%        | 281           | 1.00%         | 19                | 3.89%        | 930           | 1.64%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>23,720</b>  | <b>41.78%</b> | <b>4,527</b> | <b>7.97%</b> | <b>28,043</b> | <b>49.39%</b> | <b>489</b>        | <b>0.86%</b> | <b>56,779</b> |        |

**Table 9** Summary of first preference votes by party/vote type, Yerrabi

| Party/<br>Group | Ordinary votes |               | Postal votes |              | Early votes   |               | Declaration votes |              | Total         |        |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP             | 149            | 0.75%         | 47           | 1.32%        | 202           | 0.65%         | 4                 | 0.78%        | 402           | 0.73%  |
| ALP             | 6,106          | 30.93%        | 1,059        | 29.84%       | 9,531         | 30.60%        | 146               | 28.29%       | 16,842        | 30.65% |
| BEL             | 299            | 1.51%         | 63           | 1.78%        | 515           | 1.65%         | 11                | 2.13%        | 888           | 1.62%  |
| DLP             | 436            | 2.21%         | 54           | 1.52%        | 800           | 2.57%         | 24                | 4.65%        | 1,314         | 2.39%  |
| FFP             | 463            | 2.35%         | 80           | 2.25%        | 559           | 1.79%         | 14                | 2.71%        | 1,116         | 2.03%  |
| FNP             | 665            | 3.37%         | 79           | 2.23%        | 754           | 2.42%         | 19                | 3.68%        | 1,517         | 2.76%  |
| GREEN           | 2,624          | 13.29%        | 354          | 9.97%        | 3,340         | 10.72%        | 75                | 14.53%       | 6,393         | 11.63% |
| IFC             | 2,073          | 10.50%        | 369          | 10.40%       | 2,838         | 9.11%         | 40                | 7.75%        | 5,320         | 9.68%  |
| LIB             | 6,622          | 33.54%        | 1,384        | 39.00%       | 12,116        | 38.90%        | 167               | 32.36%       | 20,289        | 36.92% |
| UNG             | 307            | 1.55%         | 60           | 1.69%        | 490           | 1.57%         | 16                | 3.10%        | 873           | 1.59%  |
| Formal          | 19,744         | 96.97%        | 3,549        | 98.45%       | 31,145        | 98.73%        | 516               | 96.27%       | 54,954        | 98.05% |
| Informal        | 617            | 3.03%         | 56           | 1.55%        | 402           | 1.27%         | 20                | 3.73%        | 1,095         | 1.95%  |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>20,361</b>  | <b>36.33%</b> | <b>3,605</b> | <b>6.43%</b> | <b>31,547</b> | <b>56.28%</b> | <b>536</b>        | <b>0.96%</b> | <b>56,049</b> |        |

## Legislative changes made since the 2020 election

The Electoral Act was re-published nine times between the 2020 and 2024 ACT elections.

The first two republications involved the expiration of temporary amendments implemented specifically for the 2020 COVID-impacted election through the *COVID-19 Emergency Response Legislation Amendment Act 2020 (No 2)*. These amendments expired six months after the October 2020 election.

The third republication commenced amendments from the Electoral Amendment Act 2020, notified on 4 September 2020 and effective from 1 July 2021. The Act amended the Electoral Act to:

- Introduce a clause outlining the main objects of the Electoral Act
- Adjust the definition of a gift to include the first \$250 of a contribution in a single fundraising event
- Change the timing for regular gift returns from quarterly to seven days after the end of the month in which the total amount received from an entity reaches the threshold, or within seven days if received during the election period (note, this timing was adjusted again before the 2024 election)
- Introduce legislation making it an offence for property developers and their close associates to make donations to political entities, and for these entities to accept such gifts.

The next republication involved the expiry of transitional provisions related to the prohibited donor legislation.

The fifth, sixth, and eighth republications resulted from technical amendments introduced through the *Legislation (Legislative Assembly Committees) Amendment Act 2022*, the *Planning (Consequential Amendments) Act 2023*, and the *Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023 (No 2)*, respectively. These were not significantly consequential to the operation of the Electoral Act.

## Committee inquiry

Following the 2020 ACT Legislative Assembly election, on 2 December 2020, the ACT Legislative Assembly resolved that ‘the Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety inquire into the operation of the 2020 ACT election and the Electoral Act and other relevant legislation and policies concerning election-related matters.’<sup>1</sup> The inquiry report, including recommendations for legislative amendment, was tabled on 5 August 2021.

Following the Standing Committee process and extensive government consultation with the Electoral Commission, the Assembly passed the Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023. This seventh republication of the Electoral Act, effective from 29 November 2023, was the most consequential during the Assembly term.

Key amendments to the Electoral Act introduced in November include:

- **Early voting eligibility:** Any elector can vote early, as eligibility requirements were removed.
- **Early voting period:** The early voting period was reduced from three weeks to two weeks, while postal voting remains at three weeks.
- **Gift disclosures:** A permanent seven-day reporting period for gift disclosures was established throughout the election cycle. Previously, the schedule varied, requiring disclosure within 30 days of the end of the month in which the gift was received, or within seven days if received between 1 July and election day during an election year.
- **Foreign entities:** Foreign entities were added to the list of prohibited donors, alongside property developers and their close associates.
- **Overseas e-voting and telephone voting:** Legislation was permanently established, granting the Electoral Commissioner discretionary powers to deploy online voting for overseas-based electors and telephone voting for blind and vision-impaired electors. Similar legislation was temporarily provisioned before the 2020 ACT election but expired six months after the election.
- **Authorisation rules:** Additional clarity was provided on how authorisation statements should appear, including language, form, and access requirements.

1 Terms of reference, Inquiry into the 2020 ACT Election and Electoral Act, [www.parliament.act.gov.au/\\_\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0006/1695228/JCS-ToR-Election2.pdf](http://www.parliament.act.gov.au/___data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1695228/JCS-ToR-Election2.pdf).

- **Party secretaries:** The Commissioner is now required to maintain the name and address of party secretaries on the register of political parties.
- **Dual reporting agents:** A registered political party, MLA, or candidate may now appoint up to two reporting agents to facilitate financial disclosure.
- **Mobile polling for electors experiencing homelessness:** The Commissioner may declare a place in the ACT as a mobile polling location to facilitate voting for people experiencing homelessness.
- **Party names:** More rigorous party name registration checks were introduced, limiting the ability to register a name that closely resembles another political party's name or acronym.
- **Hour of nomination:** The 'hour of nomination' for candidates was adjusted to 24 days before polling day (instead of 23 days), providing the Electoral Commission with more operational time between the closing of nominations and the commencement of voting.
- **Translated material:** The definition of 'electoral expenditure' was amended to create a new class of exempt expenditure, exempting costs for translated services related to electoral matter up to 12.5% of the expenditure cap.

The *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023* also amended the *Public Unleased Land Act 2013* introducing new legislative restrictions on the use and placement of electoral signs on public land, including:

- **Number of signs:** The number of electoral signs that can be displayed was limited to a number specified in the Movable Signs Code of Practice. The Code of Practice set the number at 250 per candidate and 250 per entity.
- **Placement of signs:** The locations where an electoral sign may be placed were further limited on public land adjacent to designated public roads. The Code of Practice introduced a restriction on or adjacent to roads with a usual speed limit of 90 km/h or more.
- **Parking of vehicles with electoral signs:** A new offence was introduced for parking a vehicle with an electoral sign attached in a designated road, road-related area, or public unleased land.

## Timing of legislation

In its 2020 Election Report, the Commission noted that the *Electoral Legislation Amendment Act 2020* was passed on 2 July 2020, less than three months before voting commenced. This provided little opportunity for the Commission to develop and implement appropriate procedures. The Commissioner reinforced these concerns during committee hearings across the 2024 election cycle.

Pleasingly, the *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023* was notified on 15 November 2023, providing the Commission and Elections ACT with ample time to plan and implement the various legislative changes.

The Commissioner will continue to advocate for passing key electoral amendment legislation at least 12 months prior to the election year and encourage proactive and early consultation by political stakeholders.

## Electoral environment

In recent years, the electoral landscape has undergone significant shifts, driven by increasing community expectations and evolving challenges in delivering high-quality electoral services. The focus on electoral integrity has intensified, placing greater demands on Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) including Elections ACT. Challenges include undermining public confidence through cyber or foreign interference and the spread of misinformation and disinformation particularly via social media. Ensuring the functionality, security, integrity, and reliability of our electoral ICT systems and processes is crucial to maintaining public trust in election outcomes.

Elections ACT faced multifaceted challenges. The lingering impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic continued to affect staff availability and logistic supplies. Additionally, a resource-constrained environment due to the broader economic outlook, degradation of postal services, physical security threats, late legislative amendments, and growing regional security instability posed risks to delivering electoral services.

The Commission was determined to maintain high levels of confidence in electoral integrity and satisfaction with our services for the 2024 election. Our strategic priorities included delivering high-quality electoral services, engaging with the community and stakeholders to promote electoral awareness, participation, and compliance, and fostering a high-performing Elections ACT team. These efforts positioned us to meet our purpose and respond effectively to current challenges in the electoral environment.

## **The Commission's assessment of strategic risks in electoral delivery**

The Commission is committed to maintaining high levels of trust and satisfaction with its services throughout the 2024 election. Following an analysis of the electoral environment and consultations with other jurisdictions and security agencies, two key strategic risks were identified that needed to be mitigated in its preparations for the 2024 election:

- failure to uphold electoral integrity
- failure to meet stakeholder expectations of high-quality electoral services.

## **Delivering trusted, transparent, secure and accessible electoral services**

The Commission's mission to deliver trusted, transparent, secure, and accessible electoral services is crucial for maintaining public confidence in the democratic process. Facing challenges such as cyber threats, misinformation, and logistical complexities, Elections ACT remains committed to upholding electoral integrity and meeting stakeholder expectations. By leveraging innovative ICT systems and fostering strong partnerships with federal security agencies, local government bodies, and other electoral commissions, the Commission ensures the functionality, security, and reliability of its electoral processes.

The Commission's strategic priorities, outlined in the Corporate Plan 2023-2027, emphasise community engagement, maximising electoral participation, and continuous improvement through formal evaluations. These efforts contribute to a robust and resilient electoral system capable of adapting to an increasingly complex environment.

## **Guiding principles for 2024 election delivery**

The election was successfully conducted in accordance with the *Electoral Act 1992* and the Commission's first strategic priority of delivering trusted, transparent, secure and accessible electoral services.

The Commission's Corporate Plan 2023-2027 further details the guiding principles and actions required to achieve this strategic priority:

- Successfully deliver electoral events in accordance with the *Electoral Act 1992* and other relevant legislation
- Ensure high levels of functionality, security, integrity and reliability of electoral ICT systems and processes
- Maximise opportunities for electoral participation by all eligible electors
- Undertake formal evaluations of the conduct of elections to identify key areas for improvement in delivery of services.



## **Part 1 – successfully deliver electoral events in accordance with the *Electoral Act 1992* and other relevant legislation**

### **Stakeholders and partners**

Stakeholders in the 2024 election included all eligible electors, political candidates and parties, the Elections ACT workforce, ACT Policing, ACT Health, other ACT Directorates, federal government agencies supporting Elections ACT, the media, and other jurisdictional electoral commissions.

A defining characteristic of Elections ACT is its reliance on innovative ICT enabled electoral systems and processes across the full range of electoral operations. As a relatively small EMB, we continued to build and leverage partnerships with the following organisations in planning and delivering the election, and maintaining community trust in electoral outcomes:

- Digital, Data and Technology Solutions (DDTS), ACT Government
- Our vendors and service providers
- Federal security agencies
- The Electoral Integrity Assurance Task Force, a range of government agencies advising the Commissioner on electoral integrity
- Cross-jurisdictional government forums on electoral integrity and security
- The Electoral Integrity Advisory Panel, an independent panel advising the Commissioner on the integrity of our ICT electoral systems and processes
- The Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee, an independent panel advising the Commissioner on accessibility and disability needs
- Other jurisdictional electoral commissions

### **Electoral roll**

A well-maintained electoral roll is fundamental to the integrity of an election – it should be both complete and accurate by recording all citizens eligible to vote at an address reflecting the electorate in which they are eligible to vote. In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the electoral roll is maintained in collaboration with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) through a formal joint roll arrangement.

To keep the Australian electoral roll current and accurate, several strategies are employed. These include encouraging eligible citizens to enrol or update their details online, and directly updating and enrolling electors based on information from other government agencies (FDEU), eliminating the need for electors to complete an enrolment application. Additionally, the AEC employs continuous roll update (CRU) strategies such as direct mail to maintain accuracy.

### **Enrolment stimulation activities**

Electoral authorities are responsible for maintaining an accurate electoral roll throughout the election cycle. However, many individuals delay updating their enrolment until an election is forthcoming. To address this, electoral authorities focus on encouraging eligible citizens to enrol as key electoral roll milestones, such as the close of roll for a general election, approach.

The following enrolment stimulation activities helped to improve the ACT electoral roll for the 19 October 2024 ACT election:

- The 18 September 2023 federal close of rolls for the 14 October 2023 referendum, including the accompanying information campaign.

- The Elections ACT 2024 election information and advertising campaign of which there was a specific enrolment focus between 2 September 2024 and 6:00 pm, 13 September 2024.
- Ongoing AEC roll maintenance procedures including mail review and direct enrolment.

### Close of rolls

Prior to the 2020 ACT election, the Electoral Act was amended to allow voters not already on the ACT electoral roll to enrol to vote in an election up to and including election day. This removed the long-held concept of a ‘hard’ roll close and implemented in its place a ‘preliminary roll close,’ occurring at 6:00 pm on the first day of the pre-election period (12 September 2024). A final ‘supplementary close of rolls’ now occurs to coincide with the close of polls, 6:00 pm on election day (19 October 2024).

The preliminary roll close now closes the electoral roll to any changes to currently registered enrolments. However, the roll remains open for new enrolments of eligible electors not currently registered on the ACT electoral roll. Any eligible elector not currently enrolled had until 6:00 pm on election day to apply to the AEC for enrolment in the ACT.

This allows electors not previously enrolled anywhere in the country or electors enrolled in a different state or territory, but now residing in the ACT, to enrol to vote up to and including election day.

To facilitate this, Elections ACT provided an online enrolment terminal within every polling location for on-the-spot enrolment applications. These ‘not on roll’ electors are then offered a declaration vote, which must await the processing of their enrolment application before being admitted to the final election count. Alternatively, these electors could enrol at a time of their choosing, provided the enrolment application was lodged and accepted before 6:00 pm on election day.

By the preliminary roll close at 6:00 pm on 12 September 2024, 318,603 electors were enrolled for the 2024 election. By the final roll close at 6:00 pm on 19 October 2024, an additional 3,118 electors had enrolled, bringing the total number of eligible electors for the 2024 election to 321,721. This marked an increase of 15,721 electors compared to the 2020 election. Among the 3,118 new electors who enrolled after the preliminary roll close, 37% were first-time enrolments, 59% were transfers from other jurisdictions, and 4% were previously enrolled ACT residents who had re-enrolled after being removed from the roll.

Table 10 compares the number of electors enrolled at the last six elections.

**Table 10** Close of rolls enrolment by electorate

| Electorate   | 2004           | 2008           | 2012           | 2016           | 2020           | 2024           |
|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Brindabella  | 65,279         | 71,394         | 72,368         | 53,614         | 62,217         | 67,536         |
| Ginninderra  | 65,271         | 68,358         | 76,140         | 54,585         | 63,844         | 65,833         |
| Kurrajong    | N/A            | N/A            | N/A            | 59,010         | 59,422         | 59,904         |
| Murrumbidgee | N/A            | N/A            | N/A            | 57,058         | 59,934         | 64,479         |
| Yerrabi      | N/A            | N/A            | N/A            | 58,895         | 60,583         | 63,969         |
| Molonglo*    | 95,548         | 103,719        | 108,194        | N/A            | N/A            | N/A            |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>226,098</b> | <b>243,471</b> | <b>256,702</b> | <b>283,162</b> | <b>306,000</b> | <b>321,721</b> |

\* Molonglo no longer features as an electorate for ACT Legislative Assembly elections following the redistribution conducted prior to the 2016 ACT election.

## Measuring participation on the electoral roll

### Eligible Elector Population (EEP)

Following the introduction of federal legislation in 2012, which allows the AEC to directly update and enrol electors based on information from other government agencies, the estimated eligible elector population

rate in the ACT reached record levels at both the 2016 and 2020 elections. This high level of electoral roll completeness has been maintained through to the 2024 election.

Table 11 shows the numbers of electors enrolled by age group at the past five elections and the estimated eligible proportion of each age group enrolled.

**Table 11** Eligible voters by age group and estimated percentage of those eligible 2008 to 2024

| Age             | 2008           |                | 2012           |                | 2016           |                | 2020*          |                | 2024*          |                |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                 | No.            | % <sup>^</sup> | No.            | % <sup>^</sup> | No.            | % <sup>^</sup> | No.            | % <sup>^</sup> | No.            | % <sup>^</sup> |
| 18 <sup>#</sup> | 3,850          | 79.9           | 3,435          | 67.3           | 4,160          | 96.7           | 3,832          | 83.5           | 5,217          | 88.6           |
| 19              | 4,453          | 85.4           | 3,165          | 56.0           | 4,685          | 103.7          | 4,397          | 91.8           | 5,085          | 95.6           |
| 20–24           | 24,078         | 91.1           | 23,499         | 79.8           | 25,082         | 100.5          | 26,249         | 97.1           | 28,674         | 89.4           |
| 25–29           | 24,844         | 94.3           | 26,102         | 88.7           | 27,479         | 93.7           | 28,397         | 104.6          | 30,302         | 92.7           |
| 30–34           | 23,249         | 97.4           | 25,456         | 96.1           | 29,370         | 97.5           | 30,047         | 99.7           | 30,717         | 97.5           |
| 35–39           | 25,030         | 98.4           | 24,393         | 93.6           | 27,477         | 101.3          | 31,881         | 99.8           | 31,436         | 100.7          |
| 40–44           | 22,829         | 98.4           | 25,062         | 98.4           | 26,504         | 101.8          | 28,582         | 101.2          | 31,877         | 101.5          |
| 45–49           | 23,618         | 98.3           | 22,920         | 93.3           | 25,305         | 100.0          | 27,924         | 100.6          | 27,578         | 101.8          |
| 50–54           | 21,819         | 100.0          | 23,273         | 97.8           | 23,550         | 100.8          | 24,588         | 97.7           | 26,959         | 101.7          |
| 55–59           | 20,418         | 101.2          | 20,497         | 98.2           | 21,898         | 99.5           | 22,864         | 99.4           | 22,593         | 101.6          |
| 60–64           | 16,647         | 100.7          | 18,619         | 99.1           | 18,882         | 101.0          | 20,209         | 100.5          | 20,608         | 101.7          |
| 65–69           | 10,716         | 100.3          | 14,229         | 110.4          | 17,253         | 102.8          | 17,372         | 100.8          | 17,703         | 102.7          |
| 70+             | 21,920         | 99.6           | 26,052         | 104.6          | 31,517         | 101.2          | 39,658         | 101.4          | 45,712         | 102.8          |
| <b>Total</b>    | <b>243,471</b> | <b>97.1</b>    | <b>256,702</b> | <b>93.9</b>    | <b>283,162</b> | <b>99.8</b>    | <b>306,000</b> | <b>99.9</b>    | <b>324,461</b> | <b>99.2</b>    |


\* Figures are based on the final certified list as at 6:00 pm on election day.

<sup>^</sup> The percentages for EEP in the above table need to be treated with caution as they are calculated using ABS citizen population based on Census data. ABS data is adjusted by the AEC and projected forward to the relevant date, then adjusted for various relevant cohorts since the Census. EEP for the final Certified List includes electors who may have died or moved interstate after the preliminary close of roll date. The fact that some age groups show participation rates greater than 100 % is likely to be due to the ageing nature of the census data at the time, on which the estimates are based and may also be a result of electors remaining on the ACT electoral roll even where they had left the ACT.

<sup>#</sup> This row includes 17-year-old electors who turned 18 between the preliminary close of rolls date and polling day and were therefore entitled to vote.

The graph below shows the numbers of electors enrolled by age group and the estimated enrolment rate for each age range for the 2024 election.

**Graph 3** Enrolments by age group



The estimated number of electors on the roll compared to the estimated number entitled to be enrolled was 99.2% at the final close of rolls on election day. Between the preliminary roll close and the final roll close, it was not possible to remove electors from the ACT electoral roll. For instance, electors who had recently moved interstate or died during this period remained on the certified list, contributing to the high enrolment percentage at the final close of rolls.

Immediately following the election, once enrolment processing resumed, the ACT electoral roll declined due to adjustments not permissible during the election period. By the start of November, 2,642 electors were removed from the ACT electoral roll, reducing the total to 319,079. These removals were due to deaths or electors moving out of the ACT and re-enrolling elsewhere between 13 September 2024 and election day. By 1 December 2024, the number of ACT enrolled electors had further decreased to 318,407.

Significant improvements have been evident in each election since the introduction of direct enrolment processes following the 2012 election. These improvements are particularly notable in the enrolment rates for the 18 and 19-year-old age groups, who have historically been significantly under-enrolled.

**Voter turnout**

Traditionally, voter turnout is measured as a percentage of total actual enrolment. However, this method can be influenced by the completeness and accuracy of the electoral roll. To provide a more comprehensive view, two additional performance measures related to the completeness of the roll and voter turnout have been used in previous elections and were again applied in 2024. These measures, along with the traditional method, offer different perspectives on the state of the roll and voter turnout.

The two additional measures use the eligible elector population (EEP) as a base. The EEP is calculated by the AEC using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and applying a method developed by the AEC in consultation with the ABS. The EEP estimates the number of persons eligible to be enrolled at a given time and is calculated using post-censal estimates based on the latest census data adjusted for various relevant cohorts.

The first additional measure expresses **enrolment** as a percentage of the EEP, assessing the effectiveness of roll maintenance activities, including direct enrolment and updates by the AEC. The second measure expresses **voter turnout** as a percentage of the EEP on election day, evaluating the Commission's effectiveness in encouraging voting, independent of the electoral roll's accuracy. This measure arguably better reflects the Commission's performance than the traditional method, which partly depends on the AEC's roll maintenance and the timing of the ACT election within the federal election cycle.

However, the effectiveness of this measure has been impacted by the 9 July 2020 electoral amendment that altered the close of roll arrangements. The final close of roll figure may now be skewed due to the ability to add electors after the preliminary close but without the ability to remove those who became ineligible through moving interstate or who died. The significant drop in enrolment figures immediately following the 2024 election, where between 2,500 and 3,000 electors were removed from the ACT roll, likely affected the accuracy of the 'voter turnout as a percentage of enrolment' figure. For example, presuming that the 2,642 electors who were removed from the ACT electoral roll immediately following the election did not cast a vote, the voter turnout figure as a percentage against the new enrolment figure of 319,079 is 87.6%, essentially a percentage point higher.

Table 12 provides the calculation of the three measures at the six most recent elections.

**Table 12 Measures of enrolment and voter turnout 2004 to 2024**

| Election | EEP*    | No. enrolled | % no. enrolled to EEP | Voter turnout <sup>^</sup> | % voter turnout to EEP | % voter turnout to no. enrolled |
|----------|---------|--------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2004     | 242,042 | 226,098      | 93.4                  | 209,749                    | 86.7                   | 92.8                            |
| 2008     | 250,743 | 243,471      | 97.1                  | 220,019                    | 87.7                   | 90.4                            |
| 2012     | 273,449 | 256,702      | 93.9                  | 229,125                    | 83.9                   | 89.3                            |
| 2016     | 283,688 | 283,162      | 99.8                  | 250,460                    | 88.3                   | 88.5                            |
| 2020     | 306,294 | 306,000      | 99.9                  | 273,143                    | 89.2                   | 89.3                            |
| 2024     | 324,461 | 321,721      | 99.2                  | 279,370                    | 86.1                   | 86.8                            |

\* The estimates of the EEP may alter following the rebasing of the estimates by the ABS. A decrease in the EEP will be reflected as an increase in the participation rate, and vice versa.

<sup>^</sup> Voter turnout figures are a total of informal and formal votes counted. Voter turnout does not include declaration and postal votes received but not admitted to the count and is therefore not a full reflection of the number of people who participated in the election.

Participation rates (measured by voter turnout as a proportion of the estimated eligible population) improved between the 2004 and 2008 elections, declined in 2012, improved significantly in 2016 following the introduction of direct enrolment and update, and improved again slightly in 2020. However, the 2024 election saw a 3.1% decline in voter turnout to EEP, the lowest percentage since 2012.

Voter turnout as a percentage of enrolment also declined to the lowest level since at least 2001, with only 86.8% of enrolled electors casting a vote in 2024, down from 89.3% in 2020.

The reasons for the decrease in voter participation in 2024 are likely complex and beyond the influence of the Electoral Commission alone. Elections ACT committed considerable resources to its information and education campaign, achieving a strong reach with 85% of voters aware of the campaign when surveyed.

While it is difficult to definitively determine the reason for this decline, particularly noting the historically high outcomes during the COVID-impacted 2020 election, it is possible that the election was conducted during a period of declining global trust in democratic institutions and increasing political apathy. This erosion of trust may have led to a sense of disengagement and apathy, where voters feel less motivated to participate. Additionally, the absence of the heightened urgency and engagement seen during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 might also explain the drop in turnout.

Like each election before it, the 2024 election saw an increase in the absolute number of voters. However, compared to the previous five elections, the percentage increase is the lowest by a significant margin. In the 2008 election, an additional 10,270 voters (4.9%) cast their votes compared to 2004. A further 9,106 voters (4.1%) voted in 2012. The numbers increased significantly in 2016, with an additional 21,335 voters (9.3%), and a similar increase in 2020 with 22,674 additional voters (9.1%). However, only an additional 6,227 voters participated in 2024 compared to 2020, an increase of just 2.3%, the lowest across the five-election sample. This is likely due to slower than normal migration to the ACT during the pandemic.

The Commission intends to further research the apparent decline in election participation as part of areas of focus conducted by the Electoral Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand (ECANZ) network.

## Access to the electoral roll

The Electoral Regulation 1993 (the Regulation) was established to support the Electoral Act by detailing various administrative and procedural aspects. Initially, the Regulation provided for the remuneration and allowances of the three members of the Commission, but it has since evolved to serve multiple functions. Among these, the Regulation specifies the prescribed authorities approved by the Minister for access to electoral roll information under section 65 of the Act.

Five prescribed authorities are currently listed:

- The Chief Health Officer (since November 2000) for maintaining the cancer register.
- The Director-General of Treasury (added in 2008) for contacting Totalcare employees about superannuation.
- The Public Trustee and Guardian (added in 2015) for the administration of deceased estates.
- The Commissioner for Revenue (added in 2019) for the administration and enforcement of a tax law.
- The Integrity Commissioner (added in 2023) for investigating alleged corrupt conduct.

In addition to prescribed authorities under the Regulation, the Act also provides access to the electoral roll to the Sheriff for administering the *Juries Act 1997*, to MLAs and registered officers of registered political parties, and to candidates formally nominated to contest an election in the Legislative Assembly.

Significant data breaches have occurred in Australia in recent years, with cyber-attacks impacting data held by major companies such as Optus and Medibank Private. The level of threat from foreign espionage and interference activities in Australia is currently unprecedented, according to the Commonwealth Director-General of Security.<sup>2</sup> The electoral roll is an

<sup>2</sup> Burgess, M. (2020). ASIO chief Mike Burgess says there are more spies in Australia than at the height of the Cold War. The Conversation. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/asio-chief-mike-burgess-says-there-are-more-spies-in-australia-than-at-the-height-of-the-cold-war-132384>

asset identified and prioritised by Commonwealth security agencies as of interest for cyber-attack.

Maintaining the integrity of elections is crucial to the approach by EMBs in countering the threat of foreign interference in our democratic systems and processes. Reports of foreign interference in elections of established democracies suggest that Australia's electoral events may be targeted by those seeking to undermine our democratic processes. Foreign actors have demonstrated various motivations and methods for conducting such interference.

The Commission, together with the AEC underpinned by a joint roll arrangement, takes the protection and security of the electoral roll very seriously. Both organisations work with federal security agencies to continually review and improve cyber protections of our critical electoral systems, including the electoral roll. Currently, there are no security requirements detailed in the Regulation describing practices and procedures that a prescribed authority must take to protect the electoral roll from cyber-intrusion.

Public disclosure of the electoral roll, intentionally or otherwise, or data theft through foreign interference would greatly damage the reputation of the Commission and the ACT Government, as well as public confidence in the election process. Once roll data has been provided to a prescribed authority, political parties, MLAs, candidates, or the Sheriff, the Commission cannot control the security provisions in place to protect the sensitive personal data. This presents a potential weak point in cyber security controls over this valuable data set. Malicious actors, including possible foreign state actors, may exploit this to access the electoral roll for criminal activity and/or foreign interference.

### **Recommendation 1**

The Commission **recommends** a review of the Regulation for the purpose of reassessing the appropriateness of the prescribed authorities currently listed as requiring access to the electoral roll.

### **Recommendation 2**

The Commission **recommends** amending the Regulation to include a minimum set of security standards and requirements for any agency receiving access to the ACT electoral roll. The ACSC Essential Eight model may be appropriate to establish a baseline set of security standards.

## **Redistribution of electoral boundaries**

After every general election, the ACT Legislative Assembly electoral boundaries are redistributed. The most recent redistribution was completed in 2023. Detailed information can be found in the Augmented Electoral Commission's *Redistribution Report: ACT Legislative Assembly Electoral Boundaries Redistribution 2023*, available on the Elections ACT website.

The following table presents the projected enrolment numbers for the 2024 election and the variations from the quota estimated during the redistribution, alongside the actual results at the close of rolls for the 2024 election. Table 15 demonstrates that the redistribution successfully ensured that enrolment in four of the five electorates was within +/-5% of the quota at the time of the election. However, the actual enrolment in Kurrajong was -6.90% below the quota, or approximately 1,250 electors. This suggests that the ABS's enrolment projections used at the 2023 redistribution underestimated the growth across the ACT and overestimated Kurrajong's growth between August 2023 and October 2024.

Brindabella, Ginninderra, Murrumbidgee and Yerrabi all saw higher actual enrolment figures in comparison to the projected enrolment figures at the time of the redistribution. Only Kurrajong underperformed against the projected outcomes.

**Table 13** 2024 election actual enrolment compared to redistribution projected enrolment

| Electorate   | Estimated enrolment for polling day 2024 used during 2023 redistribution (projected) |        |                          | Actual results for polling day 2024 (actual) |        |                          |
|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
|              | Projected Enrolment at redistribution                                                | Quota  | Variation from quota (%) | Enrolment at election                        | Quota  | Variation from quota (%) |
| Brindabella  | 64,327                                                                               | 62,986 | 2.13                     | 67,536                                       | 64,344 | 5.00                     |
| Ginninderra  | 64,838                                                                               | 62,986 | 2.94                     | 65,833                                       | 64,344 | 2.31                     |
| Kurrajong    | 61,340                                                                               | 62,986 | -2.61                    | 59,904                                       | 64,344 | -6.90                    |
| Murrumbidgee | 61,577                                                                               | 62,986 | -2.24                    | 64,479                                       | 64,344 | 0.21                     |
| Yerrabi      | 62,848                                                                               | 62,986 | -0.22                    | 63,969                                       | 64,344 | -0.58                    |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>314,930</b>                                                                       |        |                          | <b>321,721</b>                               |        |                          |

In preparation for an election, the Electoral Act mandates that a redistribution of ACT Legislative Assembly electorates must begin as soon as practicable two years before the election date:

### 37 Timing of redistributions

1. After each ordinary election, a redistribution process shall, subject to section 38—
  - a. begin as soon as practicable after the beginning of the period of 2 years ending on the end of the 3rd Saturday in October in the year when the next ordinary election is due to be held; and
  - b. be completed as soon as practicable.

This means the earliest a redistribution can commence is in late October, two years before an election. However, due to the proximity to Christmas and school holidays, many Canberrans are often absent from the ACT during this period. Consequently, the Redistribution Committee routinely delays the first public consultation period until February of the following year, extending the overall process by 2 to 3 months.

Following the legislated process of public consultation, proposed redistributions, objections, and comments, it is typical for a redistribution to formally conclude only 12-15 months prior to the election date. Such delays in final outcomes can cause difficulties for political parties, candidates, and affected electors in their preparations for the election.

### Recommendation 3

The Commission **recommends** that section 37 of the Electoral Act be amended to provide for the commencement of the next redistribution process 25 months prior to when the next ordinary election is due to be held.



# Party registration

Fifteen political parties were registered for the 2024 ACT election. Of these, three (Canberra Progressives, Sustainable Australia Party – Stop Overdevelopment / Corruption, and The Community Action Party (ACT)) did not nominate any candidates.

The following table lists the parties on the ACT Register of Political Parties at the start of the pre-election period (13 September 2024) for the 2024 election, with notation of those parties registered since the previous election in 2020.

**Table 14** Parties registered for the 2024 election

| Party name                                                      | Party abbreviation          | Newly registered party? |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Animal Justice Party                                            | AJP                         | No                      |
| Australian Labor Party (ACT Branch)                             | ACT Labor                   | No                      |
| Belco Party (ACT)                                               | Belco Party                 | No                      |
| Canberra Progressives                                           | CP                          | No                      |
| Democratic Labour Party (DLP)                                   | Labour DLP                  | No                      |
| Family First Party ACT                                          | Family First                | Yes                     |
| Fiona Carrick Independent                                       | Fiona Carrick               | Yes                     |
| First Nation Party                                              | First Nation                | Yes                     |
| Independents for Canberra                                       | IFC                         | Yes                     |
| Liberal Party of Australia (A.C.T. Division)                    | Canberra Liberals           | No                      |
| Libertarian Party                                               | Libertarians                | No                      |
| Strong Independents                                             |                             | Yes                     |
| Sustainable Australia Party – Stop Overdevelopment / Corruption | Sustainable Australia Party | No                      |
| The ACT Greens                                                  | The Greens                  | No                      |
| The Community Action Party (ACT)                                | Community Action            | No                      |

## New party registrations between the 2020 and 2024 elections

Five new political parties were added to the Register of Political Parties between the 2020 and 2024 elections. Independents for Canberra was registered on 9 March 2024, Family First Party (ACT) on 14 May 2024, Strong Independents on 4 June 2024, Fiona Carrick Independent on 25 June 2024, and First Nation Party on 31 July 2024. All parties lodged their applications before the legislated cut-off for new party registration applications on 30 June 2024.

All parties lodged their applications prior to the legislated cut-off for new party registration applications on 30 June 2024.

There are several opportunities for public objections to applications to register a political party. Objections can be lodged upon public notification of an application for registration; a request for an internal review of a decision to register a party made by the Commissioner or the Commissioner's delegate can be made to the full Electoral Commission; and a review of a decision of the Commission can be sought before the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal. No objections were received for any of the newly registered political parties.

## Rejected party registrations

Two political parties, the Australian Multicultural Party and People v Voltaire's Bastard, lodged applications for registration prior to the 2024 election, but ultimately had the applications rejected by the Commissioner on the basis of not having at least 100 members of the party who are electors.

## Party registrations cancelled between the 2020 and 2024 elections

During the period between the 2020 and 2024 elections, the registration of six parties were cancelled:

- The Flux Party – ACT was cancelled with effect from 16 February 2021.
  - The Canberra Party was cancelled with effect from 9 May 2023.
  - Australian Climate Change Justice Party was cancelled with effect from 5 September 2023.
  - Small Business Australian Capital Territory was cancelled with effect from 12 December 2023.
  - David Pollard Independent was cancelled with effect from 29 June 2024.
  - Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party (ACT) was cancelled with effect from 23 August 2024.
- The de-registrations of The Canberra Party, David Pollard Independent and Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party (ACT), were all made at the request of the party.
- The registrations of the Australian Climate Change Justice Party and Small Business Australian Capital Territory were cancelled on the grounds that the party no longer held at least 100 members who were ACT electors. This determination was made following a mid-cycle party registration compliance audit.
- The Flux Party – ACT were de-registered under section 98(3) of the Act which states that 'The commissioner must cancel the registration of a registered party if it has not endorsed a candidate at the last 2 general elections.'

## Changes to existing party names between the 2020 and 2024 elections

Four of the parties that were registered during the period between the 2020 and 2024 elections applied to change their registered party name and/or registered abbreviation:

- Sustainable Australia (ACT) changed its name to Sustainable Australia Party – Stop Overdevelopment / Corruption and changed the registered abbreviation from Sustainable Australia – Stop overdevelopment. Stop corruption to Sustainable Australia Party on 5 February 2021. No objections were received.
- Australian Federation Party Australian Capital Territory changed its name to Small Business Australian Capital Territory and changed the registered abbreviation from Federation Party Australian Capital Territory to Small Business ACT on 9 June 2023. Small Business Australian Capital Territory was then de-registered on 12 December 2023 after failing to maintain the requisite 100 members who are ACT electors.
- Independents for Canberra changed its registered abbreviation from IND FOR CBR to IFC on 6 June 2024.
- The Liberal Democratic Party changed its name to the Libertarian Party and the abbreviation from Liberal Democrats to Libertarians on 2 July 2024.

## Party register recommendations

The party registration process requires robust controls and ongoing scrutiny to ensure transparency and compliance with legislation. The ACT Electoral Commissioner governs the registration of political parties in the territory, discharging these duties in line with the requirements documented in Part 7 (Sections 89 through 93) of the *Electoral Act 1992*.

### Changes to party secretary address

In its report on the 2020 ACT election, the Commission recommended amending the Electoral Act to include the name and address of the party secretary in the political party register. This amendment would require any party wishing to change its secretary to formally apply to the Commissioner, enhancing transparency and governance through a 14-day objection period. The *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023*, effective from 29 November 2023, incorporated this recommendation. However, a minor adjustment is needed to align the process for changing the party secretary's address with that of the party's registered officer. Section 95(3) of the Electoral Act prescribes that sections 91 (Notification and publication of applications) and 91A (Objections to applications and responses) do not apply to changes in the registered officer's address, resulting in automatic registration of the change without a 14-day public objection period.

The original clause, which excludes the written notice and objection period for changes to the registered officer's address, was introduced to "ensure that public money is not spent on advertising changes of addresses of party registered officers".<sup>3</sup> This reasoning can also apply to party secretaries' addresses. The recommended change will also streamline the process, removing unnecessary administrative delays for inconsequential amendments to the party register while the Commission awaits the conclusion of a 14-day public objection, which is unlikely to result in a public objection to a simple address change.

### Recommendation 4

The Commission **recommends** amending section 95(3) of the Electoral Act to allow applications for changing the address of a registered party's secretary, exempting the applications from the requirements for notification and objection in sections 91 and 91A.

### Privacy for home address details

Recent elections have seen a rise in political parties centred around a particular individual. David Pollard Independent registered before the 2020 election, while Fiona Carrick Independent and Strong Independents registered in the lead-up to the 2024 election. These small, individual-based parties often rely on the individual or a close associate, such as a family member or friend, to fulfill governance roles required under the Electoral Act, like registered officer or party secretary. Currently, Ms. Carrick serves as both the registered officer and party secretary for Fiona Carrick Independent, while Peter Strong held the position of registered officer for Strong Independents before the party's deregistration.

These small parties, along with several others, typically do not maintain separate office locations and instead operate from residential addresses. According to section 87 of the Electoral Act, the address of a person who is, or is nominated to be, the registered officer or secretary of a political party can be:

- a. The person's home address; or
- b. The person's business address (other than a post office box); or
- c. An address of the party (other than a post office box)

Section 88 of the Electoral Act mandates that the publicly available register of political parties includes the name and address details of the registered officer and secretary.

The definition of *address*, under Part 7 of the Electoral Act, was introduced through the Electoral Legislation Amendment Bill 2007, which aimed to replace the requirement to publish the personal residential address of a party's registered officer and with the option to publish a residential address, business or party address (excluding a post office box).<sup>4</sup> However, the 2007 amendment did not fully achieve its goal as

3 Explanatory statement, Electoral (Amendment) Bill (No 2) 1997, 23 September 1997, pg 2, online [https://legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db\\_13997/19970923-15892/PDF/db\\_13997.PDF](https://legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db_13997/19970923-15892/PDF/db_13997.PDF)

4 Explanatory statement, Electoral Legislation Amendment Bill 2007, 23 August 2007, online [https://legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db\\_49091/20070823-57061/html/db\\_49091.html](https://legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db_49091/20070823-57061/html/db_49091.html)

many small parties do not maintain a business or party address, resulting in the need to publish personal home addresses on the public register.

### **Recommendation 5**

To support privacy measures, the Commission **recommends** reviewing the definition of *address* under Part 7 of the Electoral Act with the aim of limiting the potential to publish the personal residential address of a party's registered officer or secretary.

### **Party membership**

To register a political party in the ACT, an application must include a list of at least 100 members who are electors, along with their names and addresses. Upon receiving an application, and during routine mid-cycle compliance reviews, the Electoral Commission audits these lists to verify that the party has at least 100 members on the ACT roll and that the listed individuals are indeed party members.

However, the Electoral Act does not define what constitutes a party member, leaving it to individual party constitutions to establish membership categories and requirements, such as financial or voting members. To ensure compliance with the 100-member rule, the Commission contacts each claimed member, requesting a response if they do not consider themselves to be a member of the party.

Recent compliance audits have revealed discrepancies between what some parties consider membership and the individuals' understanding. For instance, before the 2024 election, 27% of individuals listed by one party responded that they did not consider themselves members. The actual number might be higher, as some individuals did not respond to the Commission's inquiry. Consequently, the party's application was denied due to non-compliance with the 100-member rule, preventing it from contesting the 2024 ACT election.

This situation often causes distress among individuals mistakenly inferred to be party members, stemming from misunderstandings or, in the worst cases, fraudulent activities by the party seeking registration.

### **Recommendation 6**

To prevent ongoing issues and reduce the potential for fraudulent activity, the Electoral Commission **recommends** that all aspiring registered political parties be required to maintain records of signed party membership forms. This would serve as the

minimum basis for establishing membership status. The Commission suggests legislating this provision by introducing a definition of "member" in Part 7 of the Electoral Act. This definition would specify that a member is an individual who has physically or digitally signed a party membership form and whose membership remains active. The Commissioner should then be empowered to require the party to provide the completed membership forms under section 97A.

### **Internally reviewable decisions**

Section 93(5) of the Electoral Act prescribes that if an application for the registration of a political party is refused, the party secretary must be given an **internal review notice** about the decision.

The term "internal review notice" is defined in the Electoral Act by reference to section 244, which in turn refers to section 67B(1) of the *ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008* (ACAT Act). According to section 67B of the ACAT Act, an internal review notice must be given when an "internally reviewable decision" is made. This term is defined as a decision that the ACAT could review under the Electoral Act and that may be internally reviewed by the Commission before review by the ACAT.

However, Section 245 of the Electoral Act defines an **internally reviewable decision** as one mentioned in schedule 5, column 3 under a provision of the Electoral Act mentioned in column 2. While section 93(5) provides for advice to the party secretary of an internally reviewable decision, the decision to refuse the initial registration of a political party under section 93(1) does not appear in schedule 5. Accordingly, it is not an "internally reviewable decision" for the purposes of the Electoral Act, meaning it cannot be internally reviewed by the Electoral Commission. As there is no internally reviewable decision, there can be no decision of the Electoral Commission that may be reviewed by the ACAT.

This results in a contradictory scenario where the Commissioner must give a party secretary an internal review notice, yet the secretary cannot seek an internal review of the decision nor a review by the ACAT.

It appears the error in the legislation arose from the *ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (No 2)* (repealed), which amended the Electoral Act on 2 February 2009 to introduce part 15 and schedule 5. Schedule 5, item 10, column 3 was subsequently amended to omit the words "refuse to" to

correctly describe the decision for review under section 98(5): see Statute Law Amendment Act 2015 (No 2) (repealed), section 5, schedule 3, part 3.16, Amendment [3.103]. Prior to these amendments, the Electoral Act included at section 245 (Reviewable decisions) “a decision to refuse an application for the registration of a political party under section 93(1) or (2).”

**Recommendation 7**


The Commission **recommends** fixing what appears to be a drafting error by amending Schedule 5 of the Electoral Act to include, under column 2 “93(1) or (2)”, under column 3 “refuse an application for the registration of a political party” and under column 4 “applicant for registration”.

**Nomination of candidates**

A record total of 149 candidates nominated for the 2024 election, compared to 137 in 2020, 141 in 2016, 74 in 2012, and 86 in 2008. The increases since 2012 can largely be attributed to the increase in the size of the Assembly from 17 to 25 MLAs prior to the 2016 election.


Graph 4 provides a breakdown by gender and electorate for the 2024 election, while Graph 5 shows a total comparison against the 2020 and 2016 elections.

**Graph 4** Candidates by gender and electorate, 2024



Despite the significant difference in male nominations to female nominations, over half of the 25 elected candidates were female in all three elections since 2016.

Graph 5 Candidates by gender across the last three elections




Non-party candidates

A non-party candidate is any candidate who contests an ACT Legislative Assembly election without being nominated by a registered ACT political party. To nominate, a non-party candidate must be proposed by at least 20 electors enrolled in the electorate they intend to contest.

Seven non-party candidates contested the 2024 ACT election, continuing the significant decline from 17 at the 2016 election.

Graph 6 provides a breakdown by electorate of non-party candidates contesting the last three ACT elections.

Graph 6 Non-party candidates by electorate



The low number of non-party candidates in 2024 likely resulted from a trend of registering political parties centred around individuals who, in previous elections, may have nominated as Independent non-party candidates. Fiona Carrick and Peter Strong both registered political parties but identified as

independents during the campaign. The registered political party Independents for Canberra also campaigned on the basis that their candidates were Independents. This trend likely reduced the number of actual non-party candidates in 2024.

# Political campaigning

## Authorisation of electoral advertisements

**Electoral matter intended or likely to affect voting in an ACT Legislative Assembly election must carry an authorisation statement. This statement sets out the name of the person who authorised the electoral matter and, if published for or on behalf of a party or candidate, a statement that it is published for the party or candidate.**

The authorisation rules aim to prevent “irresponsibility through anonymity,” making it unlawful to publish electoral material without identifying the author. This allows voters to judge whether the material comes from a source with a vested interest in the election.

Section 292 of the Electoral Act prescribes that it is an offence to disseminate unauthorised electoral matter and sets out the requirements for an authorisation statement. Section 293A includes an exemption for individuals disseminating electoral matter on social media as part of their personal political views, provided they are not paid to express those views.

During the 2020 ACT election, some individuals created ‘special interest profiles’ or dedicated social media accounts to share electoral content on specific issues. These accounts lacked an authorisation statement, and the administrators were anonymous or not easily identifiable. The names or ‘handles’ of these accounts did not include personal names but instead reflected their stance on electoral issues. The November 2023 amendments to the Electoral Act strengthened the rules around authorisation, clarifying and tightening the exemption in section 293A. The amendments require that electoral matter must be disseminated in a private capacity and using an account not created primarily for disseminating electoral matter unless that account is in the person’s name.

The Electoral Commission also recommended expanding section 292 to clarify how authorisation should appear on printed material. Concerns were raised about political participants placing authorisation statements in hard-to-read locations and using colour and font size to create identification difficulties. The November 2023 amendments introduced language

requirements and form and access compliance requirements for authorisation statements, ensuring they are clearly communicated and identifiable.

The language requirements are defined in subsection 292(3). These requirements address the use of languages other than English in the dissemination of electoral matter. Their purpose is to facilitate the understanding of the authorisation statement by non-English speakers when electoral matter is disseminated in one or more languages other than English.

The number of authorisation-related complaints received by Elections ACT during the 2024 election dropped to 24, compared to 46 in 2020. Notably, only five complaints were about the manner of displaying the statement rather than its absence. This indicates that the recent amendments to the Electoral Act and the educational materials provided were effective in helping stakeholders comply with the regulations.

Under the Commissioner’s prosecution policy, all reported cases of unauthorised electoral matter are initially addressed with a request to cease distribution and ensure proper authorisation. This approach was effective in 2024, with no referrals to ACT Policing for prosecution.

## The 100-metre ban on canvassing at polling places

Section 303 of the Electoral Act makes it an offence to influence the vote of an elector within 100 metres of an early voting centre or polling place on election day. This includes handing out how-to-vote cards.

To assist party campaigners, Elections ACT prepared maps showing the 100-metre boundary for each polling place and early voting centre, available on the Elections ACT website.

In the 2024 election, only four separate allegations of breaches of the 100-metre ban were received, compared to 16 in 2020 and 33 in 2016.

For breaches of the 100-metre ban, the Electoral Commission has no power to directly impose a penalty. Formal enforcement requires police involvement and court prosecution. Accordingly, initial compliance is sought from party workers, with continued infringements potentially leading to referral to the appropriate authority. In 2024, no issues were referred to the police.



Complaints were generally handled by electoral staff, who asked campaigners to move outside the 100-metre limit and requested party workers to remove signs within the boundary.

The 100-metre ban was introduced before the 1998 election. A similar provision exists for Tasmanian Assembly elections, which also use the Robson rotation method of printing ballot papers with the Hare-Clark system. Together, the ban on canvassing, Robson rotation, and Hare-Clark proportional representation aim to reduce the influence of party tickets and empower voters. In practice, the 100-metre ban on canvassing at polling places is intended to limit the availability of how-to-vote cards as electors vote.

During the early voting period, the 100-metre ban also helps reduce disruption to retail entities, as early voting centres are often in retail or business centres. The exclusion zone limits the congregation of party workers, minimising disruption to surrounding businesses.

The Commission considers that most reported breaches of the 100-metre limit were trivial, generally close to the limit and respecting the spirit of the limit if not the letter of the law. Therefore, the Commission does not see the need for changes to the 100-metre canvassing ban provisions.

## Political party and candidate posters in public places (corflutes)

City Rangers from City Services enforce laws regarding the placement of signs in public places in the ACT. City Services has provided information on movable signs based on the Public Unleased Land (Movable Signs) Code of Practice 2023 (No 1). This code applies to electoral advertising signs and requires them to conform to relevant provisions of the ACT and Commonwealth Electoral Acts. For many election cycles, the code has limited where electoral signs can be placed, such as on median strips and designated areas with special characteristics of the National Capital. It also restricts the display period for electoral signs to six weeks before the election date until 48 hours after polling booths close.

In its 2016 and 2020 election reports, the Commission noted general dissatisfaction with the proliferation of campaign signs across Canberra's main roads and suburban streets. To address this, the Assembly

passed provisions in the *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023*, amending the *Public Unleased Land Act 2013*. These amendments expanded placement limitations and introduced a numerical limit on the number of movable signs (corflute signs) that political participants can place across the Territory.

Under the new provisions, a person commits an offence if they fail to comply with the movable signs code of practice regarding the number of signs on public unleased land, the placement of signs adjacent to a designated public road, or the attachment of an electoral sign to a vehicle parked within designated places under the Road Transport (Offences) Regulation 2005. Practically, this means individuals and entities are limited to 250 signs on public unleased land. For example, a political party with five candidates in each of the five electorates cannot exceed 6,500 signs – 250 for each candidate and 250 for the entity. Signs also cannot be placed, or displayed on vehicles, on or adjacent to roads with a usual speed limit of 90 km/h or more.

The Commission had previously been cautious about imposing expanded restrictions on electoral advertising signs, fearing that further regulation could lead to cumbersome enforcement methods. However, the initial application of the new numerical limits has been relatively successful in addressing community dissatisfaction. In 2020, Elections ACT received 17 complaints about campaign advertising signs. In 2024, no complaints were received, and there was a significant decrease in public commentary about the proliferation of corflute signs across the Territory.

The Commission does not see the need for further adjustments to the administration and enforcement of political party and candidate posters in public places.

## The threat of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on democracy

The rapid growth of generative AI has raised concerns about its potential to erode public trust in Australia's democratic institutions and processes. Controversies around AI-generated deepfake content intended to deceive the public or influence public opinion have become increasingly prevalent globally.

AI-generated content involving images, audio, or video manipulated to create fictitious depictions of people can damage an individual's reputation, posing

a threat to political candidates engaged in an election campaign. The ease of producing and spreading disinformation and misinformation across the internet makes it harder for the public to discern trustworthy information, undermining informed voting decisions.

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), provides that “AI systems intended to be used to influence the outcome of an election or referendum or the voting behaviour of natural persons in the exercise of their vote in elections or referenda should be classified as high-risk”<sup>5</sup>

Given these concerns, the impact of AI on the integrity of democracies is a significant and pressing challenge for consideration by the Assembly. However, despite these legitimate concerns about AI misuse, the 2024 ACT election did not appear to be significantly impacted by AI during the campaign. While media reports suggested AI technology was used by political participants, no genuine concerns were raised with the Commission.

Similarly, while the 2025 federal election did see some examples of artificially generated imagery and audio, most of the content that included generative AI were obviously not real and appeared to be created to either make a political point or were seeking to be humorous through satire. Nevertheless, as the technology becomes more widely available and improves, the risk that AI generated electoral advertising is used maliciously and to deceive, increases.

The Electoral Act does not currently address the threat of deepfakes and other forms of manipulated images, audio, or video directly. Section 297A – Misleading Electoral Advertising, prohibits the dissemination of electoral advertisements containing statements purporting to be statements of fact that are inaccurate and misleading. However, the scope and enforceability of this provision are limited to electoral advertisements. Similarly, Section 300, which addresses defamation of candidates, has limited scope and enforceability, requiring the false and defamatory statement to be about the personal character or conduct of a candidate.

The current primary legislative control is section 292, which requires authorisation of electoral matter. This means that a political deepfake would not breach section 292 as long as it carries the requisite authorisation. Consequently, an appropriately authorised, stand-alone video containing an AI-generated image of a candidate making

AI-generated false statements is unlikely to fall within the enforcement parameters of any of these legislative provisions.

If the Commission received a complaint about an AI-generated replica of a candidate making falsified statements, it would largely be powerless to act against the creators or publishers. The Electoral Act (section 321) does allow the Commissioner or an affected candidate to seek injunctive relief against contraventions of the Electoral Act or another Territory law in its application to elections. Individuals impacted by political deepfakes may also seek remedy under intellectual property and tort law to have deepfakes taken down and to seek damages for related loss or injury.<sup>6</sup>

It appears that the current regulatory framework in the ACT to combat the use of AI to influence the outcome of an election is insufficient.

South Australia has recently enacted new provisions under the *Electoral (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2024*, which was passed in November 2024 but had not yet commenced at the time of writing. The amendments introduce offences relating to the distribution of artificially generated electoral advertisements. Specifically, it is now an offence to publish or distribute an electoral advertisement that includes a simulated depiction of a person performing an act they did not actually perform—unless the advertisement clearly states that it has been artificially generated.

### **Recommendation 8**

Emerging AI technology if misapplied can bring significant risks to the conduct of elections and democracy more generally. To address the regulatory gaps and respond effectively to the use of AI in electoral processes, the Commission **recommends** that the Assembly undertake a review of potential regulatory responses to AI-generated political deepfake content for legislative implementation before the 2028 ACT election.

<sup>5</sup> EU Artificial Intelligence Act, recital 62.

<sup>6</sup> Andrew Ray, *Disinformation, Deepfakes and Democracies*, UNSW Law Journal volume 44(3), 2021, p.1001.

# Election funding, expenditure and financial disclosure

The ACT's election funding, expenditure, and financial disclosure scheme consists of three main components:

1. **Public funding** for election campaign and party/MLA administrative expenses.
2. **Limits** on electoral expenditure.
3. **Disclosure** of financial transactions by political entities

## Amendments to the funding and disclosure scheme between elections

### ***Electoral Amendment Act 2020***

The *Electoral Amendment Act 2020*, tabled on 29 November 2018 and passed nearly two years later on 27 August 2020, took effect on 1 July 2021. Key funding and disclosure amendments included:

- **Prohibition of gifts** from property developers and their close associates to MLAs, political parties, candidates, and associated entities and a prohibition on political entities accepting such gifts.
- **Redefinition of a gift** to include the first \$250 of a contribution at a fundraising event.
- **Amendment of the timeframe for reporting gifts** over \$1,000:
  - During election period: within seven days after total gifts from a person reach \$1,000.
  - Outside election period: within seven days after the month-end when total gifts from a person reach \$1,000.
  - Additional gifts: within seven days after receipt during election period or month-end outside election period.

### **Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023**

Passed on 31 October 2023 and effective from 29 November 2023, this Act introduced further amendments:

- **Further adjustment gift reporting** requiring gifts to be reported within seven days at all times.
- **Party secretaries** included in the register of political parties, with a 14-day public objection period.
- **Political entities** can appoint up to two Reporting Agents.
- **Exemption of costs for translated services** related to electoral matter up to 12.5% of the expenditure cap.
- **Addition of foreign entities** to the list of prohibited donors.

## Briefing sessions

The Commission conducted hybrid (online and face-to-face) briefing sessions for electoral participants aimed to draw attention to the electoral amendments and offering practical advice to ensure compliance. Briefings included:

- **20 May 2021:** Prohibited donor briefing to the Planning and Construction Industry.
- **11 June 2021:** Amendments to electoral legislation, including prohibited donors.
- **8 December 2023:** Party and candidate briefing on legislative amendments.
- **16 July 2024:** Political parties and candidates briefing.
- **16 July 2024:** Implementation of misleading electoral advertising legislation.

## Disclosure of financial transactions

Financial disclosure obligations ensure transparency and accountability in ACT Legislative Assembly elections. Political entities must disclose detailed information about their electoral expenditure and the gifts they receive.

There are three main types of disclosure returns:

1. **Election Returns:** Detail electoral expenditure incurred during an election campaign. This includes costs related to advertising, campaign materials, and other election-related activities.
2. **Gift Returns:** Disclose gifts or collections of gifts from the same donor valued at \$1,000 or more within seven days of receipt of the gift.
3. **Annual Returns:** Provide an overview of financial activities of political entities over the course of a year.

## Gift disclosure

For the 2024 election, 370 separate gifts, totalling \$386,238.90, were disclosed and published for the period 1 July to 19 October 2024. This is relatively similar in number (213) and value (\$367,245.92) to the gifts disclosed during the same period in 2020. However, both of these elections saw significantly lower disclosure compared to the 2016 election where 611 separate gifts, totalling over \$1,770,000, were disclosed.

It is likely that this dramatic reduction in disclosure numbers is not reflective of a reduction in donations to political parties in 2020, but a result of amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act, which came into effect on 1 January 2019. These amendments significantly limited the operation of the ACT's funding and disclosure scheme allowing a party with dual registration at the ACT and federal levels, to withhold gift information if the gift was to be used for federal election purposes.

It is not clear if this change to disclosure requirements fully explains the decrease, however, the Commission's ongoing compliance review process continues to analyse political party gift disclosures against their financial records and reports its finding on the Elections ACT website at [www.elections.act.gov.au/integrity/compliance-audits](http://www.elections.act.gov.au/integrity/compliance-audits)

## Election returns

Following the 2024 election, election returns detailing electoral expenditure were received from all 15 registered political parties. Non-party candidates and third-party campaigners also submitted returns outlining donations received and electoral expenditure incurred. Additionally, seven broadcasters and two publishers submitted election disclosure returns detailing electoral advertising purchases.

All election returns became available for public inspection on 1 February 2025 at [www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/election-returns/2024-election-returns](http://www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/election-returns/2024-election-returns)

The requirement for broadcasters and publishers to lodge election returns was introduced in 1994 as part of the general adoption and modification of the Commonwealth FAD scheme. However, the requirement for the AEC to collect these election returns was removed from the Commonwealth Electoral Act before the 2007 federal election following recommendations from the AEC that the returns were rarely viewed and of little use for AEC analysis.

Similarly, the requirement for broadcasters and publishers to lodge election returns for ACT Legislative Assembly elections is of little public interest and does not provide useful cross-checking benefits to Elections ACT, especially with the rise of digital advertising unconnected to traditional publishers. Combined, registered political parties disclosed a total expenditure of \$804,373 on broadcast advertisements and \$133,467 on published advertisements for the 2024 election. Broadcasters, on the other hand, reported a total of around \$160,000, suggesting that definitions of what broadcasters view as reportable expenditure and what political parties are required to report differ. It is likely that this is due to nuances around the definition of Video on Demand services for broadcast licences. Similarly, publishers reported only around \$55,000 of expenditure, significantly different from the total figure reported by parties, which likely takes into account digital advertising through means other than traditional publishers.

## Recommendation 9

The Commission **recommends** amending the Electoral Act to remove section 226, which requires broadcasters and publishers to lodge returns following an election.

## Annual returns

Annual returns covering the 2023/2024 financial year are available for viewing at [www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/annual-returns/20232024-annual-returns](http://www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/annual-returns/20232024-annual-returns).

The 2024/2025 annual returns, covering the key election period, will be made available online from 7 September 2025.

## Public funding

Registered political parties and non-party candidates who secure a minimum number of formal votes are eligible for public funding. To qualify, the endorsed party candidates must, as a group, obtain at least 4% of the

formal first preference votes in their electorate. Similarly, non-party candidates must achieve 4% of the formal first preference votes in their electorate.

The ACT public funding scheme operates on a formula-based direct entitlement system with automatic payments to parties and candidates. Payments are calculated by multiplying the total number of first preference votes received by a prescribed amount, adjusted every six months according to the all-groups consumer price index issued by the ABS. For the 2024 election, the public funding amount was 1015.896 cents per eligible vote.

Table 15 provides details of the public funding payments made for the four most recent elections.

**Table 15** Public funding at the last four ACT elections

| Political party/candidate           | 2012             | 2016               | 2020               | Election<br>2024   |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| ACT Labor                           | \$171,982        | \$750,488          | \$877,847          | \$950,564          |
| Canberra Liberals                   | \$172,064        | \$717,056          | \$784,921          | \$931,089          |
| The ACT Greens                      | \$47,546         | \$200,768          | \$313,539          | \$338,984          |
| Independents for Canberra           | -                | -                  | -                  | \$236,988          |
| Fiona Carrick Independent           | -                | -                  | -                  | \$74,181           |
| Belco Party                         | -                | -                  | \$45,381           | \$26,616           |
| Family First                        | -                | -                  | -                  | \$26,352           |
| Canberra Progressives               | -                | -                  | \$21,949           |                    |
| Democratic Labour Party             | -                | -                  | \$21,699           |                    |
| Aust. Sex Party ACT                 | -                | \$29,552           | -                  |                    |
| Fiona Carrick (Non-party candidate) | -                | -                  | \$32,613           |                    |
| Kim Huynh (Non-party candidate)     | -                | \$18,920           | -                  |                    |
| Aust. Motorist Party                | \$9,588          | -                  | -                  |                    |
| Bullet Train for Canb.              | \$8,222          | -                  | -                  |                    |
| <b>Total</b>                        | <b>\$409,402</b> | <b>\$1,716,784</b> | <b>\$2,097,950</b> | <b>\$2,584,775</b> |

## Limits on election campaign expenditure

An expenditure cap limits the amount of money that can be spent on an election campaign between 1 January in an election year and election day. Expenditure caps were first imposed on political entities in the ACT at the 2012 election, with adjustments to the cap amount made annually through the Consumer Price Index. For the 2024 election, the expenditure caps were:

- \$51,545 per candidate to a maximum of 25 candidates for party groupings (with a maximum of five candidates in each of the five electorates). Therefore, for a party that nominates five candidates in each of the five electorates, the expenditure cap is \$1,288,625.
- \$51,545 per non-party MLA or non-party candidate
- \$51,545 per associated entity
- \$51,545 per third-party campaigner.

No political participants exceeded the electoral expenditure cap during the 2024 ACT election capped expenditure period. Details of electoral expenditure for all political participants can be viewed at [www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/election-returns/2024-election-returns](http://www.elections.act.gov.au/funding-disclosures-and-registers/election-returns/2024-election-returns)

## Comparison of public funding received against election campaign expenditure

The three components of the ACT's election funding, expenditure and financial disclosure scheme – public funding, expenditure caps and gift disclosure – work together to ensure a robust, transparent and equitable electoral environment for political participants.

The explanatory statement that accompanied the *Electoral Amendment Act 2015* which originally increased the public funding amount from 200 cents to 800 cents per eligible vote, stated that:

*There is a rational connection between the limitation on political electoral expenditure and the legitimate purposes of reducing the risk that electoral debates will be dominated by the well-financed and reducing the related risk that candidates and parties will be beholden to their financial supporters. These purposes are inextricably connected to the wider purpose of discouraging corruption through a scheme of robust reporting of political donations, partial public funding and expenditure limits.<sup>7</sup>*

The table below compares the reported electoral expenditure of political parties and non-party candidates with the amounts of public funding received. While the data suggests that the introduction of an electoral expenditure cap and increased public funding has reduced reliance on private financial supporters, it also shows that the public funding amount in the ACT allows some parties and candidates to receive more in public funding than they incur on electoral expenditure.

<sup>7</sup> Electoral Amendment Bill 2014 (No 2), Revised explanatory statement, 19 February 2015, [www.legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db\\_50925/20150219-60187/PDF/db\\_50925.PDF](http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/View/es/db_50925/20150219-60187/PDF/db_50925.PDF), p.3.

**Table 16** Comparison of electoral expenditure and public funding received

| Political party/candidate                    | 2024 electoral expenditure | 2024 public funding received | Difference between expenditure and public funding in \$ | Percentage of expenditure accounted for through public funding % |
|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Australian Labor Party (ACT Branch)          | \$1,196,164                | \$950,564                    | -\$245,600                                              | 79.5%                                                            |
| Liberal Party of Australia (A.C.T. Division) | \$967,549                  | \$931,089                    | -\$36,460                                               | 96.2%                                                            |
| The ACT Greens                               | \$281,673                  | \$338,984                    | \$57,311                                                | 120.3%                                                           |
| Independents for Canberra                    | \$144,205                  | \$236,988                    | \$92,783                                                | 164.3%                                                           |
| Fiona Carrick Independent                    | \$18,003                   | \$74,181                     | \$56,178                                                | 412.0%                                                           |
| Belco Party                                  | \$11,442                   | \$26,616                     | \$15,174                                                | 232.6%                                                           |
| Family First Party (ACT)                     | \$62,969                   | \$26,352                     | -\$36,617                                               | 41.8%                                                            |

Of the parties and candidates that qualified for public funding, the two major political parties—the Australian Labor Party (ACT Branch) and the Liberal Party of Australia (A.C.T. Division)—accounted for 79.5% and 96.2% of their electoral expenditure through public funding, respectively. The Family First Party received public funding that accounted for 41.8% of their electoral expenditure.

However, the ACT Greens, Independents for Canberra, Fiona Carrick Independent, and the Belco Party each received more public funding than they incurred in electoral expenditure. Notably, Fiona Carrick Independent’s public funding was over four times their electoral expenditure amount.

The ACT is unique among states and territories in allowing public funding to exceed reported electoral expenses. In contrast, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and Queensland have reimbursement schemes where public funding is the lesser of either the prescribed amount per first preference vote or the entity’s electoral expenditure. The Northern Territory does not provide public funding.

The Commission acknowledges that there are costs associated with running a campaign that do not fall within the legislated definition of electoral expenditure and are therefore not taken into account in the comparison. However, expanding the definition to include broader ‘administrative expenditure,’ which is currently explicitly exempted from the definition is likely to impact a party’s expenditure cap calculations.

The more elements added within the definition, the more expenditure is incurred that contributes to the cap amount, increasing the risk of cap overspend. To alleviate this, the Assembly may seek to increase the capped expenditure amount.

### **Recommendation 10**

The Commission **recommends** that the Assembly committee investigate means to limit the potential for public funding received by a political party or candidate to exceed the amount of electoral expenditure incurred. This could be achieved either by introducing a reimbursement scheme similar to those in place in other jurisdictions or by reviewing the definition of electoral expenditure.

## **Limiting private funding**

The Commission maintains that a robust and transparent funding and disclosure scheme should integrate the key features of public funding, caps on electoral expenditure, real-time gift reporting and limitations on the receipt of private funding. When balanced appropriately, these features provide an equitable and transparent framework that supports community oversight of political finances.

Prior to the *Electoral Amendment Act 2015*, the Electoral Act imposed a cap on donations to political entities, limiting contributions to \$10,000 per donor per financial year. This cap was subsequently abolished, purportedly



due to concerns about its constitutional validity and the potential for donors to circumvent the law.<sup>8</sup>

However, with the recent introduction of donation caps at the federal level through the *Electoral Legislation Amendment (Electoral Reform) Act 2025* (Cth), and the existence of similar caps in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, there is renewed relevance to reconsidering such limitations in the ACT. Notably, the ACT's high levels of public funding have enabled political parties to cover a significant majority – and in some cases, exceed – their electoral expenditure through public funding. This has substantially reduced the potential for undue influence from private donations.

In light of these developments, the Commission recommends that the Assembly undertake a review of the former legislation imposing caps on private donations. This review should consider the evolving national landscape and the ACT's unique funding environment to determine whether reintroducing donation caps would further strengthen the real and perceived integrity and transparency of the Territory's electoral system.

### **Recommendation 11**

In light of recent amendments to the federal financial disclosure scheme, and to further strengthen both the real and perceived integrity and transparency of the Territory's electoral system—particularly regarding the potential undue influence of private money in ACT elections—the Commission **recommends** that the Assembly review the former legislation imposing a cap on political donations, with a view to introducing a similar provision or one aligned with the new federal donation cap framework.

## **Prospective registered party**

While new parties can register throughout most of the election cycle, it is most common for them to register in the few months just before the legislated cutoff. In 2020, eight new political parties registered between May and July, while in 2024, four new parties registered during the same period.

Due to their proximity to the formal election period, these new parties often engage in political activity before formal registration, incurring electoral expenses and receiving donations. The current legislation can

be considered silent on the appropriate status of these entities prior to political party registration. If considered third-party campaigners before formal registration, they would be required to lodge two separate election returns: one as third-party campaigners and one as registered political parties. However, this interpretation would also provide the entity with two separate calculations for an electoral expenditure cap: \$51,545 as a third-party campaigner and then an additional \$51,545 per candidate nominated once registered as a political party. This could be seen as misaligned with the intended purpose of the expenditure cap.

Similarly, third-party campaigners are not required to disclose gifts until after the election date. Thus, a political party could receive sizable donations before registration without disclosing them until 60 days post-election. This too may not align with the intended purpose of real-time gift disclosure by parties and candidates.

A similar issue is evident in relation to individuals who are considering running as a non-party candidate (known within the Electoral Act as a prospective non-party candidate) who later decide to register their own political party before the election. Their early activities may incur electoral expenses or receive donations that should arguably be considered transactions of the ultimately registered political party.

Section 200 of the Electoral Act provides that gifts received, expenditure incurred and amounts received, paid or owed, by or on behalf of a prospective candidate for a party, are taken to be received, incurred, paid or owed by the relevant party. This same logic could be used to address the issue raised above.

### **Recommendation 12**

The Commission **recommends** amending Part 14 of the Electoral Act to introduce the concept of a 'prospective registered political party' and set the relevant period to the commencement of the capped expenditure period. By introducing this concept within Part 14 of the Act, the financial transactions that occur from 1 January in an election year for a political entity that ultimately forms a registered political would be considered incurred or received by the political party once registered.

<sup>8</sup> Electoral Amendment Bill 2014 (No 2), presentation speech 27 November 2014, online at <https://www.hansard.act.gov.au/hansard/8th-assembly/2014/HTML/week13/4155.htm>



# Election staff

## Staffing

For each ACT Legislative Assembly election, Elections ACT supplements its permanent team with experienced casual and contract staff. These temporary staff manage various processes before, during, and after the election. Additionally, under the Electoral Act, the Commissioner employs polling officials for early voting centres and polling places on election day. These temporary staff typically start several months before the election and continue until most election tasks are completed.

In 2024, due to the evolving electoral environment and heightened community expectations, the Commission began engaging these staff earlier than in previous elections.

Table 17 outlines the commencement dates of key temporary staff at the 2024 ACT election.

Table 17 Key staff

| Staff position                                      | Commencement  |
|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| Election Operations Manager                         | August 2023   |
| Funding and Disclosure Officer                      | December 2023 |
| Facilities and Access Manager                       | December 2023 |
| Elections Projects Officer – ICT                    | December 2023 |
| Elections Projects Officer – ICT                    | December 2023 |
| Elections Projects Officer - Operations             | April 2024    |
| Materials Manager                                   | May 2024      |
| Elections Projects Officer – Funding and Disclosure | May 2024      |
| Elections Projects Officer – Communications         | May 2024      |
| Elections Projects Officer – Postal voting          | June 2024     |
| Materials Assistant                                 | July 2024     |
| Misleading Electoral Advertising Manager            | July 2024     |
| Misleading Electoral Advertising Officer            | July 2024     |
| Staffing Assistant                                  | August 2024   |

Between the 2020 and 2024 elections, the Electoral Commission expanded its Human Resources capacity by hiring a permanent People Manager to oversee the Elections ACT staffing team. This team played a crucial role in preparing for the 2024 ACT election by improving HR policies and procedures. Their efforts included comprehensive staff training programs, ensuring all team members were well-prepared for their roles.

The staffing team also streamlined recruitment processes to quickly attract and onboard skilled personnel, addressing the challenge of short-term organisational expansion. They introduced enhanced performance management systems to monitor and support staff performance throughout the election period. Additionally, the team improved Work Health and Safety (WHS) policies and procedures, prioritising employee well-being and safety. These measures ensured a capable workforce and fostered a culture of continuous improvement within the Commission.

Before the key 2024 election period, Elections ACT secured a secondment from the Electoral Commission South Australia (ECSA) to assist with the administration and enforcement of new misleading electoral advertising legislation. The Misleading Electoral Advertising Manager began working part-time, remotely, from July 2024.

## Election casuals

Elections ACT maintains a database of individuals who have applied for roles as polling officials and election casuals. Where possible, previously employed and suitable-rated staff are re-engaged for upcoming elections.

In 2024, the number of staff for single-day polling places and early voting centres decreased significantly compared to previous elections. This reduction was due to several factors. The 2020 election, impacted by the global pandemic, required more staff due to expanded early voting locations, extended hours, and enhanced hygiene practices. In 2024, with reduced locations, voting hours, and hygiene requirements, early voting staff decreased from 353 in 2020 to 176 in 2024.

Similarly, the number of staff for election day polling places decreased in 2024. This was primarily due to a reduction in polling places in response to the increasing trend of early voting. The anticipated decline in election day votes, with an estimated 60% of votes to be cast early, led to a reduction in polling places from 67 in 2020 to 44 in 2024. In 2020, 460 staff were employed for election day polling places, reducing to 345 in 2024.

Voter satisfaction polling indicated a high level of satisfaction with the 2024 voting experience, with 92% of voters expressing satisfaction. Voters rated staff helpfulness at 93%, friendliness at 97%, and efficiency at 95% (see Table 51 – Voter satisfaction with service delivery provided by ACT polling places under **Exit survey results** on page 95).

ACT Shared Services Payroll was contracted again to facilitate the payment of election casuals. Payment information was processed through the Elections ACT employment database and transferred electronically to Shared Services. This arrangement continued to work well.

Table 18 lists the staff employed by Elections ACT for the 2024 election. Some employees worked in multiple capacities and may be listed in more than one category.

**Table 18** Staff employed during the 2024 election

| Position                                       | No.         |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Statutory office holders                       | 3           |
| Contract executive                             | 1           |
| Permanent Public Sector Management Act staff   | 14          |
| Contract Public Sector Management Act staff    | 14          |
| Specialist election casual staff – election HQ | 2           |
| Senior casual staff— election HQ               | 87          |
| Casual staff— election HQ                      | 117         |
| Polling area managers                          | 5           |
| Early voting Officers in charge                | 11          |
| Early voting Seconds in charge                 | 11          |
| Early voting polling officials                 | 154         |
| Single day Officers in charge                  | 44          |
| Single day Seconds in charge                   | 44          |
| Election day polling officials                 | 252         |
| Mobile polling officials                       | 8           |
| <b>Total</b>                                   | <b>767*</b> |

\* Individual employees may have performed roles in multiple positions.

### Procurement

Given the challenges during election preparations, improvements in procurement management are necessary. Establishing a dedicated Procurement Manager for future ACT elections is crucial for enhancing the Electoral Commission’s efficiency and effectiveness.

The increasing complexity and compliance obligations of procurement activities have escalated the workload on existing staff, diverting their attention from essential election preparations.

By appointing a specialised Procurement Manager, the Commission can ensure procurement processes are handled with expertise and focus. This will streamline operations and allow other staff to concentrate on their core responsibilities. This strategic move will ensure better compliance and risk management, fostering a more efficient and focused team.

### Recommendation 13

The Commission **recommends** provisioning of funds through government budget processes for the appointment of a Procurement Manager in Elections ACT to ensure that procurement processes are handled with the necessary expertise and focus, thereby streamlining operations and allowing other staff members to concentrate on their core responsibilities.

### Training

Detailed training for polling officials is conducted before every election. In 2024, eight categories of polling place staff received tailored training: Polling Area Managers (PAMs), Officers in Charge (OICs), Early Voting OICs, Seconds in Charge (2ICs), Early Voting 2ICs, Issuing Officers, Early Voting Issuing Officers, and Mobile Polling Officials.

A refreshed online training system was developed for the 2024 election. All polling location staff were required to complete this online training and assessment program, which included graphics, video content, and interactive elements.

In addition to online training, all polling place management staff received comprehensive face-to-face training. Early Voting OICs and 2ICs attended regular sessions from May 2024, each focusing on different aspects of their responsibilities. Election day OICs and 2ICs had two face-to-face sessions: one on the LAPPERDS polling place management system and another on operational elements of managing an election day polling place.

Sessions were delivered by either a contracted training provider or an Elections ACT staff member, depending on the content.

**Table 19** Face to face training sessions

| Topic                         | Attendees                        | Date                     |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| People management             | Early voting OICs and 2ICs       | 28 May 2024              |
| Electronic voting             | Early voting OICs and 2ICs       | 18 June 2024             |
| LAPPERDS                      | All OICs and 2ICs                | 27 & 31 July 2024        |
| Early voting operations       | Early voting OICs and 2ICs       | 20 August 2024           |
| Early voting refresher        | Early voting OICs and 2ICs       | 1 October 2024           |
| Mobile team training          | Mobile polling OICs and officers | 10 October 2024          |
| Election day operations       | OICs and 2ICs                    | 12, 15 & 16 October 2024 |
| Polling Area Manager training | PAMs                             | 17 October 2024          |

While the training program was generally well received, with 77% of OICs, 73% of 2ICs, and 86% of issuing officers feeling very or highly prepared, the multi-session face-to-face training framework is unlikely to be used for the 2028 election. It was administratively and operationally demanding, did not result in improved outcomes, and was delivered to individuals who did not ultimately perform the role during the election period.

Elections ACT will review the online and face-to-face training programs for the 2028 election. The aim is to improve polling place outcomes and satisfaction levels among polling officials, as well as to ensure the training program is as effective as possible before the next election.

## Election equipment and logistics

Logistical preparations for a Legislative Assembly election begin immediately after the previous election, but many elements can only be finalised closer to the core election period, especially tasks involving polling place addresses or party/candidate names.

Following the 2020 election, the Assembly legislated an additional 24 hours for the Commission to finalise critical candidate-related tasks. Previously, only 3.5 days, including a weekend, were allowed for these processes. The new enactment extends this to 4.5 days, providing more time between the declaration of nominations and the opening of postal voting. This extension is crucial for completing several vital tasks before voting begins.

One such task is the typesetting, proofreading, and printing of ballot papers, ensuring each of the 60 Robson rotation versions of each electorate ballot paper is accurate. Following this, tens of thousands of postal vote applications can be processed, and postal voting packs created and dispatched as soon as permissible. Additionally, the final professional audio recording of candidate names for electronic voting, essential for blind and vision-impaired voters, must be finalised and input into the electronic voting and telephone voting systems.

Table 20 outlines key aspects of the election, illustrating the scale of equipping an ACT Legislative Assembly election.

**Table 20 Materials required for the 2024 ACT election**

| Item                                                      | No.     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| 5G routers                                                | 31      |
| Ballot boxes of various sizes                             | 272     |
| Ballot papers printed                                     | 223,050 |
| Barcodes printed                                          | 457,656 |
| BVI equipment – keyboards, keypads                        | 33      |
| Compu-sticks                                              | 66      |
| Declaration vote envelopes                                | 10,600  |
| Disinfectant (250ml bottles)                              | 245     |
| Electoral enrolment cards printed                         | 29,370  |
| Electronic voting touchscreen computers                   | 220     |
| Extension cords                                           | 200     |
| Hand-sanitiser (375ml bottles)                            | 486     |
| Headphones and hearing loops                              | 88      |
| iPads                                                     | 55      |
| Laptops (polling places)                                  | 400     |
| Laptops (ballot paper verification scanning and auditing) | 31      |
| Monitors (polling places)                                 | 69      |
| Monitors (scanning and ballot paper auditing)             | 53      |
| Pencils (single use)                                      | 129,640 |
| Personal protective masks                                 | 4,000   |
| Polling official and scrutineer badges                    | 941     |
| Polling places hired                                      | 55      |
| Power boards                                              | 200     |
| Power banks                                               | 145     |
| Printers                                                  | 16      |
| QR code readers                                           | 220     |
| Scanners (high-speed ballot paper)                        | 5       |
| Servers                                                   | 17      |
| Uninterrupted power supplies (UPS)                        | 11      |
| Voting screens and other cardboard equipment              | 1,666   |

Much of the ICT equipment used in voting locations is hired to ensure value for money and the use of contemporary technology for critical tasks such as recording voter attendance and preferences. In 2024, 400 touch-screen laptops, leased through DDTs, were deployed across 55 polling locations for electoral roll look-up, mark-off and polling place management. Additionally, 220 touchscreen voting terminals, hired from a third-party vendor, were used in 11 early voting centres. The Electoral Commission also deployed 17 servers, 16 printers, and 220 QR code readers for electronic and telephone voting.

For ballot paper scanning, 28 computers, 50 monitors, and 5 high-speed scanners were used, along with 3 additional laptops and monitors for the new auditing process.

Elections ACT achieved significant savings on election equipment in the following areas:

- **Hire of ICT equipment:** Elections ACT worked with DDTs to hire standard ACT government-provisioned laptops for the LAPPERDS systems in polling locations. This arrangement provided consistent, cost-effective hardware, avoiding the need for purchases and depreciation over multiple elections. Similar arrangements were made for hiring computer monitors and loaning 5G routers for Wi-Fi, resulting in significant cost savings and low deployment risk.
- **Polling place cardboard equipment:** Elections ACT sourced necessary cardboard equipment from the AEC's existing stores, covering only manufacturing and freight costs. This approach leveraged the economies of scale achieved by the AEC, avoiding high costs or reluctance from manufacturers to produce small quantities.
- **Hearing loops:** Elections ACT provisioned hearing loop systems in every early voting centre through loans from the AEC, aiding people with hearing aids.

## Accommodation

The Commission's office staffing levels fluctuate significantly, increasing by around 150% during election periods to manage the extensive operational requirements of ACT Legislative Assembly elections. Outside election periods, staffing and operational needs decrease, but activities like ICT development, fee-for-service elections, and secure storage continue. Historically, Elections ACT has had to source and relocate to alternative office locations in the year leading up to an election and then relocate back afterward. The ACT Government's real estate divestment program reduced the availability of temporary government-owned spaces, posing a risk to successful election conduct. This led to the 2020 election being conducted from a commercially leased location.

Securing temporary accommodation every election cycle became increasingly difficult and costly. Commercial leasing rates are higher than government-provided rates, and fitting out commercial spaces to meet government standards incurred significant costs. Temporary solutions resulted in sunk capital costs and additional expenses for make-good provisions after each lease.

To address this risk, the Commission sought an increase to its recurrent budget to secure a permanent lease in the Nara Centre. This lease would provide stable office space during peak election periods, reducing in floor space in non-election years. The office arrangement would support the Commission's independence and provide a shared arrangement where other ACT Public Sector agencies and staff could use the space until it became necessary for election preparations. This proposal solved significant operational and financial risks for Elections ACT while enhancing value for money for the Territory.

For 2023-24 and 2024-25, the Commission received \$0.374 million in additional recurrent funding for the new Level 1, Nara Centre office arrangements. In September 2022, the Commission moved into its new permanent accommodation in the north-east wing of Level 1 Nara Centre. For the 2024 ACTLA election, the Commission expanded to occupy the south-west wing of the floor from November 2023. During non-election periods, this additional space is used for flexible working of ACTGOV employees but is made available to the Commission for 12 months for election operations.

The new office solution is expected to serve Elections ACT well for future elections. It allows the agency to transform and manipulate the space to accommodate changing operational needs, providing appropriate locations for ICT testing, polling official training, secure storage, and vote scrutiny processes. The absence of the need to secure and relocate to temporary office arrangements significantly reduced risk and increased productivity for the agency.

Additionally, the Commission leased a location in Fyshwick from July to November 2024 as the materials hub for the election.

## Complaints made to the Electoral Commissioner

A total of 142 complaints were made to the Commissioner regarding the conduct of the 2024 election. Each complaint was duly considered and investigated. The complaints are categorised in Table 21, which compares data from the 2012, 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections.

**Table 21** Complaints relating to the 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 elections

| Complaint category                                                              |                                                    | 2012       | 2016       | 2020       | 2024       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Complaints relating to party and candidate activity                             |                                                    |            |            |            |            |
| Matters regulated under the Electoral Act                                       | Canvassing within 100-metres on a polling place    | 18         | 33         | 16         | 4          |
|                                                                                 | Authorisation of advertisements*                   | 24         | 35         | 46         | 24         |
|                                                                                 | Miscellaneous^                                     | 16         | 12         | 10         | 7          |
| Matters not regulated under the Electoral Act                                   | Placement of signs in public or commercial places# | 28         | 13         | 17         | 1          |
|                                                                                 | Miscellaneous~                                     | 24         | 39         | 12         | 32         |
| Sub-total — complaints relating to party and candidate activity                 |                                                    | 110        | 132        | 101        | 68         |
| Complaints relating to Elections ACT services <sup>f</sup>                      |                                                    |            |            |            |            |
| Voting                                                                          | Locations/signage                                  | 13         | 2          | 5          | 12         |
|                                                                                 | Electronic voting facilities/systems               | 14         | 1          | 3          | 9          |
|                                                                                 | Electronic voting staff assistance                 | 10         | 6          | 3          | 5          |
|                                                                                 | Other voting facilities/systems/postal voting      | 12         | 4          | 0          | 10         |
|                                                                                 | Other voting staff assistance                      | 15         | 2          | 7          | 11         |
| Elections ACT advertising                                                       |                                                    | 8          | 7          | 6          | 13         |
| Miscellaneous                                                                   |                                                    | 10         | 7          | 5          | 11         |
| Sub-total — Complaints relating to Elections ACT services                       |                                                    | 79         | 29         | 29         | 71         |
| Complaints unrelated to Party, candidate or Elections ACT activity <sup>†</sup> |                                                    | 15         | 8          | 5          | 3          |
| <b>Total complaints</b>                                                         |                                                    | <b>204</b> | <b>169</b> | <b>135</b> | <b>142</b> |

\* Where the material appeared to be in breach of the authorisation requirements, the matter was brought to the notice of the responsible person and rectified. The authorisation of electoral material is discussed above under Political Campaigning.

^ These complaints included assertions that a party provided incorrect information regarding the use of the electoral roll, issues relating to misleading/deceptive advertising, allegations of bribery and improper influence and assertions in relation to the expenditure cap.

# These complaints were referred to Transport Canberra and City Services, and included references to the number, size and location of signs, location of stationary vehicles displaying advertising, and use of public land.

~ These covered a range of activity including the quality of messages in advertising, unacceptable canvassing, junk mail, and use of material without permission.

<sup>f</sup> These complaints refer to complaints received by Elections ACT head office and do not include complaints received by polling officials working in voting centres.

<sup>†</sup> The unrelated complaints referred to issues such as the availability of electoral roll data, compulsory voting, the media blackout, voter identification not being required and the ABC television coverage.



In cases of minor, technical, or trivial breaches of the Act, the Commissioner's first approach was to contact the potential offender and request compliance with the Act. This method proved effective in preventing ongoing minor or technical breaches.

## Misleading electoral advertising complaints

On 1 July 2021, the Electoral Act was amended to establish a new offence for inaccurate and misleading electoral advertising under section 297A. This offence aims to uphold electoral integrity by preventing the spread of false information that may mislead voters. The ACT Electoral Commission was established as the entity responsible for enforcing these laws and may request the withdrawal of misleading advertisements and the publication of corrections.

These laws align with similar regulations in South Australia, and the Commission engaged closely with the ECSA to prepare for their enforcement during the 2024 ACT election.

Section 297A provides that:

1. A person commits an offence if –
  - a. The person disseminates, or authorises the dissemination of, an advertisement containing electoral matter; and
  - b. The advertisement contains a statement purporting to be a statement of fact that is inaccurate and misleading to a material extent.

The Commissioner received 32 complaints alleging breaches of section 297A. Each complaint underwent a structured assessment to determine its validity. Each complaint was initially assessed to determine whether the substance of the complaint involved matter that could be considered an 'electoral advertisement'. While 'electoral advertisement' is defined within the Electoral Act, the scope of the definition extends only to *Part 14 (Election funding, expenditure, and financial disclosure)* of the Act and could not be referenced in the application of s297A. As such, when assessing each complaint, the Commissioner relied upon the Act's definition of 'electoral matter' and the Macquarie Dictionary's definition of 'advertisement', meaning 'any device or public announcement...designed to attract public attention...'. In the absence of a legislated definition of electoral advertisement, the application and scope of

this law remain under some conjecture as it is unclear whether social media posts or recorded and published live interviews fall within its remit. Clarity, through definition, would benefit the administration and enforcement of these provisions.

Once it was established that the complaint involved an electoral advertisement, the next criterion was whether it contained a statement purporting to be a fact. In such cases, the Commissioner is empowered to undertake investigations to corroborate the supporting evidence and, where necessary, seek further information from either or both the complainant and the alleged offender.

The final assessment element is whether the statement of fact is materially inaccurate and misleading. That is, the purported statement of fact must be demonstrably incorrect and 'lead into error of conduct, thought or judgement'<sup>9</sup>, to a substantial or significant extent.

The Commission's misleading electoral advertising policy is available on the Elections ACT website at [www.elections.act.gov.au/integrity/misleading-electoral-advertising](http://www.elections.act.gov.au/integrity/misleading-electoral-advertising)

Of the 32 complaints received, 31 did not meet the criteria to be upheld as offences under section 297A. The majority of these determinations related to the absence of a statement that purported to be a statement of fact. In a small number of cases, the matter, while deemed to be a statement of fact, was determined not to be inaccurate and misleading.

One misleading electoral advertising complaint was upheld and found to contravene section 297A. After receiving the complaint on 1 October 2024, and confirming it met the criteria for investigation, the Commissioner contacted the alleged offender, requesting a submission with evidence to support the accuracy of the statements in the advertisement.

Upon receiving the reply, further clarification was sought regarding the dissemination method (platform, media outlet, or distribution method) and format (digital content or printed material). The complaint was then thoroughly assessed according to the Commission's misleading electoral advertising policy, considering all relevant information from the complainant and stakeholders.

<sup>9</sup> Macquarie dictionary online [https://app.macquariedictionary.com.au/?search\\_word\\_type=dictionary&word=mislead](https://app.macquariedictionary.com.au/?search_word_type=dictionary&word=mislead)

The Commissioner concluded that the material contained a statement of fact that breached section 297A. Consequently, on the evening of 17 October 2024, the Commissioner requested the statement cease to be published and a retraction be issued on the same platforms. The Commissioner provided the wording for the retraction.

The Commissioner then reviewed the media environment to confirm that the retraction statement had been appropriately published and that the offending statement was no longer publicly available. By noon the following day, 18 October 2024, the offender had written to confirm compliance with the directed instructions.

### **Administrative enforcement**

Following the 2020 amendments to the Electoral Act, which introduced misleading electoral advertising laws, the Commission sought additional resources for enforcement. In the 2023-24 budget, the Commission received \$0.301 million to engage two temporary staff members to assist the Deputy Electoral Commissioner in overseeing investigations and administration of misleading electoral advertising complaints.

Before the 2024 election period, Elections ACT secured a secondment from the Electoral Commission South Australia (ECSA) to assist with enforcement. The Misleading Electoral Advertising Manager worked remotely, supported by a Misleading Electoral Advertising Officer within Elections ACT.

The funding received as part of the 2023-24 budget process, while temporary and relating only to the 2024 election, was appropriate for the effective administration of misleading electoral advertising complaints. However, it is critical that the Electoral Commission remains appropriately funded to allow it to continue to administer the misleading electoral advertising legislation and that this funding is a permanent fixture within its ongoing election budget.

## **Misleading electoral advertising recommendations**

### **Recommendation 14**

The Commission **recommends** amending section 297A of the Electoral Act to introduce an applicable definition of *Electoral advertisement*. The Commission recommends that the chosen definition appropriately defines the scope of the meaning of advertisement to explicitly identify the types of broadcasts and publications that are to be captured.

### **Recommendation 15**

The Commission **recommends** the Government provide funding to support the ongoing administration of misleading electoral advertising legislation for future elections, consistent with the funding provided for the 2024 Legislative Assembly Elections.

## **Compulsory and multiple voting**

### **Compulsory voting**

Voting is compulsory for ACT elections. It is an offence for an enrolled elector to fail to vote at an election without a valid and sufficient reason.

By subtracting the number of votes counted (279,370) from the total enrolment (321,721), a total of 42,351 electors apparently failed to vote in the 2024 election. However this calculation does not account for electors who attempted to vote but had their votes rejected, such as postal voters who did not sign their declaration.

The 2024 election marked the second election in which new electors to the ACT were able to enrol up until the close of polls on election day, under the provisions known as 'enrol on the day'. As in 2020, this led to the emergence of a new category of non-voter. Some electors, newly arrived in the ACT and without attending a polling place, enrolled online after the close of the preliminary roll. Feedback from these electors during the administration of the 2020 non-voter process revealed a common misunderstanding. Firstly, many were unaware that an ACT election was underway,




having only recently moved to the Territory. Secondly, while they took responsible steps to update their enrolment—believing it was the correct action—they did not realise that doing so had made them both eligible and required to vote in an election they were largely unaware was occurring. To address this issue Elections ACT will work with the AEC to ensure that these electors are better informed of their immediate voting obligations prior to future elections.

A total of 3,118 new ACT electors were added to the ACT electoral roll through the ‘enrol on the day’ provisions. However, electors who had left the ACT

since the preliminary roll closed could not be removed. As discussed under **Voter turnout** on page 28, this had the effect of swelling the final close of roll and increasing the number of non-voters, leaving electors on the roll who, while eligible to vote, were no longer located in the territory. A total of 3,314 electors were removed from the ACT electoral roll by 1 December 2024. Had these electors been removed from the final certified list of electors, the percentage of non-voters would have reduced to 12.3%.


Graph 7 shows the percentage of apparent non-voters for ACT elections since 1995.

**Graph 7** Percentage (%) of non-voters at ACT elections



Graph 8 shows the percentage of non-voters at each of the two most recent state/territory and federal elections.

**Graph 8**    Percentage (%) of non-voters at federal/state elections



It is interesting to note from the jurisdictional table above that every jurisdiction experienced an increase in their non-voter percentages in comparison to their corresponding previous election, with the exception of Tasmania that remained steady.

A total of 13,343 apparent non-voters were not sent failure to vote notices because they either provided a valid reason for not voting or transferred their enrolment interstate after the election. On 24 March 2025, 26,263 electors were sent apparent non-voter notices.

On 8 May 2025, Elections ACT sent reminder ‘second notices’ to the 14,856 apparent non-voters who had failed to reply to the first notice by that time.

At the time of this report, Elections ACT was still accepting replies to second notices. Notices of possible prosecution may be sent to electors who do not respond to the second notice within the three-week deadline.

Elections ACT will liaise with the Director of Public Prosecutions and the ACT Magistrates Court regarding the issuing of summonses to electors who fail to respond to the notice of possible prosecution or provide an invalid reason and have not paid the failure to vote penalty.

Graph 9 below shows non-voter rates for the 2024 election as a percentage of the number enrolled for each age.

Graph 9 2024 non-voter rates by age



## Non-voter rates for the 2024 election as a percentage of the number enrolled for each age




Table 22 outlines the replies received up until 8 May 2025, just prior to the issuance of second notices, compared with the replies for the 2020 election by the same stage. Non-voter processes will continue into the 2024–25 financial year.

**Table 22** Non-voter statistics, 2020 and 2024 elections

| Details                                                               | 2020          | 2024 <sup>#</sup> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Total enrolment                                                       | 306,000       | 321,721           |
| Votes counted                                                         | 273,143       | 279,370           |
| <b>No. of apparent non-voters</b>                                     | <b>32,857</b> | <b>42,351</b>     |
| Valid reason for not voting provided before notices sent <sup>*</sup> | 8,745         | 15,836            |
| <b>No. of electors sent non-voters notice<sup>^</sup></b>             | <b>23,845</b> | <b>26,515</b>     |
| Elector claimed to have voted                                         | 251           | 247               |
| Elector deceased                                                      | 11            | 5                 |
| Other valid and sufficient reason provided                            | 2,671         | 3,306             |
| \$20 penalty paid                                                     | 5,235         | 5,616             |
| Elector moved permanently interstate or overseas                      | 1,511         | 1,928             |
| Letter returned undelivered                                           | 952           | 529               |
| Under investigation                                                   | 104           | 28                |
| No reply — second notice sent                                         | 14,318        | 14,856            |

<sup>\*</sup> Includes electors who provided an early excuse, whose postal or declaration votes were not admitted to the count, who transferred their enrolment interstate before notices were sent, enrolled after the preliminary roll close, applied for a postal vote or involved a polling official error.

<sup>^</sup> The number of notices sent and the number of valid reasons provided before notices were sent do not sum to the total number of apparent non-voters because some electors who did in fact vote were sent non-voter notices as their names were not correctly marked as having voted in polling places and because some electors who were not enrolled had their votes admitted to the count following the declaration vote scrutiny.

<sup>#</sup> At the time of preparing this report the non-voter process was yet to be finalised. 2024 figures are not final.

After the 2020 non-voter process, 9,795 electors paid the \$20 fine for failing to vote. For the 2024 election, 5,616 electors had already paid the fine by the time second notices were sent. This number is expected to increase following the deadline for second notice responses and the issuance of notices of possible prosecution later in 2025.

As argued in previous election reports, it is possible that the marked increase since 2004 in the number of non-voters choosing to pay the \$20 penalty for failing to vote may be due, at least in part, to the low value of the penalty. For some electors, it may be that the \$20 penalty is not a sufficient incentive to encourage them to vote.

It is noteworthy that only the Commonwealth and the ACT currently have a \$20 penalty for failing to vote. Western Australia, which previously had a \$20 penalty, now imposes a \$50 penalty for first-time offenders, increasing to \$75 for repeat offenders. Penalty notice fines in other jurisdictions range from \$25 in the Northern Territory to \$154 in Queensland, although in Queensland the penalty reduces to \$77 if the penalty is paid by the first due date. The penalty in Tasmania is \$40.40, \$55 in New South Wales, \$99 in Victoria and \$109 in South Australia, which include a \$99 victims of crime levy. In each of these jurisdictions with the exception of the Commonwealth, Western Australia, South Australia and the ACT, the penalty for failing to vote is linked to a penalty unit, providing for the penalty to increase over time. In South Australia, while the failure to vote penalty is not itself linked to a penalty unit, the penalty includes a victims of crime levy which may increase over time.

The Commission notes that the current ACT penalty for failure to vote that may be imposed by a court, is half a penalty unit (plus court costs). With one penalty unit currently set at \$160, this penalty is \$80. The Commission suggests that, if the penalty notice fine in the ACT is to be increased, it would be appropriate to link it to a quarter of a penalty unit, rounded down to the nearest \$5 (for ease of administration). This would result in the penalty notice fine being increased to \$40.

**Recommendation 16**

To help address declining participation rates in the ACT, the Commission **recommends** that the penalty notice fine for failing to vote at ACT Legislative Assembly elections be increased. The Commission suggests the penalty for failing to vote be linked to a fraction of a penalty unit. The Commission further **recommends** that the penalty should be set at quarter of a penalty unit, rounded down to the nearest \$5.

## Enforcement of compulsory voting through the Magistrates Court

Division 10.7 of the Electoral Act outlines the procedures for enforcing compulsory voting in the ACT. Section 164 requires the final default notice to inform electors that they can either pay the prescribed penalty or convince the Commissioner they voted or had a valid reason for not voting to avoid court proceedings.

For the 2020 election, after the final default notice process, the Commission issued 2,005 non-voter summonses. This volume of court cases places a significant burden on the Magistrates Court and the Director of Public Prosecutions, as well as the administrative efforts and costs for the Electoral Commission.

Liaison with the Director of Public Prosecutions following the 2024 election has indicated a reluctance to dedicate the significant and scarce resources required to prosecute non-voters, which may undermine the compulsory voting system in the ACT.

Aside from the Commonwealth, the ACT is the only jurisdiction where electors who do not respond to their apparent failure to vote notices with a valid reason or payment of the initial penalty, are dealt with through the courts. In all other jurisdictions, these electors are referred to the respective fines enforcement registry where fines typically increase, and enforcement activities, such as driver's licence suspension, are used to recover fines. Courts are only involved if the elector seeks to have the matter heard, which is rare.

The Commission believes a more practical and efficient solution is needed in the ACT to uphold the policy objectives of enforcing compulsory voting, while avoiding direct court involvement.

One potential solution is to introduce an infringement notice alongside the prescribed penalty, creating a graduated enforcement step. An elector who failed to vote without a valid reason could pay the prescribed penalty. If they do not act after the three-notice process, the matter would be referred to the responsible ACT government entity for issuing infringement notices. The penalty amount for the infringement notice could be tied to a penalty unit or a fraction thereof. This graduated fine increase would provide a meaningful penalty and incentivise offenders to pay early rather than pay an increased fine and also avoids court action.

This proposed regime would eliminate the issuance of all summonses. The Magistrates Court and the DPP would only be involved for electors who explicitly seek to contest the matter in court. Failure to pay the infringement notice would be handled similarly to other non-payment issues in the ACT, such as driver's licence suspension.

### Recommendation 17

The Commission **recommends** legislation for the imposition of a non-voter infringement notice, linked to a penalty unit or a fraction of a penalty unit, to provide for a graduated increase in the penalty for failing to vote. The Commission further **recommends** amending the Electoral Act to remove direct prosecution through the courts if a non-voter does not sufficiently discharge their liability for the offence.

## Multiple voting

After each election, the records of electors who voted are reviewed to identify instances where an elector may have been marked as having voted more than once. Investigations typically reveal that multiple roll marks are due to polling official errors, such as marking a similar name.

In the ACT, deliberate multiple voting is rare and considered a serious offence, carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units (\$8,000), six months imprisonment, or both. Historically, cases suggesting multiple voting often involve mitigating circumstances, such as an elector voting through a mobile facility in a nursing home and then again at a polling place at the direction of their family.

No elector in the ACT has ever been prosecuted for deliberate and systematic multiple voting.

In 2024, there were 74 cases (88 in 2020 and 87 in 2016) where a person presenting to vote had already had their name marked off. To ensure that no elector is denied their voting rights, these electors were issued declaration votes, with 27 votes admitted and 47 rejected after preliminary scrutiny.

The introduction of the electronic networked electoral roll system (LAPPERDS) has largely eliminated the opportunity for effective fraudulent multiple voting. LAPPERDS ensures that a voter's roll mark transaction is transmitted across the network within minutes.

Electors found to have already had their name marked are offered the chance to vote using a declaration vote, which is then scrutinised against the amalgamated certified list to determine its validity.

After examining the amalgamated certified list and accounting for polling official errors, Elections ACT found only 21 names marked more than once without explanation. These included four electors from Brindabella, four from Ginninderra, one from Kurrajong, five from Murrumbidgee, and seven from Yerrabi. At the time of this report, 21 electors had been sent further investigation notices, with 18 providing acceptable explanations and three yet to reply. The Commission believes these investigations are unlikely to reveal any organised or systematic attempts to fraudulently influence the election results.

## 2024 election budget

Over the period 2022-23 to 2024-25 the Commission received a total of \$9.219 million in recurrent funding for the purpose of agency administration and election preparations and conduct.

This funding, spanning three financial years, included \$7.019 million in baseline electoral funding which, for the first time in 2022-23, included the supply of an additional appropriation for new permanent office accommodation designed to meet the adaptive requirements of Elections ACT in delivering Legislative Assembly elections over a four-year cycle.

In addition to the baseline electoral funding, the Commission brought forward a budget bid in 2023-24 in support of enhanced electoral integrity. The Commission received additional funding amounting to \$1.490 million over two years until 2024-25.

For 2024-25 financial year, a further budget bid was submitted successfully obtaining \$0.710 million in additional funding to engage courier services to expedite the delivery and return of overseas postal votes.

The Commission's total expenditure for the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election is estimated at \$9.546 million. This includes \$2.585 million for the legislated public funding of eligible parties and candidates.

Expenditure on the 2024 election and election ICT projects exceeded the Commission's budget allocations by approximately \$0.326 million. These are mainly brought about by higher than anticipated costs associated with the information campaign, leasing of the materials hub, ICT systems hosting & support, physical security, venue hire and public funding. The Commission's 2024-25 annual report will provide more detail on the Commission's budget outcomes for the financial year.

Expenditure of \$6.961 million (excluding public funding) equates to a cost per vote of \$24.92 (\$21.62 in 2020 and \$12.52 in 2016).

Table 23 shows the Commission's 2024 election expenditure broken down into main areas of expenditure.

**Table 23 2024 election expenditure**

| Expenditure <sup>^</sup>                                                           | \$(GST ex)       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| ICT assurance plan implementation                                                  | 561,915          |
| Information campaign                                                               | 896,385          |
| Materials and general printing                                                     | 138,671          |
| Materials hub                                                                      | 121,843          |
| Non-voters                                                                         | 95,064           |
| Other ICT systems hosting and support                                              | 255,535          |
| Postal voting                                                                      | 417,287          |
| Redistribution of electoral boundaries                                             | 21,484           |
| Scrutiny                                                                           | 173,997          |
| Security costs                                                                     | 131,823          |
| DDTS ICT project management and hardware hire                                      | 273,413          |
| Payroll services                                                                   | 49,541           |
| Staff <sup>#</sup>                                                                 | 2,748,715        |
| Temporary office accommodation                                                     | 365,836          |
| Training                                                                           | 88,590           |
| Vehicles                                                                           | 29,422           |
| Venue hire                                                                         | 328,546          |
| Voting (including scanning of ballot papers, electronic voting and general voting) | 262,842          |
| Total not including public funding                                                 | 6,960,908        |
| Public funding of parties and candidates                                           | 2,584,775        |
| <b>Total including public funding</b>                                              | <b>9,545,683</b> |

<sup>^</sup> Some expenditure was incurred in earlier financial years, particularly relating to redistribution of electoral boundaries, salaries and wages of temporary staff, temporary office accommodation and procurement of equipment, stores and storage.

<sup>#</sup> Includes permanent FTE overtime, excludes permanent FTE base salary.

In addition, following the 2020 election and the subsequent performance review of the ICT-based electoral business systems, a need for continual modernisation was identified to enable a trusted, secure, and accessible 2024 election. To support this, a transfer of Controlled Recurrent Payment (CRP) appropriation to Capital Injection was undertaken under section 14 of the *Financial Management Act 1996*, transferring \$0.380 million into capital. This transfer between appropriations supported upgrades to eVACS®, LAPPERDS and ballot paper scanning.

The Commission intends to seek additional funding for the 2026-2027 budget and forward years reflecting the clear need to re-baseline appropriation and to increase the FTE of Elections ACT to address capability gaps in the delivery of electoral services.

## **Part 2 – ensure high levels of functionality, security, integrity and reliability of electoral ICT systems and processes**

### **Electoral integrity assurance**

The Commission has a proud history of electoral innovation, conducting industry-leading ICT-enabled elections since 2001. Committed to providing high-quality, transparent, trusted, secure, and accessible electoral services, the Commission continues to enhance its systems for the benefit of the ACT community.

However, trust in electoral authorities is hard-earned and easily lost. Increasing community expectations and evolving challenges in delivering electoral services, with a heightened focus on electoral integrity, have significantly shifted the electoral landscape. Community acceptance of electronically conducted elections can no longer be taken for granted. It is no longer sufficient for election management bodies to simply administer a clean election; now, in the face of many emerging challenges, electoral authorities must redefine their role as guardians of electoral integrity and democracy.

While the benefits of ICT-enabled elections are significant, any system failure or perception of irregularities, such as cyber-attacks or service disruptions, would greatly undermine election integrity and damage community trust in the Commission and government.

Recent experiences, both domestically and internationally, demonstrate the need for the Commission to act assertively to mitigate against the erosion of public confidence in democracy through cyber-interference and misinformation. Meeting this challenge requires unprecedented levels of transparency and integrity mechanisms in the ACT context.

### **Integrity assurance processes for the 2024 ACT Election**

Elections ACT implemented a comprehensive suite of integrity and security processes to ensure trust and integrity in the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election. These processes included:

- **Ballot Paper Scanning Assurance Process:** A new initiative for an independent assurance review of the vote preference determinations after the scanning and processing of completed paper ballots. This assurance process was conducted live during the vote scrutiny in the week following election day. Independent auditors randomly selected ballot papers and analysed the digital preference determinations against the hardcopy ballot papers as well as the scanned images. Party and candidate scrutineers were allowed to observe the process, increasing transparency and confidence in the election result
- **Infosec Registered Assessors Program (IRAP) Assessments:** External registered assessors evaluated ICT systems against the Australian Government Information Security Manual and the Federal Government's Protective Security Policy Framework to identify risks and recommend mitigations.
- **Electoral Integrity Advisory Panel (EIAP):** An external advisory panel reviewed the security and electoral integrity of proposed systems, providing expert recommendations.
- **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM):** A SIEM was introduced to analyse logs from various election systems to identify potential security



threats and vulnerabilities, with a managed service provider conducting monitoring and analysis.

- **Source Code Audits:** Independent audits of the source code for key systems ensured no malicious or unintentional code that could alter the election result was present.
- **Open-Source Software:** The code for eVACS® was published on the Elections ACT website well in advance of the election for increased transparency and stakeholder inspection.
- **Internal Functionality Testing:** Elections ACT staff, in collaboration with vendors, tested the performance of each business-critical election system, including eVACS®, LAPPERDS, Scanning, and TIGER.
- **Recovery from Backup Testing:** The ability to recover from backups for each critical election system was tested to ensure data integrity and system reliability.
- **ICT System Security Plans (SSPs):** Updated SSPs were produced to assess risks and ensure identified vulnerabilities were actively mitigated.
- **Vulnerability Assessments and Penetration Tests:** These assessments were deployed to identify and prioritise system vulnerabilities.
- **External Cyber Maturity Review:** An independent external assessment of Elections ACT's cyber maturity informed the development of a refreshed cyber security roadmap leading into the electoral event.
- **System Rehearsals:** End-to-end rehearsals of the ballot paper process were conducted to ensure the integrity of the election process, involving critical components of TIGER, Scanning, and eVACS®. A schedule of numerous other key electoral processes was also conducted during the months leading into the live event.
- **Cyber Incident Response and Disaster Recovery Plans:** These plans were reviewed, updated, and systematically rehearsed to ensure preparedness for any potential cyber incidents or disruptions.

## Use of information and communications technology

Elections ACT continues to be at the forefront in Australia for adopting innovative ICT that provide the ACT community with more efficient and faster electoral services.

During its preparations for the 2024 election, Elections ACT continued to build upon many of the successful ICT systems previously deployed at past ACT elections.

### ICT system upgrades

ACT elections rely heavily on the functionality, security, integrity, and reliability of ICT-enabled electoral systems. Any failure or perceived failure of these systems, or disruption through cyber-attacks, denial of service, or overloading, would undermine election integrity and damage community trust in the Electoral Commission and government. To meet expectations for a trusted, transparent, secure, and accessible election, these systems require review and upgrades between each electoral event. Elections ACT uses the period between elections to review ICT system performance, establish upgrade requirements, secure vendor services, develop, test, and deploy improvements.

Following the 2020 election, Elections ACT was able to immediately utilise unexpended funds from the election, converted to capital for the commencement of these upgrade projects. This facilitated an earlier than typical commencement of the upgrade projects, contributing to an earlier than typical conclusion. Many of the ICT upgrade projects were finalised and ready for deployment in the first half of 2024. This has not typically been the case. It is an unfortunate reality that the Commission's current funding and the budget cycle hinders effective and efficient upgrade programs.

To demonstrate, each ACT election concludes in November of an election year, coinciding with the period when budget business cases must be developed and submitted to Treasury for the following May budget. This scheduling means that Elections ACT has not had the opportunity to analyse the performance of its ICT systems, understand the necessary improvements, estimate costs and draft a business case for the commensurate funds. This misalignment with budget processes results in the Commission being unable to submit a bid until the subsequent budget round, delaying any forthcoming funds by 18 months or more.

This delay leaves the Commission with less than 28 months to procure, develop, and test ICT systems before the next election. However, Elections ACT aims to be ‘election ready’ twelve months before an electoral event meaning all systems must be upgraded, fully tested, and ready for deployment by October 2027 for the 2028 ACT election. This effectively provides only 18 months for development and testing of critical electoral systems.

The Commission believes uncertainty about future capital funding is an impediment to its electoral preparations. Assurance of minimum capital funding is essential to allow for the earliest commencement of a continuous ICT modernisation program. These systems underpin the delivery of reliable and trusted electoral services in the ACT. Continuous improvement and modernisation are fundamental to ensuring public confidence and trust in electoral processes and outcomes, especially in an era of increasing cyber and physical threats to democracy.

Recent domestic and international experiences demonstrate that the Electoral Commission must guard against and act assertively to mitigate the undermining of public confidence in democratic systems and processes through cyber or foreign interference, or misinformation and disinformation amplified through social media. This will require even greater levels of demonstrated transparency and integrity in electoral systems and processes to counter false narratives.

To that end, there is a need for assured capital funding to the Commission for the continuous modernisation of the ICT systems used by Elections ACT to mitigate these growing risks. Relying on unassured funding each election cycle results in development projects being squeezed within a truncated development window.

The Commission recommends that it be provided with ongoing assurance of the necessary capital funds to support the routine ICT modernisation projects that need to commence following the conclusion of each ACT election. The current four-year election cycle and the annual budget cycle do not align in a way that supports the early and comprehensive preparations necessary for robust ICT modernisation.

Assured capital funding across each election cycle will allow for the earliest commencement of necessary ICT development work before each electoral event. This will significantly mitigate integrity and trust risks through a thorough and comprehensive upgrade program spanning the full development period.

## **Recommendation 18**

The Commission **recommends** that it be provided with ongoing assurance of the necessary capital funds to support the routine ICT modernisation projects that need to commence following the conclusion of each ACT election.

## **LAPPERDS**

The performance of the LAPPERDS system during the 2020 election was reviewed, leading to a moderate upgrade project starting in February 2023. Significant upgrades included improvements to reconciliation processes, HQ functionality for early voting counts, e-voting card-only issuing points, new capabilities for uploading supplementary roll data, and enhanced functionality for uploading mark-offs from alternative vote types.

In July 2024, a pre-election deployment rehearsal of the LAPPERDS system was conducted. This rehearsal covered all LAPPERDS tasks within a polling place, such as synchronising OIC and issuing point laptops, recording ballot paper allocations, issuing votes, handling notifications, reconciling ballot papers, and transmitting results. It also served as a load test, simulating simultaneous roll mark-offs and results transmission from approximately 25 polling places using the LAPPERDS wifi network established by DDTS. This rehearsal coincided with in-person training for senior polling place managers.

DDTS primarily sourced the hardware supporting LAPPERDS. A total of 400 laptops were deployed across 55 polling locations. Additionally, a dedicated wifi network was set up to support LAPPERDS operations in ACT government schools, with routers provided by DDTS for non-ACT government premises and mobile teams.

## **eVACS®**

Following the 2020 election, the eVACS® system was reviewed, leading to an upgrade project starting in July 2022. Key enhancements included updates to the counting program, ballot paper customisation functionality, enhanced reporting, and improved security measures.

In April 2024, a pre-election deployment rehearsal of the eVACS® system was conducted. This included a load test where approximately 850 votes were entered in a

simulated early voting centre over a half-hour period, exceeding the maximum expected voting volume.

Hardware support for eVACS® was sourced from private vendors and DDTS, including voting clients (all-in-one touchscreen terminals), voting servers, cables, server cabinets, QR code readers, and BVI equipment.

Over 200 eVACS® voting terminals were deployed across 11 early voting locations, along with 11 voting servers. Additionally, two specialised servers were stationed at Elections ACT Headquarters to support telephone voting operations.

## Ballot paper scanning

Between elections, the ballot paper scanning system's performance during the 2020 election was reviewed, leading to an upgrade project in October 2023. Key enhancements included upgrading the 'V3' portal to a modern technology platform and adding an additional verification queue to improve system integrity and accuracy.

In April 2024, a comprehensive pre-election deployment rehearsal was conducted. Approximately 3,000 ballot papers were scanned to evaluate the system's ability to accurately capture diverse handwriting styles, preferences, and numerical sequences. The rehearsal involved a single scanner and five verification operators managing the three stages of scanning verification. The system's proficiency in capturing preferences, verifying them, and exporting for counting through the eVACS® system was successfully tested. Additionally, the networking capabilities of the new scrutiny centre were validated.

Hardware for the ballot paper scanning system was procured from the system vendor and DDTS, including five scanners, 25 verification laptops, 50 monitors, two servers, storage devices, and networking equipment.

## Online polling official training

For the 2024 election, the online polling official training system was reviewed and upgraded. Elections ACT chose not to reuse the 2020 system, instead revamping the successful platform from 2012, last used in 2016. The upgrade focused on modernising the user interface to enhance usability. The updated system was effectively deployed to deliver online training content to a diverse group of polling officials.

## TIGER – Election Management System

The TIGER system is the Commission's custom-built Election Management System (EMS). This ICT business system supports various business-as-usual processes and all administrative tasks associated with planning, preparing, and conducting an ACT Legislative Assembly election. TIGER aids the Commission's preparations and logistics through modules dedicated to:

- Nominations and ballot paper creation
- Registration and administration of political parties
- Polling place information and appointment
- Vote estimations
- Polling place staffing
- Election forms and materials
- Non-voter and multiple voter processing
- Electoral roll
- Postal voting
- Election funding, expenditure, and financial disclosure administration

In 2018-19, the Commission sought and received funding to modernise the TIGER EMS to mitigate the risk of the aging Microsoft Access platform becoming unsupported. The funding also included developing the OSEV overseas e-voting system, successfully deployed in the 2020 election. The Commission received \$0.456 million in capital injection and allocated \$0.300 million from its own accumulated funds. In the 2020-21 budget, a technical adjustment was made to transfer \$0.139 million in recurrent funding to capital injection to cover additional work required, particularly on the OSEV element of the project. In 2022, following an independent functional point assessment of the proposed system, the Commission agreed to fund a further \$0.824 million from its accumulated funds to complete the project.

To prepare for the 2024 election, the Commissioner approved a hybrid technology approach termed TIGER24, which used new and old TIGER modules to oversee electoral operations. Four new TIGER modules were successfully deployed for the conduct of the election:

1. **ICER:** Imports the electoral roll and provides roll lookup services.

2. **VIPERS:** Managed postal vote applications, issuing domestic and international postal packs, and handling receipt and preliminary scrutiny processing.
3. **Ballot Paper Scanning and Assurance (BPSA):** Provided functionality for the independent audit of the ballot paper scanning process (see **Ballot paper scanning integrity assurance** on page 73 for more detail).
4. **ENVI:** Managed the issuance of apparent failure to vote notices and administered returned excuses and penalty payments.

While significant progress was made on the remaining new TIGER modules, the Commissioner determined that utilising the established modules of the older TIGER system was the more appropriate approach for conducting a complex and critical election. The remaining modules, such as modules for administering staffing, funding and disclosure and polling places, will be deployed in 2025.

## Overseas e-voting (Osev)

The transformational potential of technology on democratic processes inevitably led to discussions on the feasibility and security of implementing online voting systems for parliamentary elections. In response to this evolving technological landscape and to address the mounting evidence that international postal services were in decline, potentially disenfranchising ACT electors based outside of Australia, the Commission took the pioneering step of introducing the Overseas e-voting system (Osev) in the lead-up to the 2020 election. The system was specifically designed and deliberately limited to facilitate online voting for overseas-based electors.

The motivation for developing Osev stemmed from challenges in managing postal votes for overseas electors. The decrease in timely returned overseas postal votes during the 2016 ACT election prompted the conceptualisation, design, and deployment of Osev for the 2020 election. A strong emphasis was placed on security as well as vote and process integrity, and the Commission sought expert advice from key federal cyber organisations throughout the development.

Following the successful deployment of Osev in the 2020 election, the Commissioner sought to further investigate its suitability for the 2024 ACT election. The Electoral Integrity Advisory Panel (EIAP) was

established to examine the security and integrity of election ICT systems, with a focus on the Osev system. The EIAP provided analysis on deployment risks and recommendations for system and process improvements.

The EIAP concluded that the redeployment of Osev presented both compelling benefits and significant risks. The risks associated with online voting, particularly concerning integrity, confidentiality, and availability, are genuine and demand robust mitigation strategies. The susceptibility to cyberattacks, insider threats, and breaches of voter confidentiality underscores the critical importance of implementing thorough safeguard enhancements.

The EIAP's insights led to a comprehensive set of recommended measures, covering system design, operational protocols, governance, and incident preparedness. These enhancements, if implemented, would serve as a foundation for ensuring the security and dependability of the Osev system, ultimately upholding the integrity of the democratic process.

The EIAP noted that online voting is not without its merits. The increased participation among overseas-based electors, the elimination of delays associated with postal votes, and the potential for cost efficiency remained compelling reasons to consider the continued deployment of Osev. These advantages themselves contribute to the integrity of the ACT election outcome, ensuring that every eligible elector has an appropriate opportunity to successfully lodge a formal and accepted vote.

However, in October 2023, the Commissioner decided not to invest further development costs into Osev for the 2024 election and determined not to deploy the system in 2024. The Commissioner's decision was based on advice from federal security agencies and an analysis by the Commission's EIAP of the risks to electoral integrity and the delivery of trusted, transparent, secure electoral services through the use of online voting, which could not be satisfactorily mitigated in time for the 2024 election.

The Commissioner noted that this decision does not reflect on the successful deployment of Osev in the 2020 election, but rather the increased security challenges of the 2024 electoral environment.

## System integrity and reliability

No electoral process is entirely immune to operational or procedural irregularities. Despite robust planning, training, and system testing, elections can encounter unexpected issues. These may include administrative oversights, human errors, logistical disruptions, or technical malfunctions. While such incidents are generally isolated and managed, they can still raise concerns about the integrity of the process, particularly in tightly contested elections.

Importantly, not all errors are equal in their impact. Australian legal doctrine suggests that errors or irregularities should only invalidate a result where they are material – meaning they could realistically have affected the outcome. In an electoral context, a petitioner to the Court of Disputed Elections must convince the court that it was more likely than not that the issue at hand affected who won the election, not just that it affected some votes<sup>10</sup>. This principle aims to protect the democratic process from being undermined by minor or immaterial issues that are unlikely to have altered the result and provides a rationale for legislative reform that would clarify that immaterial errors, whether administrative, procedural or technical, should not, on their own, be grounds for seeking to invalidate an election result.

For example, in the recent federal election, a polling official working in the seat of Barton took a box containing live ballot papers home on election night. While the incident appears not to have compromised the official vote count, it illustrates how procedural lapses could be used to theoretically challenge election results. Similarly, a temporarily unavailable voting channel may not affect the outcome if alternative voting methods are available, it ultimately becomes available once more before the polls close or if the number of affected voters is negligible. A dispute on such matters could lead to reputational damage for the Commission, a decline in public trust in the democratic process, and the potential for expensive court actions or even election re-runs if mandated by the Court of Disputed Elections.

To reinforce this principle within ACT electoral legislation, the Commission recommends legislative amendment to explicitly safeguard the validity of election results where immaterial errors occur. This would ensure that elections are not at risk of

invalidation due to issues that, while potentially concerning, do not alter the democratic will of the electorate. Such provisions would enhance legal clarity, reduce frivolous or politically motivated challenges and minimise community confusion of electoral outcomes in the case of an unsubstantiated and immaterial dispute.

### Recommendation 19

The Commission **recommends** amending section 256 of the Electoral Act to safeguard the validity of election results where immaterial errors occur, whether procedural, technical or human. This would ensure that only errors capable of affecting the outcome of an election may be grounds for disputing its validity.

## Cyber security preparations

Ensuring the cybersecurity of an ACT election involves extensive and meticulous preparation. The Commission collaborates closely with federal and territory expert cyber agencies to fortify its defences against potential threats. This collaboration includes conducting external cyber-maturity reviews to assess and enhance the organisation's cyber posture. The Commission also develops and rehearses comprehensive incident response procedures, ensuring readiness for any cyber incidents.

### Collaboration with cyber agencies

The Commission works in partnership with both federal and territory cyber agencies. These collaborations are crucial for sharing intelligence, resources, and best practices. By leveraging the expertise of these agencies, the Commission is able to stay ahead of emerging threats and ensure that its cybersecurity measures are aligned with the latest standards and technologies.

### External cyber-maturity reviews

To maintain a robust cybersecurity posture, the Commission undertakes regular external cyber-maturity reviews. These reviews provide an independent assessment of the organisation's cybersecurity capabilities, identifying strengths and areas for improvement. The insights gained from these reviews are used to enhance the Commission's overall cyber resilience.

10 State Library of New South Wales 2025, *Legal disputes over elections*, State Library of NSW, viewed 16 May 2025, <https://www.sl.nsw.gov.au/find-legal-answers/books-online/hot-topics-voting-and-elections/legal-disputes-over-elections>.



## **Incident response procedures**

Developing and rehearsing incident response procedures is a critical component of the Commission's cybersecurity strategy. These procedures define the steps to be taken in the event of a cyber incident, ensuring a swift and effective response. Regular rehearsals of these procedures help to identify any gaps and ensure that personnel are well-prepared to handle potential threats.

## **Command centre**

The Commissioner established a Command Centre to serve as the coordination and control centre for the conduct of the 2024 ACT election. The purpose of the Command Centre was to facilitate effective and timely information management and decision-making by the Commissioner in the event of a cyber, ICT, or physical incident. It also provided a framework for disaster recovery and immediate access to the necessary technical and communications expertise. Invitees to the Command Centre included senior representatives from Elections ACT, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), Digital, Data and Technology Solutions (DDTS), ACT Policing, the Government Solicitor's Office, and each ICT vendor. While the Command Centre was not required to oversee a serious incident during the election, it brought an enhanced level of coordination to the Commission's electoral event management.

## **ICT System Security Plans (SSP)**

The Commission reviewed and updated its ICT SSPs before the election to ensure that they remained effective against evolving threats. These plans encompass a wide range of security measures, including access controls, encryption, and network security. By routinely updating these plans, the Commission is able to adapt to new challenges and maintain a strong security posture.

## **Penetration testing**

Penetration testing is conducted to identify and address potential vulnerabilities within the Commission's systems. These tests simulate real-world cyber-attacks, allowing the Commission to identify weaknesses and implement necessary improvements. These penetration tests are essential for maintaining the integrity and security of the electoral process.

## **Backup and recovery testing**

Testing recovery processes from backups is another vital aspect of the Commission's cybersecurity preparations. These tests ensure that, in the event of a cyber incident, critical data can be restored quickly while maintaining its integrity and accuracy. By regularly testing backup and recovery procedures, the Commission aims to minimise the impact of potential data breaches and ensure the continuity of electoral operations.

## **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)**

The establishment of a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system prior to the 2024 election allowed the Commission to monitor and respond to security events in real-time. The SIEM system collects and analyses data from various sources, including the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing service (CTIS), providing a comprehensive view of the threat landscape and the organisation's security posture. This real-time monitoring enables the Commission to detect and respond to threats promptly, enhancing overall cybersecurity.

## **DDTS support**

The Electoral Commission was ably supported throughout its preparations and conduct of the 2024 election by Digital, Data and Technology Solutions. Throughout the four-year preparatory period, the Commissioner periodically convened the Elections ACT ICT Steering Committee, with the purpose of overseeing and guiding Elections ACT ICT related projects.

The membership of the Committee included:

- The Electoral Commissioner
- The Deputy Electoral Commissioner
- The Elections ACT Director of Electoral Operations
- DDTS, Executive Group Manager, Customer Data and Technology
- DDTS, Executive Branch Manager, Customer Engagement Services Branch
- DDTS, Senior Director ICT, JACS and PATOCS
- Senior representatives, federal security agencies

The role of the Committee is to:

- Develop ICT strategies and plans that ensure Legislative Assembly and other elections are enabled by cost effective and timely application of ICT systems and resources;
- Review current and future technologies to identify opportunities to further innovate in ACT elections and increase efficiencies of Elections ACT ICT resources;
- Provide advice to the Electoral Commissioner on electoral related ICT projects and achievements against the Elections ACT ICT Strategic Plan;
- Provide advice and recommendations to the ACT Electoral Commissioner on significant ICT issues effecting ACT elections, including cyber security matters.
- Provide an escalation point to expedite ICT activity to ensure critical and immutable election timeframes are met.

In preparation for the 2024 election, the Committee was assigned the responsibility of evaluating the suitability of the proposed Elections ACT ICT business system upgrades and redevelopments. This included assessing the risks associated with each proposed ICT business system and providing recommendations to the Commissioner on whether to endorse the use of these systems for the election. The Committee concluded that the systems in place were sufficient and supported their deployment for the 2024 election. The DDTS contingent of the Committee also ensured that the necessary areas within DDTS were available and prioritised to assist where necessary.

Throughout multiple electoral cycles, the broader DDTS establishment has consistently offered crucial support to Elections ACT during election preparations and execution. This support encompassed bi-weekly meetings with representatives from all key DDTS areas, aiding in the procurement of essential hardware, ICT equipment installation, network setup and maintenance, cyber-assurance and guidance, as well as assistance with system and load testing.

The Electoral Commission would like to publicly thank DDTS executives and support staff for their continued and invaluable support and assistance.

## Election night and the virtual tally room

Starting at 6:00 pm on election night, 19 October 2024, Elections ACT provided an Election Results Display System (ERDS) via its website, until the final results were announced on 26 October. After the final results were declared, the election results website was merged with the Elections ACT website for ongoing public access.

The system features detailed election results in both textual and graphical forms, with interim preference distributions available as electronic votes are entered and paper ballots are scanned. Data feeds are also provided to media organisations for real-time results that can be integrated with the media company's own election result displays.

The counting of paper votes began at each polling place at 6:00 pm, with ballot papers sorted by first preference for each candidate.

Interim distributions of preferences from electronic votes cast during the early voting period were made available on the website by 6:30 pm, with a second update which amalgamated early voting electronic votes with electronic votes cast during election day, published by 8:40 pm.

Once first preferences on paper ballots were counted in each polling place, results were entered into the LAPPERDS system by polling place managers and transmitted to a central database for immediate publication on the ERDS. The results displayed were updated every minute as additional polling place figures came in and included vote totals for candidates and parties, as well as a dashboard with voter turnout, top parties and candidates, swing data, and total vote counts.

The transmission of results directly from polling place laptops to the virtual tally room replaced the practice of phoning results to a call centre last used at the 2008 ACT election but still widely used across other jurisdictions. In 2024, 81% of polling places had completed their reporting by 9:30 pm, with an average reporting completion time of 9:00 pm.

## Election result website load issues

Shortly after polls closed on election night, some web users began to experience a website caching issue, resulting in a subset of website pages showing out-of-date election result information or a 'webpage maintenance page'. At the time, only vote figures from early voting electronic votes had been uploaded to the election results system, as figures from polling places do not start arriving until a little later in the night's proceedings.

Initial load testing conducted prior to making the website public showed satisfactory performance with response times under one-second.

Following the incident, Elections ACT sought confirmation from the vendor regarding the cause of the display errors. The explanation provided was that excessive HTTP requests caused by the auto-refresh functionality were not appropriately handled by the caching function. This caused all the requests on the web servers to be queued, delayed, and then timed out.

Auto-scaling of the web servers was established within the system. However, it was insufficient to cope with auto-refresh requests, despite load balancing being in place. As requests were queued, the cache was not always being updated for users. Consequently, some viewers may have initially seen early voting results but later encountered screens displaying out-of-date figures or zero figures once the automatic refresh functionality requested updated data.

To remediate the issue, under the direction of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, the vendor temporarily increased the cache duration from 2 minutes to 30 minutes, increased the number of web servers from two to eight, and increased the CPU and memory allocations of the web servers by a factor of four.

While improvements in performance were evident prior to 7:00 pm, the issue was completely resolved by 7:35 pm. Despite the issues, the system successfully processed the majority of requests throughout the incident, with only a subset of users experiencing impact.

Key findings identified that while auto-scaling functioned correctly, the initial resource allocation for tasks was insufficient. Earlier load testing did not identify the vulnerability as it had not included HTTP POST request scenarios.

In preparation for the 2028 election, Elections ACT will undertake a review of the auto-refresh caching function and will consult with DDTs on the appropriate infrastructure required to support the election results system. The vendor has offered several recommended remediation steps, which will be considered in consultation with DDTs.

## The count of preferences

### Scanning scrutiny system

The scanning of ballot papers has been a feature of ACT elections since 2008, marking the first use of such a system for a parliamentary election in Australia. This system has significantly reduced the time required to determine a final election result by several weeks.

Due to the legislative requirement to wait for the final mail delivery on the Friday following election day, the earliest possible timeframe for a final result is Friday evening, six days after election day. In 2020, due to COVID travel restrictions and the deployment of the Overseas e-voting system (OSeV), which resulted in fewer overseas postal votes, Elections ACT was able to complete the scanning and verification of the final postal items on Friday evening, publishing the final result at 9:45 pm.

However, in 2024, the use of international couriers for overseas postal votes resulted in a greater number of returned postal votes on the final allowable day. Consequently, the final election result was publicised via a media release at 2:30 pm on Saturday, 26 October 2024, less than one week after the polls closed. While the 2020 achievement was an anomaly due to the small number of postal votes, the 2024 result, although not as early, nevertheless achieved a final result as early as can be expected.

Similarly, the final distribution of preference result sheets were posted on the Elections ACT website at 1:09 pm on 26 October 2024, six days and 19 hours after the polls closed. Noting that the final scrutiny of votes does not commence until the Monday after election day, this continued achievement is a proud accomplishment unique to ACT elections.



In most respects, the process followed in 2024 was essentially the same as the process followed in all other deployments of the system since 2008, with a few minor alterations throughout the years. This process is described in more detail in the Commission's report on the 2008 election.

The primary enhancement between the 2020 and 2024 elections was the addition of an extra queue in the second stage of verification to bolster system integrity and accuracy. V2-C was developed to isolate ballot papers where the V2 officer had altered the preference string from the system's interpretation. These ballot papers then fed into V2-C, where a different V2 officer could compare the new preference string against the image capture of the relevant ballot paper. This second oversight of preference alterations enhanced confidence in the accuracy of V2 amendments.

For the first time, the scanning enhanced scrutiny process was conducted in the new expanded Elections ACT office accommodation on Level 1, Nara Centre. Candidate scrutineers were able to observe and challenge the full verification process, along with declaration vote and postal vote processing.

### **Ballot paper scanning integrity assurance**

In 2008, when ballot paper scanning was first introduced, it was accompanied by an internal process of auditing the system's accuracy. Elections ACT staff conducted audits after the declaration of the election result, examining the digital preferences determined through the ballot paper scanning verification process and comparing them to the scanned image to confirm accurate outcomes.

In 2024, as an additional transparency and integrity measure, the Commission engaged an independent third-party auditing company to conduct the ballot paper scanning assurance audit.

Rather than the earlier practice of completing the audits after the completion of the count, this new process was conducted live, during the final election scrutiny process in the week following election day and was observable by candidate scrutineers attending the scanning scrutiny process.

### **System and procedures**

The Ballot Paper Scanning System digitally captures voter preferences from paper ballots, including postal votes, declaration votes, and ordinary votes issued at polling places. The system, established for the 2008 ACT Legislative Assembly elections, has proven effective in accurately capturing voter preference data across multiple elections.

To ensure the integrity of the ballot paper selection for audits, a separate pseudo-random number generator is used to generate a seed number to create a sequence of pseudo random numbers. These numbers are then used to select batches of ballot papers for auditing. The randomness of the selection process ensures that no one can predict or tamper with the selection, while the repeatability allows for verification.

Ballot papers are maintained in batches of up to 100 papers, randomly shuffled and tagged with relevant election details such as the electorate, polling place, sequence of upload, and date and time of upload. Once the ballot papers are committed to the system, the random seed is entered, and the batches for auditing are generated.

The assurance process consists of four main components: sample selection, assurance testing, review of potential exceptions, and report creation. The sample selection involves randomly choosing batches as well as the starting ballot papers, using the Ballot Paper Scanning Assurance System. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) provides tools to determine the statistically acceptable sample sizes for the audit.

During assurance testing, external audit staff compare the scanned images of ballot papers with the physical ballots to ensure accuracy. This includes verifying that all marks on the scanned image match the physical ballot paper and checking the correct Robson Rotation allocation. Any discrepancies are flagged for further review.

Potential exceptions identified during the assurance process are reviewed by senior Elections ACT officials to confirm the correct interpretation of voter intent. If any discrepancies are found, an official error is recorded.

At the completion of the assurance process, the error rate and confidence interval are calculated. These results are then published by the Commissioner, providing transparency and building public confidence in the electoral system.

### ***Audit sample and results***

The audit used a sampling skip count of 95, resulting in an audit sample size of 1 in every 95 paper ballots. Out of a total of 126,245 paper ballots, a final audit sample of 1,367 ballots was selected, evenly distributed across the five electorates.

No errors or discrepancies were detected in any of the audited ballots.

### ***Statistical confidence***

Although no scanning errors were found in the audit sample, statistical methods were used to estimate the potential number of errors in the entire population of ballot papers. The audit sample was selected randomly without replacement, following a Hypergeometric distribution.

The Hypergeometric distribution describes the probability of selecting a certain number of erroneous ballots from the population. Using this distribution, the probability of selecting zero erroneous ballots was calculated. The smallest number of erroneous ballots that returns a probability of less than 5% is 275. This means there is a 95% confidence that there are 274 or fewer erroneous ballot papers in the population, translating to an error rate of less than 0.22%.

Similarly, there is a 99% confidence that there are 422 or fewer erroneous ballot papers in the population, corresponding to an error rate of less than 0.34%.

The audit results indicate a high level of accuracy in the ballot paper scanning process, with no detected errors in the sample and a very low estimated error rate in the overall population. This provides strong assurance of the integrity and reliability of the election outcome.

## **Part 3 – maximise opportunities for electoral participation by all eligible electors**

### **Election communication and engagement campaign**

The Commission successfully implemented a comprehensive communication and engagement campaign for the 2024 ACT Legislative Assembly election. The campaign was structured into several key phases, each focusing on different aspects of the election process.

#### **Public relations activities**

Throughout 2024, the Commission engaged in various public relations activities to raise awareness and provide information about the forthcoming election:

- Issued election-related media releases.
- Conducted radio, television, and newspaper interviews with the Commissioner.
- Posted updates and information on social media platforms.
- Held briefings for media and political participants.
- Organised public events, including the declaration of nominations and draw for ballot positions.

#### **Advertising campaign**

The 2024 advertising campaign covered traditional messaging components with a focus on enrolment, early voting, formal voting and election day voting. Additionally, the campaign emphasised electoral integrity and countering misinformation through the “Check the Source” initiative.

#### **Methods for engaging electors:**

- Radio, newspaper, television, video on demand services and online advertising.
- Mail-outs of two separate information booklets to every household in the ACT.
- Bus shelter and other out-of-home advertising, such as digital displays in shopping centres and office lobbies.
- Social media campaigns.
- Updates on the Elections ACT website.

#### **Community engagement and education**

Elections ACT implemented targeted strategies to engage and educate various community groups:

#### **Electors with disabilities:**

- Consulted with the disability community through Elections ACT’s Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee.
- Provided election information products to the disability sector for inclusion in newsletters and websites.
- Hosted accessibility and disability services webinars including Q&A sessions.
- Offered alternative formats of printed publications upon request.
- Arranged for election guides to be read on Radio 1RPH and distributed as audio files.
- Contributed to a Radio 1RPH podcast series on electoral services.

### **Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) Communities:**

- Consulted with the CALD community through Elections ACT's Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee.
- Provided printed electoral information in targeted languages for dissemination across community hubs.
- Made translated electoral information available on the Elections ACT website.
- Equipped electronic voting terminals with instructions in 12 community languages.
- Displayed translated printed materials in polling places.
- Broadcast electoral information on Radio CMS (Canberra multicultural radio station).

### **Indigenous communities:**

- Consulted with the indigenous community through Elections ACT's Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee.
- Held information sessions at community locations
- Produced pamphlets and posters with key messages using an indigenous theme for distribution in community venues.

### **Homelessness:**

- Liaised with peak bodies to assist clients in enrolling and voting.
- Held an information session at the Early Morning Centre.
- Updated written resources to suit the needs of those experiencing homelessness.
- Established mobile polling locations in areas where people experiencing homelessness gather to improve accessibility options

### **Schools/first time voters:**

- Attended events for years 11 and 12 such as careers days and transition fairs
- Provided information sessions at colleges
- Provided targeted materials and brochures for first time voters

## **Access Canberra contact centre**

With the assistance of Access Canberra, Elections ACT established a contact centre team to handle simple electoral enquiries, with more complex enquiries managed by the Elections ACT inquiry team.

The Access Canberra call centre team took 4,883 calls with an average call duration of 4.5 minutes.

## **Timings**

Key dates and phases for the 2024 information campaign were as follows:

- **Check the Source campaign:** 26 July – 17 October 2024
- **Enrolment phase:** 2 September – 13 September 2024
- **Early voting phase:** 30 September – 19 October 2024
- **Formal voting and election day phase:** 14 – 19 October 2024

This structured approach ensured that all electors were well-informed and engaged throughout the election process, reinforcing trust and participation in the democratic process.

For further information on the effectiveness of the information campaign see **Exit surveys** on page 95.

## **Civics and citizenship education**

Elections are a fundamental component of civics and citizenship education, serving as a practical example of democratic participation. Understanding elections helps students grasp the principles of democracy, the importance of voting, and the role of citizens in shaping their government. Civics education aims to equip students with the knowledge and skills necessary to engage in civic life, fostering informed and active citizens who can contribute to their communities and the broader society.

In the Australian Curriculum, civics and citizenship education is integrated into the Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) learning area for students, with elections and democracy a focus area in years 5 and 8 and to a lesser degree 10. The curriculum covers key concepts such as democracy, government, and the electoral process. For example, students learn about the importance of democratic decision-making, the values underpinning Australia's democracy, and the features of

the electoral process, including the secret ballot and compulsory voting. These lessons are designed to build a foundational understanding of how elections work and why they are crucial to maintaining a democratic society.

However, recent research has highlighted a concerning decline in civics understanding among Australian students. The latest national curriculum testing revealed that only 28% of Year 10 students met the 'proficient standard' in civics in 2024, down from 38% in 2019<sup>11</sup>. This decline underscores the need for enhanced civics education to ensure that students are adequately prepared to participate in democratic processes.

Reaching students, particularly those approaching or having reached voting age, presents significant challenges for electoral commissions. One of the primary issues is that civics and citizenship education is not a mandatory part of the curriculum for students in Years 11 and 12 unless they choose specific subjects and even then it is often at the discretion of the teacher. This gap means that most college age students miss out on crucial education about elections and voting at a time when they are first likely to need to put this understanding into practice.

Without a structured curriculum in their final years of schooling, students may lack the necessary knowledge about the electoral process, the importance of voting, and how to engage effectively in democratic practices. This situation makes it difficult for electoral commissions to reach and educate these students about their civic duties. To address this challenge, there is a need for adjustments to the curriculum to ensure that all Year 11 and 12 students receive comprehensive civics and citizenship education.

If the curriculum is appropriately adjusted, electoral commissions can run targeted education sessions on elections and voting. These sessions could include practical activities such as mock elections, which provide students with hands-on experience of the voting process and help demystify the procedures involved. By engaging students in interactive and participatory learning experiences, electoral commissions can better prepare young people to exercise their voting rights confidently and responsibly when they reach the legal voting age.

## Recommendation 20

To address the declining levels of civics understanding among Australian students and ensure that young people are well-prepared to participate in democratic processes, the Commission **recommends** that the Legislative Assembly undertake a review of ways in which civics and citizenship education can reach all Year 11 and 12 students. This review could consider:

1. **Amending the Curriculum:** Mandating civics and citizenship education for all senior secondary students to provide consistent and comprehensive coverage of key democratic principles, the electoral process, and the importance of civic engagement.
2. **Facilitating Partnerships:** Providing opportunities for the Electoral Commission to collaborate with schools to deliver targeted education sessions on elections and voting. These sessions could include practical activities such as mock elections, which offer students hands-on experience and help demystify the voting process.

Should such actions be taken, the Commission will require suitable funding to support these increased educational demands.

## Voting

A total of 279,370 electors cast votes that were admitted to the final scrutiny at the 2024 election. This represents a turnout of 86.1% against estimated eligible electors. This turnout was 3.1% lower than the comparative figure for the 2020 election (89.2%) and the lowest turnout against officially enrolled electors (86.8%) since the introduction of Hare-Clark. For further information on **voter turnout** see page 28. The 2024 election continued the trend of recording the highest absolute number of votes in an ACT Legislative Assembly election, compared to 273,143 in 2020.

58.5% of all votes cast at the 2024 election were by voters who voted before election day. This is a decline from the historical high of 76.2% in the COVID-impacted 2020 election, but significantly higher than all previous elections (38.9% in 2016 and 31.2% in 2012). Votes cast at an early voting centre accounted for 51.1% (69.9% in 2020, 33.7% in 2016, and 26.9% in 2012), while postal votes accounted for 7.3% (6.3% in 2020, 5.2% in 2016, and 4.3% in 2012). Table 24 shows the percentage of ordinary, early, and postal votes for each ACT election since 1995.

11 Smith, J. (2025) 'Understanding the decline in civics education', The Conversation, 5 April. Available at: [www.theconversation.com/understanding-the-decline-in-civics-education-2025](http://www.theconversation.com/understanding-the-decline-in-civics-education-2025).

**Table 24** Percentage of votes cast by vote type

| Year | Percentage (%) |        |            |             |
|------|----------------|--------|------------|-------------|
|      | Ordinary       | Postal | Early vote | Declaration |
| 1995 | 86.1           | 2.4    | 10.6       | 0.9         |
| 1998 | 84.1           | 2.8    | 12.2       | 1.0         |
| 2001 | 83.8           | 3.2    | 12.4       | 0.6         |
| 2004 | 81.4           | 3.1    | 14.7       | 0.9         |
| 2008 | 75.0           | 4.4    | 20.3       | 0.4         |
| 2012 | 68.4           | 4.3    | 26.9       | 0.4         |
| 2016 | 61.0           | 5.2    | 33.7       | 0.1         |
| 2020 | 22.7           | 6.3    | 69.9       | 1.1         |
| 2024 | 40.6           | 7.3    | 51.1       | 1.0         |

Details of numbers of votes cast by vote type and electorate are in Tables 5–11.

## Early voting

### Impact of a shortened early voting period

In November 2023, the Assembly passed the *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023*, which, among other changes, reduced the attendance early voting period from three weeks to two weeks, while maintaining the postal voting period at three weeks.

This had the effect of commencing postal voting on 30 September 2024, and attendance early voting eight days later on Tuesday, 8 October 2024 (Monday, 7 October 2024 was a public holiday).

The Commission, in its discussions with the 2020 election inquiry committee and the government, noted the possible impacts of reducing the early voting period for several reasons:

- The resultant reduction in voter accessibility to early voting services at a time deemed convenient by the elector.
- Implementation would work directly against well-established and increasing community demands for flexible and accessible early voting services across the historic three week early voting period, with a resultant sense of voter disenfranchisement.

→ A compression of early voter load from three to two weeks would likely create queues at early voting facilities, increase risks of voter dissatisfaction, and heighten pressures upon polling and electoral officials.<sup>12</sup>

The Commission also noted that providing two weeks of early attendance voting and three weeks of postal voting could increase the number of electors applying for a postal vote; many of whom would cast an attendance vote in the first week of the early voting period if it were available. The Commission highlighted that postal voting continues to be the voting method with the highest risk of electors failing to have their votes counted, either because of issues related to the postal service or errors made on the postal vote declarations.

While the 2024 experience does not appear to support the prediction that postal votes would increase beyond the expected election upon election trend, it did create a separate issue for electors and Elections ACT’s administration. The timing divergence between postal and attendance voting created a challenge for electors who were scheduled to travel overseas during the first week of postal voting. These electors required a postal vote but couldn’t rely on the postal service to deliver the voting materials after postal voting began but before they left the country. Historically, these electors

12 ACT Electoral Commission Response to the Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety Report of August 2021 Inquiry into the 2020 ACT Election and the Electoral Act, 13 December 2021, [www.parliament.act.gov.au/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0012/1946199/JCS-02-Inquiry-into-2020-ACT-Election-and-the-Electoral-Act-ACT-Electoral-Commission-response-dated-13-Dec-2021.pdf](http://www.parliament.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/1946199/JCS-02-Inquiry-into-2020-ACT-Election-and-the-Electoral-Act-ACT-Electoral-Commission-response-dated-13-Dec-2021.pdf), p.3.

would vote in person at an early voting centre before leaving for overseas. However, in 2024, they needed an alternative solution.

To address this, Elections ACT offered a collect-in-person option, allowing electors to pick up their postal vote from the Elections ACT office, complete it, and return the sealed vote immediately.

142,833 early votes were issued in 2024, only 46,747 less than in 2020; an election where early voting was actively encouraged due to pandemic-based concerns and where 15 early voting centres were established offering extended voting hours. The numbers in 2024 were achieved with nine less voting days and four less voting centres, equating to 1,502 fewer operating hours than in 2020.

The Assembly's decision to shorten the early voting period presented several challenges for the Commission, including potential voter disenfranchisement and increased pressure on voting facilities. However, Elections ACT's proactive measures, such as offering a collect-in-person option for postal votes, helped mitigate some of these issues.

## **2020 election background**

The 2020 ACT election was significantly influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting Elections ACT to actively encourage early voting. As a result, 15 early voting centres (EVCs) were established across the ACT, operating daily for three weeks with extended hours on Fridays. These centres also remained open on election day. Approximately 70% of all votes in 2020 were cast early through these EVCs.

On election day, 67 additional polling places were opened, totalling 82 polling places. However, only 62,067 votes (22.72%) were cast on election day, with around 50,000 of these votes taken at single-day static polling places. This resulted in an average of 746 votes per polling place, highlighting an inefficient use of resources.

## **2024 early voting strategy**

Early voting has continued to grow in popularity in the ACT and across Australia more generally. The 2023 NSW state election and the 2022 federal election both saw increases in early voting, despite legislative reductions in the early voting periods, similar to that introduced in the ACT prior to the 2024 election. See **Legislative changes made since the 2020 election** on page 22.

This trend has, for some time, suggested that once voters first access early voting, they were likely to continue this practice at future elections. Therefore, in its preparations for the 2024 election, it was reasonable for Elections ACT to assume that the 70% early voting rate from the 2020 ACT election could be repeated in 2024.

The 2020 election's high early voting rate was partly due to the pandemic and associated COVID-safe measures. However, with reduced COVID concerns and a different electoral context in 2024, such high early voting numbers were unlikely to be replicated. Therefore, Elections ACT adopted a more conservative approach for the 2024 election, estimating early voting (including postal votes) at 60% of all votes cast, with a corresponding adjustment to election day numbers. This strategy was informed by experiences from the NSW state and federal elections, which indicated that a reduction in voting days, as introduced in the ACT for 2024, was unlikely to significantly impact early voting numbers.

Selection of the location and number of polling locations for the 2024 election was based on a thorough analysis of voting data—where, when, and in what numbers votes were cast—during the 2020 election. This data-driven approach ensured that electoral services in 2024 were aligned with demonstrated voting trends and voter demand, including the clear decline in the need for final day polling places as more voters opted for early voting (notably over 76% of all voters having done so in 2020). Additionally, the efficient, ethical, and appropriate use of public resources required to provide a high standard of trusted, transparent, secure, and accessible electoral services at each location was a crucial factor in the Commissioner's decision-making process. The Commissioner was also advised by the Electoral Accessibility Advisory Committee, which includes representatives from communities with additional voter accessibility requirements and members with lived experience of such needs.

Noting that one of the three Early Voting Centres (EVCs) in each electorate in 2020 took considerably fewer votes than the other two (e.g., Harrison EVC took 6,267 early votes compared to Gungahlin West EVC's 17,266 votes), Elections ACT decided to reduce the number of EVCs, ultimately deploying eleven in 2024. The availability of suitable community facilities or commercial premises determined the locations of these EVCs. Securing these premises was challenging due to a lack of



suitable commercial spaces in appropriate locations. Additionally, landlords of suitable commercial spaces were hesitant to agree to short-term leases until just prior to the required period. Despite these challenges, Elections ACT believed that the proposed eleven EVC strategy would manage voter numbers effectively.

Elections ACT decided to return to pre-pandemic operating hours. During the 2020 election, voting centres were open every day of the voting period, including weekends and public holidays, from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm Saturday to Thursday, and from 9:00 am to 8:00 pm on Fridays. For the 2024 election, the operating hours were adjusted to open Monday to Friday and the Saturday before election day.

However, driven by an analysis of voter flow during the 2020 early voting period, and noting that fewer electors were choosing to vote in the first hour of voting, the decision was made to adjust the opening hours to 10:30 am to 6:30 pm. This change aimed to better meet voter demand once electors finished work.

Despite the intention behind the adjusted operating hours for the 2024 election, the change was not entirely successful. Observations during the 2024 voting period revealed that large numbers of electors began lining up to vote from around 10:00 am. Anecdotal evidence suggested that these early voters were predominantly elderly and retirees. This indicated that while the adjustment aimed to accommodate typical work hours, it did not fully meet the needs of all voter demographics.

To address this issue, Elections ACT plans to further adjust the opening hours for the 2028 election. Likely new hours will be from 10:00 am to 6:00 pm, shifting the opening time back by half an hour. This change aims to better balance the needs of all electors, ensuring a smoother voting experience.

Early voting centres were located in Belconnen, Casey, Civic, Dickson, Gungahlin, Kippax, Lanyon, Manuka, Tuggeranong, Weston Creek and Woden across the newly reduced two-week early voting period before election day, commencing on Tuesday, 8 October 2024.

Electronic voting was provided at all early voting centres.

A total of 142,833 early votes were cast in 2024, not including postal votes. This equated to 51% of all votes cast. Increasing to 163,310 and 59% taking postal votes into account.

Of the early votes cast in 2024, 133,151 were cast electronically, representing 93.2% of votes cast early, a slight reduction from the 2020 result of 94.5%.

The early voting centres were also used as polling places on polling day, with electronic voting available at those locations. This replicated the practice of all previous elections since 2001.

Details of the numbers of early votes cast at the 2024 election are at Tables 4–9.

## Electronic voting at polling places

ACT elections have benefited from electronic voting for over 23 years, first deployed at the 2001 election. While the number of electors using electronic voting declined in 2024 (153,180) compared to the historic high in 2020 (192,892), engagement with e-voting remains substantial and significantly higher than in earlier elections (81,538 in 2016 and 59,200 in 2012).

eVACS® continued to provide significant benefits to the ACT electoral system by reducing inadvertent informal votes, providing an early indication of the likely election result on election night, and enabling a faster completion of the final election results, less than a week after the polls closed.

**Table 25** Votes cast electronically

|                                                                    | 2008   | 2012   | 2016   | 2020    | 2024    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| Total number of votes cast at early voting centres                 | 44,635 | 61,680 | 84,358 | 191,253 | 142,833 |
| Number e-votes at early voting centres                             | 36,323 | 50,767 | 72,203 | 179,101 | 133,151 |
| Percentage (%) of e-votes cast at early voting centres             | 81.4   | 82.3   | 85.6   | 93.6    | 93.2    |
| Total number of e-votes cast                                       | 43,820 | 59,200 | 81,538 | 193,178 | 153,304 |
| Percentage of e-votes cast in the election                         | 19.9   | 25.8   | 32.6   | 70.7    | 54.9    |
| Total votes issued at e-voting centres on election day*            | 9,312  | 10,163 | 9,849  | 12,468  | 21,363  |
| e-votes issued at e-voting centres on election day                 | 7,497  | 8,433  | 9,335  | 12,185  | 19,998  |
| Percentage (%) of e-votes cast on election day at e-voting centres | 80.5   | 83.0   | 94.8   | 97.7    | 93.6    |

\* The number of electronic voting centres issuing electronic votes on election day has differed since electronic voting was introduced. Four electronic voting centres issued electronic votes on election day in 2001; eight in 2004; reducing to five centres in 2008; then six in 2012 and 2016; 15 in 2020; and 11 locations issued electronic votes on election day in 2024.

Tables at Appendix 1 show the number and percentage of paper ballots and electronic votes by electorate cast at the 11 electronic polling places in 2024. However, where fewer than 20 paper votes were taken at some electronic voting centres, these were counted under the Central Scrutiny category. These are not included in the tables at Appendix 1. The table above includes votes counted under the Central Scrutiny category in 2024, where fewer than 20 paper votes were taken at some electronic voting centres. This includes 120 votes cast at early voting centres and 279 votes cast at that same locations on election day.

**Deployment of electronic voting for the 2024 election**

Electronic voting was deployed in the 11 early voting centres located across the ACT (see **Early voting** on page 78). These same locations also had electronic voting on election day. Traditional paper ballots were available at each of these electronic voting centres.

To set up the early voting centres, Elections ACT staff installed a voting server and multiple electronic voting terminals, tailored to each centre’s size and location. Specific terminals were established to assist electors who needed to be seated or in a wheelchair, as well as those with vision impairments. Each electronic voting booth featured a 23-inch touch-screen display, a QR code reader, and an instruction poster. For vision-

impaired electors, the booths included headphones and a keypad, with audio instructions to guide them through the voting process.

In previous elections, a recurring issue arose where some polling officials marked an elector as being issued an e-voting card but instead issued a paper ballot, or vice versa. This discrepancy affected the daily reconciliation of ballot papers, leaving uncertainty about the numbers correctly issued and remaining. To address this issue in 2024, Elections ACT adjusted elector mark-off procedures and the supporting LAPPERDS system, establishing multiple tables for the issuance of e-voting cards only and a single table for issuing ballot papers. This decision was guided by the high percentage of electronic votes from previous elections (in 2020, 94.5% of all votes cast in early voting centres were electronic).

However, the new approach raised concerns among some voters, who felt pressured into voting electronically. This occasionally caused an alternative administrative issue where electors were marked off as having been issued an e-voting card on one electoral roll, then, having decided to vote by paper instead, were directed to the alternative issuing table. On occasion, this resulted in a second roll mark-off for the elector before the original roll mark-off had time to be electronically communicated to the other computers in the mark-off network, which again affected the daily

reconciliation of ballot papers. Consequently, the aim of resolving the reconciliation issue was not fully realised, with the added impact of causing annoyance to some electors.

Following a post-election review, Elections ACT has decided to abandon the new approach and revert to the pre-2024 process and will attempt to identify alternative means to reduce inaccurate roll markings.

### Voting at polling places

In 2020, 67 static polling places were established on election day, in addition to 15 early voting centres. Due to the success of the ‘Vote early, vote safe’ campaign, these polling places only took approximately 50,000 votes, averaging around 746 votes per location, which was an inefficient use of resources. Historically, a polling place taking around 2,000 votes on election day is considered medium-sized. The 2024 strategy aimed to increase the average turnout to around 2,000 votes per location, establishing medium-sized polling places with four to five issuing points.

Based on an analysis of the 2020 voting figures and adjustments for accessibility, and considering an estimated 60% early voting rate, it was concluded that 23 of the 2020 polling places would not be reestablished for the 2024 election. This left 44 single-day polling places operational, along with 11 early voting centres (EVCs), resulting in a total of 55 polling locations on election day. Each location was estimated to average 2,081 votes.

In addition to the 11 early voting centres open throughout the early voting period, the 44 single-day polling places were open from 8:00 am to 6:00 pm on election day, 19 October 2024. This provided 55 locations open for voting on election day. At each location, electors could cast an ordinary vote, issued to an elector whose name is found on the certified list of electors for the election.

Polling venues used at the 2024 election included accommodation provided by public schools (41), private schools (2), community facilities (7) and commercial properties (5).

**Table 26** Polling place venue changes and closures

| Polling place name   | Previous venue                                | 2024 venue                                    |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Bonython             | Bonython Primary School                       | Closed                                        |
| Charnwood North      | Charnwood-Dunlop School                       | Closed                                        |
| Chisholm EVC*        | 26 Benham Street, Chisholm                    | Single day PP – Caroline Chisholm School      |
| City EVC*            | Canberra City Uniting Church                  | Closed                                        |
| Deakin               | Canberra Girls Grammar School (Junior school) | Closed                                        |
| Dickson EVC*         | Ground floor, 490 Northbourne Avenue, Dickson | Ground floor, 470 Northbourne Avenue, Dickson |
| Evatt                | Evatt Primary School                          | Closed                                        |
| Farrer               | Farrer Primary School                         | Closed                                        |
| Flynn EVC*           | Flynn Community Hub                           | Closed                                        |
| Forde                | Burgmann Anglican School                      | Closed                                        |
| Garran               | Garran Primary School                         | Unavailable                                   |
| Gilmore              | Gilmore Primary School                        | Closed                                        |
| Giralang             | Giralang Primary School                       | Closed                                        |
| Griffith             | St Edmund’s College                           | Closed                                        |
| Gungahlin EVC*       | Gungahlin Enclosed Oval                       | Level 1, Shop 12, Marketplace Gungahlin       |
| Gungahlin North EVC* | Ruby apartments, 8 Gribble Street, Gungahlin  | Closed                                        |

| Polling place name | Previous venue                                 | 2024 venue                      |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Hall               | Hall School Museum                             | Closed                          |
| Harrison EVC*      | Ground floor, Harrison Green                   | Single day PP – Harrison School |
| Holder             | St Jude's Primary School                       | Closed                          |
| Holt               | Kingsford Smith School                         | Closed                          |
| Hughes             | Hughes Primary School                          | Closed                          |
| Kambah West        | St Thomas the Apostle Catholic Primary School  | Closed                          |
| Lanyon EVC*        | 21 Sidney Nolan Street, Conder                 | 17 Sidney Nolan Street, Conder  |
| Latham             | Latham Primary School                          | Closed                          |
| Lyons              | Lyons Early Childhood School                   | Closed                          |
| Macquarie          | Macquarie Primary School                       | Closed                          |
| Manuka EVC*        | 33 Bougainville Street, Manuka village         | Manuka oval                     |
| Nicholls           | Gold Creek School (Junior site)                | Closed                          |
| Oaks Estate        | Oaks Estate Community Hall                     | Closed                          |
| Page               | St Matthew's Primary School                    | Closed                          |
| Richardson         | Richardson Primary School                      | Closed                          |
| Tharwa             | Tharwa Community Room                          | Closed                          |
| Theodore           | Theodore Primary School                        | Closed                          |
| Wanniassa          | Wanniassa School (Senior Campus)               | Closed                          |
| Weston Creek EVC*  | Weston Arcade, 11 Brierly Street, Weston Creek | Weston Creek Community Centre   |
| Woden EVC*         | Bonner House, Neptune St, Phillip              | 2 Bowes Street, Phillip         |

\* Polling location served as an early voting centre during the early voting period and as an electronic polling place on election day.

**Table 27** New polling places

| Polling place name | 2020 venue                                              |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Casey EVC*         | Nicholls Playing Field, 230 Clarrie Hermes Dr, Nicholls |

\* Polling location served as an early voting centre during the early voting period and as an electronic polling place on election day

## Interstate voting

All interstate votes are issued as declaration votes.

Interstate voters could vote in person at the capital city office of each State and Territory electoral commission during the early voting period. The 2024 election saw a significant increase in the number of interstate votes compared to the pandemic impacted 2020 election where a number of state electoral authority offices were not open to the public at the time of the 2020 election.

There were 716 votes issued at the interstate voting locations at the 2024 election compared to 111 in 2020 and 557 in 2016.

Of the 716 votes, 709 were admitted to the count.

Table 28 shows the detailed returns from each interstate voting venue.

**Table 28** Interstate voting at the 2024 election

| Interstate Electoral Commission | Brindabella | Ginninderra | Kurrajong  | Murrumbidgee | Yerrabi    | Total      |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| NSW                             | 30          | 39          | 95         | 74           | 46         | 284        |
| NT                              | 5           | 1           | 8          | 5            | 3          | 22         |
| Qld                             | 24          | 6           | 25         | 25           | 13         | 93         |
| SA                              | 6           | 12          | 12         | 13           | 10         | 53         |
| Tas                             | 4           | 3           | 6          | 3            | 0          | 16         |
| Vic                             | 30          | 24          | 66         | 49           | 27         | 196        |
| WA                              | 6           | 9           | 21         | 11           | 5          | 52         |
| <b>Total</b>                    | <b>105</b>  | <b>94</b>   | <b>233</b> | <b>180</b>   | <b>104</b> | <b>716</b> |

## Antarctic electors

Part 11 of the Electoral Act provides detailed directions on the method for taking receipt of votes from eligible ACT electors who are stationed in Antarctica, its surrounding islands, or on a ship transporting research personnel to or from Antarctica.

As the Electoral Act was initially drafted prior to 1992 and was based on similar provisions within the Commonwealth Electoral Act at the time, the provisions for Antarctic voting are based on the establishment of Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers for each Antarctic station and the use of outdated technology (fax machines or another means approved by the Commissioner). If an ACT elector is currently residing at an Antarctic station or on a ship, the Commissioner must transmit to the Returning Officer an extract of the certified list and directions on how the Returning Officer can prepare a ballot paper for the elector. The Returning Officer must arrange for an empty ballot box, provide the ballot paper to the elector for completion and lodgement. After the polls close in the ACT, the Returning Officer in Antarctica is to transmit to the Commission the particulars of the elector(s) who have voted and the particulars of the preference marks of each ballot paper. Upon receipt of the transmission, an officer of the Commission is then required to transcribe the elector's vote onto an official ballot paper and seal it in an Antarctic elector envelope.

While this process was appropriate at the time of initial drafting, it is now considerably outdated, and the process described above does not provide for a secret vote for an elector residing in Antarctica. For this reason, it is not compulsory for Antarctic electors to vote under section 129 of the Act.

However, the Electoral Act has now been amended to allow Antarctic electors to cast an electronic vote if a program for use in electronic voting has been approved by the Commissioner.

While it is very rare for Elections ACT to take a vote from an Antarctic elector, there are now improved means for Antarctic electors to engage with their voting rights in ACT elections. Accordingly, Part 11 of the Electoral Act is now considered redundant.

### Recommendation 21

To address the outdated nature of polling procedures for Antarctic electors as prescribed under Part 11 of the Electoral Act, the Electoral Commission **recommends** that Part 11 (Polling in Antarctica) be removed, and any necessary definitions or clauses be moved within Part 10.

## Postal voting

A total of 25,188 postal votes were dispatched in 2024. Of these, 20,477 were returned prior to the last date for receipt of postal votes (25 October 2024) and admitted to the count following a preliminary scrutiny.

The 2024 election saw a 13% increase on the number of postal votes issued, compared to the 32% increase between 2016 and 2020 and the 39% increase between 2012 and 2016. A surprising result given the reduction to the attendance early voting period but nevertheless represents an overall increase in the percentage of all votes cast (7.33%) compared to 6.29% in 2020 and 5.24% in 2016.

Table 29 provides details of the number of postal votes issued, returned and admitted and the various categories of postal votes received by Elections ACT, but rejected from the count, for the previous three elections.

**Table 29** Postal vote outcomes

| Category of postal vote                                                                                                                               | 2016          | 2020          | 2024          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Issued                                                                                                                                                | 16,925        | 22,317        | 25,188        |
| Ballot papers admitted to the count                                                                                                                   | 13,114        | 17,172        | 20,477        |
| Applied for, but voted by another means                                                                                                               | 750           | 2,128*        | 1,210         |
| Returned to sender                                                                                                                                    | 252           | 232           | 158           |
| Returned too late to be admitted                                                                                                                      | 701           | 247           | 403           |
| Received, but not admitted, voter not correctly enrolled                                                                                              | 68            | 112           | 50            |
| Cancelled due to death or advice of incapacity                                                                                                        | 6             | 7             | 12            |
| Received, but not admitted, voter marked his/her vote after polling day                                                                               | 200           | 69            | 90            |
| Received, but not admitted because the voter did not sign the declaration                                                                             | 144           | 195           | 128           |
| Received, but not admitted, voter's signature did not match signature on application/enrolment or security question not completed or answer incorrect | 65            | 181           | 540^          |
| Received, but not admitted, signed by someone other than the elector                                                                                  | 26            | 26            | 10            |
| Received, but not admitted, returned without any identifying declaration                                                                              | 295           | 347           | 359           |
| <b>Total returned to Elections ACT or postal voters who voted by another means</b>                                                                    | <b>15,621</b> | <b>20,716</b> | <b>23,437</b> |
| <b>Total not returned to Elections ACT</b>                                                                                                            | <b>1,304</b>  | <b>1,601</b>  | <b>1,751</b>  |

\* In 2020, this figure included 507 electors who were sent a postal vote, but cast an overseas e-vote and two electors who were sent a postal vote but cast a telephone vote.

^ In 2024, Elections ACT introduced a security question and answer provision to all postal votes to improve the integrity of the postal vote preliminary scrutiny process. This figure includes electors who failed to satisfactorily confirm their identity through a combination of security question and signatures.

The following table shows the number of postal vote applications received using the various methods of application. Note that electors registered as general postal voters are automatically sent postal ballot papers without needing to make an application.

**Table 30 Applications for postal votes**

|                                                                    | 2016          | 2020               | 2024           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------|
| General postal voters                                              | 4,306         | 5,502              | 6303           |
| Access Canberra                                                    | 1,621         | 2,628              | 1828           |
| In person at Elections ACT                                         | 4             | 0                  | 4              |
| Over the phone at Elections ACT                                    | 104           | 169                | 194            |
| Email                                                              | 151           | 37                 | 32             |
| On a printed official postal vote application form                 | 1,265         | 0 <sup>^</sup>     | 0 <sup>^</sup> |
| Web application                                                    | 10,107        | 13,229             | 17,451         |
| Postal vote applications from previous mobile polling institutions | -             | 1,231 <sup>#</sup> | -              |
| Other                                                              | 4             | 1                  | 114            |
| <b>Total ~</b>                                                     | <b>17,562</b> | <b>22,797</b>      | <b>25,926</b>  |

<sup>^</sup> Elections ACT did not provide hardcopy postal vote application forms in 2020 or 2024.

<sup>#</sup> Mobile polling was not conducted in 2020 due to COVID-19. In lieu of mobile polling, qualifying institutions were offered a bulk postal vote service for the residents.

~ Not all postal vote applications received resulted in postal ballot packs being issued. As the ACT has fixed term elections, postal vote applications can be made many months in advance of election day. It is relatively common for electors to apply for postal votes early, but later withdraw their application when they are made aware of the dates for despatch of postal voting papers. Electors may also apply for a postal vote multiple times, potentially using a variety of mediums.

## Overseas postal voting

The implementation and subsequent discontinuation of the Overseas e-voting System (OSEV) for ACT elections highlight significant challenges in ensuring the enfranchisement of overseas electors. The 2016 ACT election saw a notable increase in postal votes rejected due to late receipt, with 701 postal votes, including 560 from overseas, arriving after the deadline. This issue was attributed to declining postal service efficiency, particularly for international deliveries, exacerbated by Australia Post's changes to its delivery model.

In response, the Electoral Commission introduced OSEV for the 2020 election to mitigate the risk of disenfranchising overseas voters. The system provided a secure online voting option and significantly reduced the number of late overseas postal votes, with only 22 such votes received after the deadline in 2020, compared to 560 in 2016.

Despite its success in 2020, the Commissioner decided against redeploying OSEV for the 2024 election, citing advice from federal security agencies and the Electoral Integrity Advisory Panel regarding risks to electoral integrity which could not be mitigated satisfactorily for the 2024 election. Consequently, Elections ACT engaged

commercial courier services for the delivery and return of overseas postal ballots. This approach aimed to enhance the timely receipt and return of postal votes, addressing the challenges posed by traditional postal services.

However, the overseas courier solution produced mixed results, proving to be logistically complex, expensive and for some electors, unsatisfactory. The solution offered direct delivery of postal voting materials to the advised overseas address and a return arrangement where the elector, depending on location, could arrange for a courier pick-up or to drop off their material at a specified vendor location. However, significant concerns were raised by some electors across the globe experiencing difficulties with the return process. Elections ACT received complaints from electors that the supplied 'waybills' were not being recognised by the issuing vendor, that some vendor offices were requiring additional information and labelling resulting in refusal to accept the return material, lodged satchels being returned to the elector rather than being processed and returned to Australia and booked pickups through the vendor or a supplied third-party provider not occurring as scheduled.



For Elections ACT, the administration and liaison with the international courier vendor were complex and time-consuming, requiring significant resources to address issues raised by individual electors. For electors, international couriers did not entirely solve the postal voting issue. Some electors, due to frequent travel, do not have a suitable address to use and couriers still does not guarantee delivery and return within the legislated timeframes.

The arrangement also appears to be cost prohibitive for a continuation of the solution at future elections. Not including staffing and administrative costs, the overseas courier delivery and return project cost \$201,251.09, equating to \$126.65 per returned international vote.

### ***Potential approaches to international voting for future elections***

In light of the challenges and successes experienced with various voting methods for overseas electors, several potential approaches to international voting for future ACT elections are worth considering:

#### **Returning to using the overseas e-voting system (OSEV)**

The Overseas e-Voting system (OSEV) was implemented successfully during the 2020 ACT election, significantly reducing the number of late overseas postal votes. Despite its success, the system was not redeployed for the 2024 election due to increasing and unresolved security risks of the changed electoral environment. Revisiting OSEV as a potential solution involves addressing these security issues in collaboration with federal security agencies. If these concerns can be mitigated in the future, currently considered unlikely without cost and time prohibitive risk mitigations, OSEV could again provide a secure and efficient voting method for overseas electors.

#### **Seeking funding in support of international couriers services in 2028**

Seeking continued funding for this method could help ensure that postal votes are received and returned within the legislated timeframes, thereby reducing the risk of disenfranchisement due to postal delays. Although this approach is costly and logistically complex, it did successfully assist over 1500 electors cast their votes from overseas.

### **Implementing a system of telephone voting**

Telephone voting offers an alternative method for overseas electors to cast their votes without relying on postal services or internet access. In this system, electors would speak to an operator who would transcribe their vote, likely into the electronic voting system. This method provides a secure and accessible option for voters, although it does impact the secrecy of the vote, requiring the voter to disclose their vote to another person, albeit anonymously.

While Elections ACT already deploys a telephone voting system, it is designed specifically for blind and vision-impaired electors and is not suitable for general use.

Multiple Australian electoral jurisdictions deploy a form of telephone voting. Implementing such a system could provide a reliable alternative for overseas electors, ensuring their participation in the electoral process.

### **Investigating an alternative e-voting solution**

Exploring alternative e-voting solutions could offer another viable option for overseas voting although any such solution would need to appropriately address the electoral integrity and security concerns inherent in any internet supported solution.

The Electoral Act already provides the Commissioner with the discretion to approve a computer program for use in electronic voting. It also allows the Commissioner to deploy a system of telephone voting for electors with a visual impairment. However, it does not currently support the deployment of a telephone voting system for other types of eligible electors, including those within Australia but outside ACT during the voting period.

### **Recommendation 22**

The Commission **recommends** that the Electoral Act be amended to grant the Electoral Commissioner the discretion to approve a telephone voting process for electors outside of Australia during the voting period. The Commission further recommends that the Commissioner be granted the discretion to use such a system for domestic-based electors outside of the ACT during the voting period.

## Mobile polling

As the health concerns relating to the COVID-19 pandemic were ongoing at the time of the 2020 election, the Commission decided against delivering mobile polling arrangements to any institutions at that time.

The 2024 election saw the reintroduction of traditional mobile polling services.

Four teams of polling officials, each consisting of an officer in charge and a mobile voting issuing officer, visited 47 institutions to offer mobile voting services to residents. The Electoral Act provides that all mobile polling will be conducted in the week leading up to and including election day.

The mobile teams took a total of 1,644 votes.

The Assembly passed the *Electoral and Road Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2023*, which, among other things, addressed the Commission's 2020 recommendation to amend Division 10.5 of the Electoral Act to allow mobile polling to be conducted directly to people experiencing homelessness.

Accordingly, mobile voting institutions in 2024 included nursing homes/retirement villages, public and private hospitals, the Alexander Maconochie Centre and for the first time, locations where people experiencing homelessness are likely to attend or gather.

Elections ACT worked closely with Orange Sky, a charity that offers free mobile laundry services for the homeless. Elections ACT was able to match the schedule of Orange Sky to maximise the potential that eligible electors experiencing homelessness would be attending the locations when voting services were scheduled.

While only 69 votes were taken at homelessness locations, it remains an important accessibility and inclusivity measure that will continue to be deployed across future elections.

## Prisoner voting

In May 2008, the entitlement for prisoners to enrol to vote was amended to allow all eligible ACT prisoners to enrol and vote in ACT Legislative Assembly elections. By contrast, for federal elections, prisoners sentenced to imprisonment for three years or longer are not eligible to vote. As in previous elections, all ACT remandees and prisoners eligible to enrol and vote at the 2024 election were located in the Alexander Maconochie Centre (AMC).

Elections ACT coordinated with ACT Corrective Services to facilitate the enrolment and voting process for these remandees and prisoners. A list of prisoners was provided by ACT Corrective Services and cross-checked against the electoral roll. An enrolment drive explaining prisoner enrolment and voting entitlements was undertaken through ACT Corrective Services two weeks before the close of rolls, allowing those not enrolled to do so.

Arrangements were made with Corrective Services for mobile polling at the AMC on Wednesday, 16 October, from 8:30 am to 5:00 pm. Corrective Services officers escorted inmates to the mobile polling team in a secure location. A total of 53 votes were cast at the AMC by the mobile polling team.

Applying for a postal vote was also available for those unable to vote when the mobile polling team attended the centre.

## Declaration voting

A declaration vote is issued to a voter in a polling place or early voting centre where:

- The elector's name cannot be found on the preliminary certified list (the electoral roll) for any of the five electorates.
- The elector's name appears on the preliminary certified list as having already been marked as having voted.
- The elector's name is found on the electoral roll for the correct address, but the year of birth does not match.
- The vote is issued at an interstate polling place (716 in 2024).

Postal votes (see **Postal voting** on page 84) are also considered forms of declaration votes. In 2024, 4,214 declaration votes (not including postal votes) were issued, a similar number to 2020 (4,142).

Before a declaration vote envelope can be opened and the ballot paper included in the count, each declaration vote must undergo a preliminary scrutiny to establish that the vote inside is eligible for inclusion in the count.

New legislation introduced by the Assembly just prior to the 2020 election now allows electors who are not on the ACT roll at the close of the preliminary roll to enrol before the close of polls at 6:00 pm on election day. Electors in this situation are offered a declaration vote, and if they successfully enrol by the end of polling, the declaration vote will likely be admitted to the final count. This legislation is known as ‘enrol on the day’ legislation. However, there remains a requirement under Schedule 3 of the Electoral Act for the preliminary scrutiny to ascertain whether the elector was provided with a declaration vote because their name did not appear on the electoral roll due to ‘official error’. In practice, this means conducting a complex task involving the detailed examination of the voter’s enrolment history using the AEC’s computerised roll management system to determine whether their most recent enrolled address was in the electorate for which they completed their declaration vote and, if not for an error, should still be enrolled in that electorate.

With the introduction of ‘enrol on the day’ legislation, it appears that this further detailed examination of enrolment history is unnecessary and not warranted by the use of Commission resources in high demand at a busy and critical time.

To facilitate ‘enrol on the day’ legislation, Elections ACT provides an enrolment terminal in every polling location. If an elector is found not to be enrolled in the ACT, they are offered the opportunity to enrol on the spot or to take an enrolment card home and enrol before the close of polls. They are then provided with a declaration vote.

### **Recommendation 23**

If the elector, having been instructed to enrol before the close of polls for their vote to be counted, does not take this opportunity either at the polling location or at their home after leaving the polling location, any failure of their name appearing on the ‘supplementary roll’ (as it is known in the Electoral Act) should no longer be considered official error, and their vote should not undergo further examination of roll history. Accordingly, the Commission **recommends** amending Schedule 3 of the Electoral Act to remove the requirement to examine the declaration voter’s enrolment history for possible ‘official error’. This will put the onus on the declaration voter to take the opportunity provided within each polling location to enrol before the legislated cut-off of 6:00 pm on election days.

Table 31 shows the outcome of the preliminary scrutiny of declaration votes at the 2016, 2020 and 2024 elections.

**Table 31** Preliminary scrutiny of declaration votes

| Category of declaration vote                      | Preliminary scrutiny outcome | 2016         | 2020         | 2024         |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Elector not found on roll                         |                              | 1,243        | 3,915        | 3,411        |
|                                                   | Admitted on roll             | 96           | 2,877        | 2,576        |
|                                                   | Admitted not on roll         | 100          | 35           | 92           |
|                                                   | Rejected                     | 1,047        | 1,003        | 743          |
| YOB/Name don't match*                             |                              | 29           | 4            | 5            |
|                                                   | Admitted                     | 28           | 3            | 4            |
|                                                   | Rejected                     | 1            | 1            | 1            |
| Already marked as having voted                    |                              | 87           | 88           | 74           |
|                                                   | Admitted                     | 73           | 29           | 27           |
|                                                   | Rejected                     | 14           | 59           | 47           |
| Interstate                                        |                              | 557          | 111          | 716          |
|                                                   | Admitted                     | 551          | 111          | 709          |
|                                                   | Rejected                     | 6            | 0            | 7            |
| Declaration votes: Electronic voters <sup>^</sup> |                              | 20           | 24           | 8            |
|                                                   | Admitted                     | 0            | 4            | 2            |
|                                                   | Rejected                     | 20           | 20           | 6            |
| <b>Total</b>                                      |                              | <b>1,936</b> | <b>4,142</b> | <b>4,214</b> |
| <b>Total Admitted Declaration#</b>                | <b>Admitted</b>              | <b>297</b>   | <b>2,948</b> | <b>2,701</b> |
| <b>Total Rejected</b>                             | <b>Rejected</b>              | <b>1,088</b> | <b>1,083</b> | <b>804</b>   |

\* The purpose of this category is to identify electors who may show as enrolled at the correct address, but their year of birth suggests a different elector. An example may be a father and son who share a name and address, but a different year of birth. The father is marked as having voted against the son's record. When the son presents to vote only the father's roll record is yet to be marked — same name, same address different year of birth. Most occurrences of these declaration votes are found to be incorrectly issued by polling officials who issued the declaration vote because of minor errors associated with the elector's date of birth.

<sup>^</sup> Declaration votes: Electronic voters were issued to an elector where the elector claimed not to have successfully completed their electronic vote before the vote was lodged. In almost all cases records indicated that these electors had cast electronic votes.

# Total admitted does not include interstate as these are reported elsewhere in the election statistics and may also include admitted declaration envelopes that did not have a ballot paper inside.

## Part 4 – undertake formal evaluations of the conduct of elections to identify key areas for improvement in delivery of services

### Ballot paper surveys

After every ACT election, the Commission conducts surveys of the marking of informal and formal votes to determine whether any patterns of behaviour can be deduced. These insights are used to inform future election information campaigns.

#### Formal vote survey

Examining the formal votes cast in the 2024 ACT election reveals intriguing patterns in voter behaviour. In particular, the length of sequence of numbering of votes can provide some insight into the way voters interpret the instructions on the ballot paper, as well as information from Elections ACT brochures and party and candidate canvassing material. It also provides an indication of the impact of the number of candidates, and the possible impact of electronic voting.

Since 2001, the electronic recording of preferences on all formal ballot papers has allowed for detailed statistical analysis of how electors number their preferences.

*Tables 65–69 — Length of sequence* show, for each electorate in 2024, the length of sequence of each ballot paper, recording how far each elector indicated preferences in an unbroken sequence.

In 2024, approximately 98.2% of formal voters followed the ballot paper instructions, indicating at least as many preferences as there were vacancies in the electorate. This result suggests that the instructions provided to voters were effective. Around 68.4% of formal voters indicated **exactly** as many preferences as there were vacancies, a rate consistent with 2020 (68.1%), slightly higher than 2016 (64%), but lower than 2012 (72%).

Around 30% of formal voters indicated more than the minimum number of preferences, compared to 31% in 2020, 35% in 2016, and 26% in 2012. The 2024 election recorded the lowest level (5.5%) of formal voters marking preferences for every candidate, since the introduction of five electorates, compared to 6.3% in 2020 and 7.8% in 2016. Murrumbidgee had the highest number of formal voters marking preferences for every candidate at 7.0%.

The Electoral Act's formality rules accept as formal any ballot paper indicating at least a unique first preference, even if the instructed minimum number of preferences has not been indicated by the elector. This is known as a savings provision. Around 1.8% of electors who cast a formal ballot failed to number at least as many preferences as there were vacancies in the electorate, compared to 1.1% of electors in 2020, 1.2% in 2016 and 1.9% in 2012. It is unclear how many of these votes were cast knowingly as formal votes despite not meeting the recommended minimum, versus those resulting from a misunderstanding of the instructions. Regardless, the number of such ballot papers justifies maintaining the current formality rules while continuing to instruct voters to number at least as many candidates as there are vacancies.

Every election, Elections ACT receives a small number of complaints or comments regarding the instructions on the ballot paper and their perceived contradiction with the formality rules. These complainants, noting the impact of the legislated savings provision, highlight the inconsistency between the advice on the ballot paper and the permissibility of a single preference. They either express concerns that the Commission is providing false information to electors about the permissibility

of a single preference or suggest that ballots should not be counted if they fail to follow the instructions and number at least as many preferences as there are vacancies.

The instructions on the ballot paper are legislated through Schedule 1 of the Electoral Act. Elections ACT ensures that all electors are provided with clear information, including the impact of the savings provision, through its information and education campaign.

If adjustments were made either to the ballot paper instructions or through the removal of the savings provision, the impact on the election outcome could be considerable. For instance, if the instructions were altered to align with the legislated ability to count any paper as long as it includes a unique first preference, it is highly likely that the percentage of electors who number at least as many preferences as there are vacancies would significantly decrease from 98.2%. Currently, 68.4% of all formal voters follow the first line of the instructions exactly, numbering 'five boxes from 1 to 5 in the order of [their] choice'. This change in voter behaviour would likely result in a significant increase in the number of ballot papers exhausting at early counts of a scrutiny, having no further candidates preferred to continue the distribution. Such an outcome is likely to lead to more candidates elected having not reached quota along with greater margins between their final vote tally and the quota. This consequence could be argued as undesirable for the integrity of the election outcome and the legitimacy of the elected members.

Similarly, if the Electoral Act were amended to remove the savings provision, the final election outcome might have less legitimacy and democratic integrity. Currently, 1.8% of voters cast a vote that does not number at least as many preferences as there are vacancies. While it is unclear how many of these votes are cast with the knowledge that they do not comply with the recommended minimum and how many are due to a failure to understand or follow the instructions, it is likely that a significant number are the latter. If the savings provision were removed, these electors' voting intentions would not contribute to the final result, impacting around 5,000 voters and increasing informality rates from 1.91% to 3.68%.

## Recommendation 24

Notwithstanding concerns about ballot paper instructions, the Commission **recommends** maintaining the current ballot paper instructions detailed in Schedule 1 of the Electoral Act to support consistent voter behaviour, reduce unintended disenfranchisement and minimise ballot exhaustion.

*Table 64 — Sequence breaks on formal ballot papers* shows the number of ballots that omitted or duplicated a preference number, thus breaking the sequence of preferences considered in a Hare-Clark scrutiny. In 2024, 882 ballot papers contained a repeated number (compared to 604 in 2020, 1,068 in 2016, 780 in 2012, and 1,142 in 2008), and 519 ballots missed a number in the sequence (compared to 336 in 2020, 719 in 2016, 650 in 2012, and 863 in 2008). The increase from 2020 but decrease from earlier elections likely reflects the impact of electronic voting, which prevents such errors on electronic ballots. The 2020 election experienced a higher number of electronic votes compared to 2024 and therefore recorded fewer occurrences of missing or repeated numbers.

Under the ACT's Hare-Clark system, these ballot papers are still counted as formal, as they had a unique first preference. However, they could not be given full effect, with regard to any preferences shown after the break in sequence.

This outcome supports the continued widespread use of electronic voting to reduce the likelihood of voters making inadvertent errors on their ballot papers that ultimately impacts the final election result.

Most sequence breaks occurred early, with mistakes decreasing as the number of preferences increased. This trend is expected, given that around 68% of formal voters only indicated the recommended minimum number of preferences.

## Informal vote survey

The informal rate for the 2024 election was 1.9%. The second lowest rate of informal voting at an ACT election behind 1.4% achieved at the 2020 election.

**Graph 10** Percentage (%) informal voting in the ACT




Table 32 provides the results of a survey of all informal paper ballots, categorised by the reason for their informality.

**Table 32** Breakdown of informal paper ballots by reason for informality

| Informal type                                                 | Brindabella  |      | Ginninderra  |      | Kurrajong  |      | Murrumbidgee |      | Yerrabi      |      | Total        |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------|--------------|------|------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|
|                                                               | No.          | %    | No.          | %    | No.        | %    | No.          | %    | No.          | %    | No.          | %    |
| Electronic informal                                           | 366          | 25.8 | 287          | 24.8 | 178        | 23.7 | 204          | 21.9 | 292          | 26.7 | 1327         | 24.8 |
| Identify the voter                                            | 1            | 0.1  | 0            | 0.0  | 1          | 0.1  | 1            | 0.1  | 0            | 0.0  | 3            | 0.1  |
| Totally blank                                                 | 315          | 22.2 | 251          | 21.7 | 160        | 21.3 | 209          | 22.5 | 225          | 20.5 | 1160         | 21.7 |
| Ticket vote — a preference for one or more parties            | 5            | 0.4  | 8            | 0.7  | 10         | 1.3  | 7            | 0.8  | 12           | 1.1  | 42           | 0.8  |
| Numbers but no number 1                                       | 31           | 2.2  | 24           | 2.1  | 12         | 1.6  | 22           | 2.4  | 22           | 2.0  | 111          | 2.1  |
| A single tick                                                 | 10           | 0.7  | 8            | 0.7  | 4          | 0.5  | 4            | 0.4  | 4            | 0.4  | 30           | 0.6  |
| A single cross                                                | 5            | 0.4  | 5            | 0.4  | 1          | 0.1  | 2            | 0.2  | 3            | 0.3  | 16           | 0.3  |
| Consecutive numbering from 1 in every column                  | 68           | 4.8  | 58           | 5.0  | 31         | 4.1  | 71           | 7.7  | 61           | 5.6  | 289          | 5.4  |
| Consecutive numbering from 1 in 2 or more columns but not all | 57           | 4.0  | 72           | 6.2  | 59         | 7.9  | 46           | 5.0  | 50           | 4.6  | 284          | 5.3  |
| A first preference in every column only                       | 11           | 0.8  | 11           | 1.0  | 3          | 0.4  | 9            | 1.0  | 6            | 0.5  | 40           | 0.8  |
| A first preference for all candidates in one column only      | 57           | 4.0  | 22           | 1.9  | 24         | 3.2  | 33           | 3.6  | 39           | 3.6  | 175          | 3.3  |
| A first preference in every box                               | 14           | 1.0  | 10           | 0.9  | 7          | 0.9  | 8            | 0.0  | 12           | 1.4  | 51           | 0.5  |
| More first preferences than number of columns                 | 11           | 0.8  | 14           | 1.2  | 5          | 0.7  | 16           | 1.7  | 12           | 1.1  | 58           | 1.1  |
| With 9 first preferences                                      | 0            | 0.0  | 6            | 0.5  | 7          | 0.9  | 0            | 0.0  | 15           | 1.4  | 28           | 0.5  |
| With 8 first preferences                                      | 6            | 0.4  | 5            | 0.4  | 5          | 0.7  | 4            | 0.4  | 7            | 0.6  | 27           | 0.5  |
| With 7 first preferences                                      | 25           | 1.8  | 8            | 0.7  | 7          | 0.9  | 18           | 2.0  | 9            | 0.8  | 67           | 1.3  |
| With 6 first preferences                                      | 19           | 1.3  | 12           | 1.0  | 11         | 1.5  | 12           | 1.3  | 9            | 0.8  | 63           | 1.2  |
| With 5 first preferences                                      | 54           | 3.8  | 63           | 5.4  | 32         | 4.3  | 31           | 3.4  | 62           | 5.6  | 242          | 4.5  |
| With 4 first preferences                                      | 12           | 0.8  | 15           | 1.3  | 8          | 1.1  | 6            | 0.7  | 8            | 0.7  | 49           | 0.9  |
| With 3 first preferences                                      | 13           | 0.9  | 14           | 1.2  | 11         | 1.5  | 8            | 0.9  | 18           | 1.6  | 64           | 1.2  |
| With 2 first preferences                                      | 43           | 3.0  | 44           | 3.8  | 26         | 3.5  | 36           | 3.9  | 44           | 4.0  | 193          | 3.6  |
| Voter has 'written in' a candidate                            | 19           | 1.3  | 15           | 1.3  | 11         | 1.5  | 14           | 1.5  | 8            | 0.7  | 67           | 1.3  |
| Marks/writing/lines/scribbles/slogans/stickers only           | 268          | 18.9 | 195          | 16.9 | 128        | 17.1 | 164          | 17.6 | 173          | 15.8 | 928          | 17.4 |
| Not enclosed in a declaration envelope                        | 0            | 0.0  | 0            | 0.0  | 1          | 0.1  | 1            | 0.1  | 0            | 0.0  | 2            | 0.0  |
| Other                                                         | 6            | 0.4  | 9            | 0.8  | 8          | 1.1  | 4            | 0.4  | 4            | 0.4  | 31           | 0.6  |
| <b>Total</b>                                                  | <b>1,416</b> |      | <b>1,156</b> |      | <b>750</b> |      | <b>930</b>   |      | <b>1,095</b> |      | <b>5,347</b> |      |



Table 33 compares the informal rate of paper and electronic ballots. More detailed tables showing the numbers of electronic votes cast are included at Appendix 1.

**Table 33** Comparison of rate of informal voting, paper v electronic ballots

| Ballot type                     |          | Brindabella |     | Ginninderra |     | Kurrajong |     | Murrumbidgee |     | Yerrabi |     | ACT total* |     |
|---------------------------------|----------|-------------|-----|-------------|-----|-----------|-----|--------------|-----|---------|-----|------------|-----|
| Votes                           |          | Votes       | %   | Votes       | %   | Votes     | %   | Votes        | %   | Votes   | %   | Votes      | %   |
| <b>Paper</b>                    | Informal | 1050        | 4.0 | 869         | 3.2 | 572       | 2.4 | 726          | 2.7 | 803     | 3.6 | 4,020      | 3.2 |
| Total paper ballots             |          | 26,348      |     | 26,774      |     | 23,614    |     | 27,178       |     | 22,276  |     | 126,190    |     |
| <b>Electronic</b>               | Informal | 366         | 1.1 | 287         | 0.9 | 178       | 0.7 | 204          | 0.7 | 292     | 0.9 | 1327       | 0.9 |
| <b>Total electronic ballots</b> |          | 33,314      |     | 30,434      |     | 26,058    |     | 29,601       |     | 33,773  |     | 153,180    |     |
| Total informal Ballots          |          | 1,416       | 2.4 | 1,156       | 2.0 | 750       | 1.5 | 930          | 1.6 | 1,095   | 2.0 | 5,347      | 1.9 |

The 2024 election data again highlights a significant disparity between the informal voting rates of those using electronic voting (0.9%) and those using paper ballots (3.2%). The continued high proportion of electronic votes in 2024 and the comparatively low rate of informal electronic votes again contributed to the very low total informal rate of 1.9% in 2024.

One of the significant benefits of electronic voting is that it does not allow votes if they do not meet the rules of a formal vote. The only means for an elector to cast an informal vote electronically is to cast a blank ballot, and eVACS® has been designed to make the casting of a blank electronic ballot a very intentional action. Only 0.9% of electronic voters cast what can be considered an intentional informal vote. A similar rate is observed in the analysis of informal paper ballots, with 1,160 totally blank paper ballots cast in 2024, representing 0.9% of all paper ballots. While paper ballots allow for other intentional informal actions, such as writing in an alternative candidate, it is estimated that the rate of intentional informality is between 1% and 2%.

The remaining informal ballots are likely mistakes made by the electors, underscoring the importance of electronic voting in ensuring that all voting preferences are accurately captured.

Historically, a relatively common informal vote is a vote in which the elector numbers one to n in more than one party or group column, where n is the number of candidates in the column. It is likely that this type of informal vote are unintentional informal ballot papers. It is possible that these voters believed that they needed to vote for candidates starting with one in multiple columns. However, in 2024 there were only 573 informal votes in this category or just 0.45% of all paper votes cast, slightly down from 0.58% in 2020.

To address this common mistake, Elections ACT has emphasised the correct numbering of ballot papers in its information strategy. Posters in each voting compartment highlighted correct numbering, and videos played alongside the queue in every polling place and early voting centre demonstrating the correct method of numbering ballot papers. Additionally, brochures delivered to all households provided guidance on how to correctly complete a formal vote.

## Exit survey results

Elections ACT engages a third-party vendor to conduct exit polling on voter awareness and satisfaction with polling place voter services and Elections ACT public awareness programs undertaken for the 2024 ACT election. The results of these surveys are compared to the equivalent results obtained from similar surveys conducted during previous elections.

**Table 34 Exposure to the Elections ACT public information campaign**

**QUESTION:** The ACT Electoral Commission, known as Elections ACT, has been conducting a public information campaign over the last few months to publicise this ACT Election, the election date, and voting procedures. Can you remember hearing, seeing or reading material involved in the Elections ACT information campaign?

|                 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%) | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Yes             | 89   | 81   | 85   |
| No              | 11   | 19   | 15   |

**Table 35 Usefulness of the Elections ACT public information campaign**

**QUESTION:** Overall, was this campaign by Elections ACT for you useful or not useful?

|                 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%) | 510  | 514  | 1435 |
| Very useful     | 55   | 32   | 31   |
| Somewhat useful | 24   | 52   | 49   |
| Not useful      | 12   | 4    | 7    |
| No impact on me | 7    | 11   | 12   |
| Unsure          | 2    | 2    | 2    |

**Table 36 Reach of different media**

**QUESTION:** In which of these ways did the Elections ACT public information campaign reach you? Multiple response possible

|                                | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)                | 571  | 510  | 1435 |
| TV                             | 46   | 18   | 23   |
| Radio                          | 23   | 14   | 5    |
| Newspaper                      | 20   | 9    | 8    |
| Social media                   | 39   | 41   | 38   |
| Website                        | 38   | 29   | 29   |
| Online ads                     | 15   | 13   | 8    |
| Bus stop / shopping mall signs | 17   | 14   | 31   |
| Elections ACT brochures        | 78   | 72   | 64   |

**Table 37 Information sources used to locate an ACT polling place**

QUESTION: In which of these ways did you find out about the location of this polling place?

|                              | 2020 | 2024 |
|------------------------------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)              | 514  | 1435 |
| Elections ACT website        | 73   | 71   |
| Household election guides    | 54   | 50   |
| Through friends/relatives    | 39   | 33   |
| Online advertisements        | 32   | 32   |
| Access Canberra website      | 37   | 27   |
| Direct mail by Elections ACT | 40   | 23   |
| Radio news stories           | 16   | 22   |
| Direct SMS by Elections ACT  | 24   | 21   |
| Voted where I always vote    | 16   | 24   |
| Road side signage/other      | -    | 30   |

Note these results may sum to more than 100 per cent as respondents could nominate more than one response.

The conclusion to draw from this data is that the Elections ACT household brochures and the Elections ACT website continue to demonstrate their importance in providing polling information to the ACT public.

**Table 38 Usage and satisfaction with the Elections ACT website**

QUESTION: Did you access the Elections ACT website to gain any information about the 2024 ACT election? If yes, how useful was this site in giving you information about the 2024 ACT election?

|                               | 2001 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)               | 500  | 500  | 545  | 505  | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Yes                           | 4    | 7    | 14   | 31   | 39   | 50   | 55   |
| No                            | 96   | 93   | 86   | 69   | 61   | 50   | 45   |
| If Yes Very useful            | 26   | 35   | 32   | 54   | 43   | 41   | 47   |
| Useful                        | 37   | 54   | 57   | 36   | 48   | 52   | 47   |
| Neither useful nor not useful | 5    | 3    | 5    | 3    | 5    | 5    | 4    |
| Not useful                    | 16   | 3    | 3    | 3    | 4    | 2    | 1    |
| Not useful at all             | 11   | -    | 3    | 4    | -    | 0    | 0    |
| Unsure/don't know             | 5    | 5    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 0    |

Respondents were also asked what information they were seeking. Key information sought included early voting information (57%) the address of polling places (50%), information about candidates (35%), information on how to fill in a ballot paper (20%) and an explanation of electorates and the number of elected members (17%).

These findings show a strong level of voter satisfaction (94%) when using the Elections ACT website and for most users the information sought was found (97% net yes).

**Table 39 Awareness and use of the 2024 Elections ACT brochure**

**QUESTION:** Did you or your household receive a copy of this brochure from the ACT Electoral Commission which explained this ACT election and its procedures? (The brochure was shown to each respondent). If yes, did you read the brochure?

| Sample size (%) |                                     | 1998<br>500 | 2001<br>500 | 2004<br>500 | 2008<br>545 | 2012<br>505 | 2016<br>571 | 2020<br>636 | 2024<br>1690 |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Yes             |                                     | 69          | 70          | 81          | 69          | 71          | 76          | 68          | 67           |
| No              |                                     | 22          | 22          | 12          | 23          | 29          | 21          | 15          | 15           |
| Cannot remember |                                     | 10          | 7           | 7           | 9           |             | 3           | 17          | 18           |
| If Yes          | Yes, read it thoroughly             | 19          | 27          | 21          | 23          | 20          | 24          | 22          | 35           |
|                 | Yes, read parts needed to           | 19          | 15          | 17          | 21          | 33          | 34          | 42          | 32           |
|                 | Yes, read & talk to others about it | 3           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 3           | 4           | 7           | 3            |
|                 | Yes, glanced at it quickly          | 23          | 27          | 30          | 23          | 26          | 20          | 20          | 17           |
|                 | No, did not look at it at all       | 34          | 27          | 30          | 23          | 15          | 15          | 7           | 9            |
|                 | No, lost it or threw it away        | 2           | 3           | 7           | 6           | 3           | 2           | 2           | 2            |
|                 | Don't know                          | -           | -           | -           | 1           | -           | 1           | 1           | 2            |

The above findings show that nearly seven in ten voters (67%) in 2024 could recall receiving the Elections ACT information brochure delivered to the house. Some 88% of those respondents read the material.

**Table 40 Usage and usefulness of the 2024 Elections ACT social media network**

**QUESTION:** Elections ACT for this election introduced a social media network incorporating Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. Did you access this social media to gain information about this election? Did it provide useful information?

| Sample size (%)         |  | 2012<br>505 | 2016<br>571 | 2020<br>636 | 2024<br>1690 |
|-------------------------|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Yes                     |  | 28          | 26          | 20          | 21           |
| No                      |  | 72          | 74          | 75          | 70           |
| Unsure                  |  | -           | -           | 5           | 8            |
| Found to be useful?     |  |             |             |             |              |
| Yes, useful information |  | 35          | 71          | 93          | 90           |
| No, not useful          |  | 61          | 11          | 2           | 4            |
| Unsure                  |  | 4           | 18          | 5           | 6            |

These measures show that the Elections ACT social media network was accessed by 21% of voters before the 2024 ACT Election. Nine in ten (90%) of these voters believed that the content was useful for their purpose. This suggests there is still some improvement required to ensure that this important information access point is utilised appropriately throughout the community.

**Table 41 Voter awareness of the Check the Source campaign**

**QUESTION:** Elections ACT has been conducting a public information campaign over the last few months to raise awareness of the need to consider and review the source of electoral communication so electors can avoid being misled by disinformation. Can you remember hearing or seeing this campaign?

|                 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------|------|------|
| Sample size (%) | 636  | 1690 |
| Yes             | 31   | 30   |
| No              | 69   | 70   |

**Table 42 Usefulness of the Check the Source campaign**

**QUESTION:** Overall, was the check the source campaign by Elections ACT useful or not useful to you?

|                 | 196 | 509 |
|-----------------|-----|-----|
| Sample size (%) |     |     |
| Useful          | 81  | 80  |
| Not useful      | 19  | 7   |
| Unsure          | -   | 3   |

**Table 43 Voter awareness of the name of their electorate**

**QUESTION:** Can you tell me the name of your electorate?

|                 | 1998 | 2001 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%) | 500  | 500  | 500  | 545  | 505  | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Brindabella     | 27   | 24   | 27   | 31   | 22   | 11   | 10   | 11   |
| Ginninderra     | 26   | 26   | 24   | 22   | 26   | 20   | 20   | 16   |
| Kurrajong       | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 21   | 24   | 19   |
| Murrumbidgee    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 16   | 18   | 18   |
| Yerrabi         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 18   | 19   | 19   |
| Molonglo        | 40   | 39   | 38   | 35   | 36   | -    | -    | -    |
| Fenner          | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0    | 0    | 1    |
| Canberra        | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 5    |
| Fraser/Bean     | 1    | 1    | 3    | 1    | 2    | -    | 1    | 3    |
| Other           | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| Don't know      | 6    | 9    | 8    | 10   | 13   | 12   | 5    | 8    |

This shows that around 17% of voters did not know or selected federal divisional names for their electorate in 2024. This was particularly high amongst 19 to 24 year old voters (27%)

**Table 44 Voter awareness of how many Members will be elected in their electorate**

QUESTION: Can you tell me how many Members are to be elected in your electorate?

|                 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%) | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| 1-4             | -    | -    | 4    |
| 5               | 54   | 40   | 32   |
| 6-10            | -    | -    | 2    |
| 15              | -    | -    | 0    |
| 17              | 1    | 1    | 0    |
| 20              | -    | -    | 0    |
| 25              | 1    | 1    | 0    |
| Don't know      | 38   | 54   | 61   |

Elections ACT adjusted the options available for respondents as part of the 2024 survey.

Only 32% of voters in 2024 knew how many Members were elected in their electorate. This statistic remained relatively consistent since 1998 however the 2024 figure is the lowest ever recorded in the ACT together with the highest ever 'don't know' response.

The conclusion regarding voter awareness is that knowledge is declining and that for future elections, added emphasis will need to be placed on the education of the community in relation to these issues, particularly among younger voters.

**Table 45 Voter perception of adequacy of instructions on ballot papers**

QUESTION: How adequate was the information provided by the ACT Electoral Commission on how to fill out your ballot paper for this election?

|                                 | 1998 | 2001 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)                 | 500  | 500  | 500  | 545  | 505  | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Very adequate                   | 36   | 36   | 38   | 54   | 61   | 54   | 46   | 42   |
| Adequate                        | 51   | 54   | 55   | 36   | 32   | 41   | 40   | 40   |
| Neither adequate nor inadequate | 8    | 5    | 2    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 7    | 8    |
| Inadequate                      | 3    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    |
| Very inadequate                 | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | -    | 0    | 1    |
| Unsure/don't know               | -    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 2    | 2    | 5    | 6    |

Voter satisfaction with the instructions given to explain how to fill out the ballot paper has been strongly positive since 1998, displaying around 90 per cent satisfaction throughout but does appear to be declining. The 2024 election saw around 82% of voters considering the instructions to be very adequate or adequate.

**Table 46 Voter satisfaction with service delivery provided by ACT polling places**

QUESTION: how would you rate the service provided by the people running this polling place, that is, those inside the school / hall, etc. against the following areas?

| Sample size (%) |                                   | 1998<br>500 | 2001<br>500 | 2004<br>500 | 2008<br>545 | 2012<br>505 | 2016<br>571 | 2020<br>636 | 2024<br>1690 |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Helpfulness     | Very helpful                      | 51          | 49          | 48          | 63          | 71          | 84          | 74          | 70           |
|                 | Helpful                           | 43          | 45          | 46          | 31          | 26          | 14          | 23          | 24           |
|                 | Neither helpful nor unhelpful     | 6           | 5           | 6           | 6           | 2           | 1           | 3           | 5            |
|                 | Unhelpful                         | -           | 1           | -           | -           | 1           | 1           | 0           | 1            |
|                 | Very unhelpful                    | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | 0           | 1            |
| Efficiency      | Very efficient                    | 55          | 47          | 55          | 67          | 73          | 80          | 77          | 68           |
|                 | Efficient                         | 38          | 47          | 42          | 30          | 24          | 18          | 19          | 27           |
|                 | Neither efficient nor inefficient | 6           | 4           | 3           | 3           | 1           | 1           | 3           | 4            |
|                 | Inefficient                       | 1           | 2           | 1           | -           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 1            |
|                 | Very inefficient                  | -           | -           | -           | -           | 1           | -           | 0           | 0            |
| Friendliness    | Very friendly                     | 53          | 48          | 52          | 67          | 75          | 79          | 73          | 73           |
|                 | Friendly                          | 42          | 48          | 44          | 30          | 21          | 19          | 24          | 24           |
|                 | Neither friendly nor rude         | 5           | 4           | 4           | 3           | 4           | 1           | 3           | 3            |
|                 | Rude                              | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | 0           | 0            |
|                 | Very rude                         | -           | -           | -           | -           | -           | 1           | 0           | 0            |

There was a high level of satisfaction with the voting experience in 2024 (92% satisfied). Voters were very satisfied with the staff at polling places, in relation to helpfulness (93%), efficiency (95%) and friendliness (97%).

**Table 47 Voter inconvenience at the polling place**

QUESTION: When you voted today, what, if any, inconvenience did you experience? [multiple response possible]

| Sample size (%)                              |  | 1998<br>500 | 2001<br>500 | 2004<br>500 | 2008<br>545 | 2012<br>505 | 2016<br>571 | 2020<br>636 | 2024<br>1690 |
|----------------------------------------------|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Queuing                                      |  | 1           | 1           | 2           | 1           | 5           | 8           | 1           | 11           |
| Entrance to polling place was blocked        |  | -           | -           | -           | 1           | -           | -           | 1           | 1            |
| Staff inattentiveness                        |  | -           | -           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 1            |
| Booth layout                                 |  | -           | -           | 1           | 1           | -           | -           | 1           | 2            |
| Instructions on ballot paper not clear       |  | 1           | -           | -           | 1           | -           | -           | 0           | 1            |
| Instructions for electronic voting not clear |  | NA          | 1           | -           | 1           | 1           | 1           | 2           | 1            |
| Disabled access facilities                   |  | NA          | -           | -           | 1           | -           | 2           | 1           | 1            |
| Polling place location changed               |  | NA          | NA          | NA          | NA          | 4           | 1           | 2           | 2            |
| Other                                        |  | 8           | 7           | 5           | 6           | 5           | 5           | 8           | 5            |
| No inconvenience                             |  | 89          | 91          | 91          | 90          | 86          | 86          | 86          | 80           |



**Table 48 Voter satisfaction with queuing**

QUESTION: Which of these best describes how you found the queuing here today?

|                              | 1998 | 2001 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)              | 500  | 500  | 500  | 545  | 505  | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Unacceptable long            | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0    | 1    |
| Long but acceptable          | 2    | 4    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 9    | 2    | 8    |
| Not very long and acceptable | 9    | 11   | 3    | 6    | 4    | 10   | 9    | 21   |
| Not a real problem           | 88   | 85   | 95   | 92   | 90   | 80   | 89   | 70   |

The findings from these questions show that most voters (over eight in ten) in 2024 said they experienced no inconvenience with the voting process and 90% found there to be no inconvenience with the level of queuing.

**Table 49 Voter awareness and usage of ACT election electronic voting procedures**

QUESTION: The 2024 ACT Election had electronic voting available at some Polling Places. Were you aware of the possibility to undertake electronic voting?

|                   | 2001 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)   | 500  | 500  | 545  | 505  | 571  | 636  | 1690 |
| Yes               | 69   | 64   | 65   | 62   | 67   | 72   | 57   |
| No                | 30   | 34   | 33   | 36   | 32   | 24   | 34   |
| Unsure/don't know | 1    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 4    | 9    |

**Table 50 Voter usage of electronic voting**

QUESTION: If electronic voting available at the polling place. Did you vote today using electronic voting or the ballot paper method?

|                              | 2001    | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|------------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)              | Unknown | 74   | 74   | 133  | 571  | 636  | 1298 |
| Yes, used electronic voting  | 59      | 73   | 81   | 79   | 89   | 95   | 94   |
| No, used paper ballot method | 41      | 27   | 19   | 21   | 11   | 5    | 6    |

**Table 51 Voter satisfaction with electronic voting**

QUESTION: If you used the electronic voting system, did you find it...?

|                                 | 2001    | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|---------------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)                 | Unknown | 54   | 60   | 105  | 571  | 636  | 1298 |
| Easy to use                     | 89      | 86   | 85   | 91   | 90   | 96   | 96   |
| Fast and efficient              | 70      | 88   | 90   | 88   | 94   | 98   | 97   |
| Had clear instructions          | 81      | 83   | 79   | 87   | 92   | 95   | 96   |
| Easy to scan the e-voting card  | NA      | 86   | 66   | 73   | 90   | 90   | 91   |
| Queuing length was satisfactory | NA      | 91   | 97   | 91   | 97   | 97   | 93   |

Similar to other findings, these findings show an recent decrease in electoral knowledge in the ACT (a decrease in awareness of electronic voting from 72% in 2020 to 57% in 2024)

The 2024 maintained the strong growth in voters using electronic voting increasing from 59% in 2001 to mid-nineties across 2020 and 2024.

Voters using electronic voting in 2024 maintained the high levels of satisfaction with electronic voting indicating that it is a simple and fast means in which to cast a vote.

**Table 52 Reason why some voters at electronic voting polling places did not vote using the electronic method**

QUESTION: Why did you prefer to use the paper ballot method?

|                                               | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-----------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)                               | 20   | 14   | 28   | 27   | 26   | 75   |
| Don't trust electronic voting                 | 5    | 14   | 7    | 26   | 35   | 35   |
| Don't use or don't like computers             | 20   | 21   | 25   | 26   | 15   | 31   |
| Too many people queuing for electronic voting | 5    | -    | 11   | -    | 16   | 17   |
| Prefer paper ballot                           | 65   | 64   | 57   | 70   | 4    | -    |
| Other reasons                                 | 5    | -    | -    | 7    | 35   | 19   |

Note these results are based on small sample sizes.

**Table 53 Voter interest in electronic voting at polling places where it was not available**

QUESTION: If this polling place had electronic voting do you think you would have used electronic voting or use the paper ballot method? AND, if the paper ballot method is preferred or unsure/don't know, why did, or why would you choose not to use electronic voting?

|                                                 |                             | 2001    | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2024 |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sample size (%)                                 |                             | Unknown | 426  | 471  | 372  | 571  | 636  | 392  |
| Electronic voting                               |                             | 55      | 50   | 49   | 59   | 66   | 64   | 44   |
| Paper ballot method                             |                             | 32      | 38   | 42   | 31   | 22   | 23   | 40   |
| Unsure/don't know                               |                             | 13      | 12   | 9    | 10   | 12   | 13   | 17   |
| Sample size (%)                                 |                             | Unknown | 162  | 198  | 153  | 127  | 99   | 75   |
| If paper ballot preferred or unsure/don't know: | Don't trust this method     | 17      | 31   | 29   | 16   | 24   | 44   | 43   |
|                                                 | Don't use or like computers | 25      | 30   | 27   | 18   | 11   | 14   | 29   |
|                                                 | Paper ballot is easier      | NA      | 35   | 44   | 66   | 21   | 11   | -    |
|                                                 | Other                       | 58      | 5    | -    | -    | 46   | 31   | 31   |

At polling places in the 2024 ACT election where electronic voting was not provided as a voting option the percentage of voters who expressed an interest in using it if it was made available declined (44%) from 2020 figures (64%). Distrust in electronic voting was the main reason for preferring not to vote electronically although there was a significant rise in the number of voters stating that they do not use computers at all or expressing a dislike for computers generally.

**Table 54** Voter awareness of election day voters of the new eligibility for all electors to vote early

QUESTION: For the 2024 Election all ACT voters became eligible to vote early, before Election Day. Were you aware that you were eligible to vote early?

| Sample size (%) | 2024<br>392 |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Yes             | 83          |
| No              | 11          |
| I was unsure    | 6           |

**Table 55** Information on the interest in the final election result

QUESTION: How interested are you in the result of the election?

| Sample size (%)                    | 2024<br>1690 |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| Very interested                    | 46           |
| Somewhat interested                | 20           |
| Neither interested or uninterested | 20           |
| Uninterested                       | 6            |
| Very uninterested                  | 8            |

**Table 56** Information on how electors find out about the election result

QUESTION: How do you intend to find out about the election?

| Sample size (%)       | 2024<br>1453 |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| Elections ACT website | 14           |
| Television            | 43           |
| Online news           | 31           |
| Friends/family        | 6            |
| Newspaper             | 4            |
| Other                 | 2            |

Although the Elections ACT website experiences considerable traffic on election night, television and online news are the most popular means of receiving election results.

**Table 57** Voter views on whether the election was conducted impartially

QUESTION: Do you think Elections ACT conducted this election impartially and without bias?

| Sample size (%) | 2016<br>571 | 2020<br>636 | 2024<br>1690 |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Yes             | 86          | 86          | 80           |
| No              | 3           | 1           | 3            |
| No opinion      | 11          | 13          | 17           |

There continues to be a high level of trust in the Commission. Of those that provided a response as to why they think it was not impartial or without bias, it would appear that there is an unclear delineation, when considering bias and impartiality, between the impact of parties, the media and the Electoral Commission.

## Other recommendations for legislative amendment

### Security clearances for members of the Commission

As the electoral landscape has become increasingly complex, with evolving challenges such as cyber risks, foreign interference, and the spread of misinformation, ensuring the security and integrity of democratic processes has become crucial to maintaining public trust in election outcomes.

Given the multifaceted challenges faced by Elections ACT, including physical security and cyber threats, the potential for regional instability, and foreign interference, it is essential that members of the electoral commission are approved to receive classified information from federal and territory agencies. Requiring an NV1 security clearance would ensure that commission members can access and handle sensitive information necessary for safeguarding electoral processes. This measure would enhance the commission's ability to respond effectively to security threats, protect the electoral process, and sustain public confidence in democracy.

#### Recommendation 25

The Commission **recommends** amending Division 2.4 of the Electoral Act to mandate the holding of an NV1 security clearance or higher.

### Casual vacancy quota

In clause 12 of Schedule 4, the quota for a casual vacancy is calculated as follows:

$TVA/2 + 1$ , where TVA means the sum of the total votes allotted to the continuing candidates at the count, any fraction being disregarded.

As TVA is now calculated to 6 decimal places, following legislative amendment in July 2020, the above clause is problematic insofar as it disregards any fraction.

Unlike the quota for a general election (where it is logical to raise the quota by the integer 1 and disregarding any fraction), the point of the “floating” quota in a casual vacancy is to work out which is the most preferred candidate.

This means effectively excluding all the candidates except the last 2, then declaring the candidate that is in the lead to be the successful candidate. While the current definition of the casual vacancy quota will achieve this it will arrive at a problematic scenario where the last two candidates are less than one full vote apart.

As way of example, the last two candidates in a casual vacancy have the following vote totals:

→ Candidate A: 1929.633672

→ Candidate B: 1929.333672

→ TVA would be 3858.967344.

$TVA/2 + 1$ , disregarding any fraction, would be 1930.

As can be seen, neither candidate has a quota. While the Electoral Act provides for a solution, requiring the candidate with the fewest votes to be excluded, where no candidate has the quota, electing, in this case, Candidate A, it leads to what would otherwise be an unnecessary exclusion. It would be appropriate to align the casual vacancy quota with the recent amendment to calculate vote totals down to six decimal places.

#### Recommendation 26

The Electoral Commission **recommends** that the definition of the quota in clause 12 of Schedule 4 be changed to:

$TVA/2 + 0.000001$ , where TVA means the sum of the total votes allotted to the continuing candidates at the count, calculated to 6 decimal places.

### Temporary staff

Section 32 of the Electoral Act establishes the Commissioner's ability to employ ‘temporary staff’ on behalf of the Territory. The *Fair Work Act 2009* (Cth) refers to such workers as ‘casual’ employees.

#### Recommendation 27

The Electoral Commission **recommends** amending section 32(1)(a) of the Electoral Act as ‘employ casual staff; or’ to align with terminology within the Commonwealth's *Fair Work Act 2009*.

## Limitations on filming and photos in a polling location

In a number of recent Australian elections, including the 2024 ACT election, there have been instances where members of the public have filmed polling officials while performing their duties. These actions were often driven by a belief that the election process lacks integrity or there are actions being undertaken that are contrary to the law. While transparency in elections is crucial, the unauthorised filming and photographing of polling officials can lead to significant issues, including intimidation and harassment.

A concerning trend is that these recordings are often made with the intent to publish them on social media platforms. This not only amplifies the privacy concerns but also increases the potential for harassment. The widespread dissemination of such footage can lead to targeted attacks and unwarranted scrutiny of polling officials, further exacerbating the issue.

Polling officials play a vital role in ensuring the smooth and fair conduct of elections. When these officials are filmed without their consent, it can create an environment of discomfort and fear, potentially impacting their ability to perform their duties effectively.

Elections ACT has guidelines in place to protect the privacy of voters and polling officials. However, these guidelines are not always sufficient to prevent unauthorised filming and photography. Accordingly, more stringent regulations to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and protect those involved are required.

One effective approach to address this issue is to introduce legislation similar to the Local Government (General) Amendment (Elections) Regulation 2024 in New South Wales. This regulation specifically prohibits the filming or photographing of election officials or scrutineers if it is reasonably likely to cause intimidation or harassment. The penalties for violating this regulation include fines of up to \$1,100.

## Recommendation 28

The Electoral Commission **recommends** amending the Electoral Act to introduce a new offence under Part 17, limiting the filming or photographing of election officials if it is likely to cause the official to be intimidated or harassed. Implementing this legislation in the ACT would provide a clear legal framework to prevent unauthorised filming and photography within polling places. This would help to ensure that polling officials can perform their duties without fear of harassment.

## Appendix 1: Votes cast at the 2024 ACT election

This appendix shows details of votes cast at the electronic voting polling places, including votes cast using electronic voting and votes cast using paper ballots.

**Table 58** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: ACT totals

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Other paper    |               | Total          |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
| AJP          | 1,917            | 1.26%         | 175                                | 1.55%        | 1,611          | 1.45%         | 3,703          | 1.35%  |
| ALP          | 51,991           | 34.24%        | 3,137                              | 27.81%       | 38,443         | 34.67%        | 93,571         | 34.15% |
| BEL          | 1,920            | 1.26%         | 287                                | 2.54%        | 1,301          | 1.17%         | 3,508          | 1.28%  |
| DLP          | 1,382            | 0.91%         | 132                                | 1.17%        | 769            | 0.69%         | 2,283          | 0.83%  |
| FCI          | 3,555            | 2.34%         | 447                                | 3.96%        | 3,301          | 2.98%         | 7,303          | 2.67%  |
| FFP          | 3,513            | 2.31%         | 454                                | 4.03%        | 2,676          | 2.41%         | 6,643          | 2.42%  |
| FNP          | 1,839            | 1.21%         | 122                                | 1.08%        | 1,625          | 1.47%         | 3,586          | 1.31%  |
| GREEN        | 17,869           | 11.77%        | 791                                | 7.01%        | 14,708         | 13.26%        | 33,368         | 12.18% |
| IFC          | 12,501           | 8.23%         | 988                                | 8.76%        | 9,840          | 8.87%         | 23,329         | 8.51%  |
| LIB          | 52,797           | 34.77%        | 4,500                              | 39.90%       | 34,362         | 30.99%        | 91,659         | 33.45% |
| LP           | 218              | 0.14%         | 28                                 | 0.25%        | 153            | 0.14%         | 399            | 0.15%  |
| STR          | 571              | 0.38%         | 48                                 | 0.43%        | 512            | 0.46%         | 1,131          | 0.41%  |
| UNG          | 1,780            | 1.17%         | 170                                | 1.51%        | 1,590          | 1.43%         | 3,540          | 1.29%  |
| Formal       | 151,853          | 99.13%        | 11,279                             | 94.79%       | 110,891        | 97.03%        | 274,023        | 98.09% |
| Informal     | 1,327            | 0.87%         | 620                                | 5.21%        | 3,400          | 3.07%         | 5,347          | 1.91%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>153,180</b>   | <b>54.83%</b> | <b>11,899</b>                      | <b>4.26%</b> | <b>114,291</b> | <b>40.91%</b> | <b>279,370</b> |        |

**Table 59** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: Brindabella

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Paper at other polling places |               | Total         |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP          | 515              | 1.56%         | 25                                 | 1.59%        | 418                           | 1.76%         | 958           | 1.64%  |
| ALP          | 11,100           | 33.69%        | 426                                | 27.13%       | 8,170                         | 34.43%        | 19,696        | 33.82% |
| FFP          | 724              | 2.20%         | 70                                 | 4.46%        | 639                           | 2.69%         | 1,433         | 2.46%  |
| FNP          | 376              | 1.14%         | 29                                 | 1.85%        | 341                           | 1.44%         | 746           | 1.28%  |
| GREEN        | 2,724            | 8.27%         | 76                                 | 4.84%        | 2,459                         | 10.36%        | 5,259         | 9.03%  |
| IFC          | 2,266            | 6.88%         | 168                                | 10.70%       | 1,985                         | 8.37%         | 4,419         | 7.59%  |
| LIB          | 14,942           | 45.35%        | 748                                | 47.64%       | 9,445                         | 39.81%        | 25,135        | 43.15% |
| UNG          | 301              | 0.91%         | 28                                 | 1.78%        | 271                           | 1.14%         | 600           | 1.03%  |
| Formal       | 32,948           | 98.90%        | 1,570                              | 94.01%       | 23,728                        | 96.15%        | 58,246        | 97.63% |
| Informal     | 366              | 1.10%         | 100                                | 5.99%        | 950                           | 3.85%         | 1,416         | 2.37%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>33,314</b>    | <b>55.84%</b> | <b>1,670</b>                       | <b>2.80%</b> | <b>24,678</b>                 | <b>41.36%</b> | <b>59,662</b> |        |

**Table 60** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: Ginninderra

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Paper at other polling places |               | Total         |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP          | 489              | 1.62%         | 63                                 | 1.72%        | 405                           | 1.82%         | 957           | 1.71%  |
| ALP          | 11,137           | 36.94%        | 1,109                              | 30.30%       | 8,580                         | 38.57%        | 20,826        | 37.15% |
| BEL          | 1,393            | 4.62%         | 238                                | 6.50%        | 989                           | 4.45%         | 2,620         | 4.67%  |
| DLP          | 465              | 1.54%         | 64                                 | 1.75%        | 280                           | 1.26%         | 809           | 1.44%  |
| FFP          | 1,450            | 4.81%         | 219                                | 5.98%        | 925                           | 4.16%         | 2,594         | 4.63%  |
| GREEN        | 4,343            | 14.41%        | 258                                | 7.05%        | 3,279                         | 14.74%        | 7,880         | 14.06% |
| IFC          | 2,215            | 7.35%         | 311                                | 8.50%        | 1,703                         | 7.66%         | 4,229         | 7.54%  |
| LIB          | 8,009            | 26.57%        | 1,296                              | 35.41%       | 5,466                         | 24.57%        | 14,771        | 26.35% |
| LP           | 218              | 0.72%         | 28                                 | 0.77%        | 153                           | 0.69%         | 399           | 0.71%  |
| UNG          | 428              | 1.42%         | 74                                 | 2.02%        | 465                           | 2.09%         | 967           | 1.73%  |
| Formal       | 30,147           | 99.06%        | 3,660                              | 96.85%       | 22,245                        | 96.74%        | 56,052        | 97.98% |
| Informal     | 287              | 0.94%         | 119                                | 3.15%        | 750                           | 3.26%         | 1,156         | 2.02%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>30,434</b>    | <b>53.20%</b> | <b>3,779</b>                       | <b>6.61%</b> | <b>22,995</b>                 | <b>40.20%</b> | <b>57,208</b> |        |

**Table 61** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: Kurrajong

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Paper at other polling places |               | Total         |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP          | 306              | 1.18%         | 34                                 | 2.25%        | 304                           | 1.41%         | 644           | 1.32%  |
| ALP          | 9,638            | 37.24%        | 440                                | 29.06%       | 7,600                         | 35.30%        | 17,678        | 36.14% |
| DLP          | 52               | 0.20%         | 8                                  | 0.53%        | 100                           | 0.46%         | 160           | 0.33%  |
| FFP          | 305              | 1.18%         | 36                                 | 2.38%        | 267                           | 1.24%         | 608           | 1.24%  |
| FNPP         | 618              | 2.39%         | 34                                 | 2.25%        | 671                           | 3.12%         | 1,323         | 2.70%  |
| GREEN        | 4,272            | 16.51%        | 204                                | 13.47%       | 4,157                         | 19.31%        | 8,633         | 17.65% |
| IFC          | 3,471            | 13.41%        | 221                                | 14.60%       | 2,929                         | 13.61%        | 6,621         | 13.53% |
| LIB          | 6,530            | 25.23%        | 481                                | 31.77%       | 4,875                         | 22.64%        | 11,886        | 24.30% |
| STR          | 571              | 2.21%         | 48                                 | 3.17%        | 512                           | 2.38%         | 1,131         | 2.31%  |
| UNG          | 117              | 0.45%         | 8                                  | 0.53%        | 113                           | 0.52%         | 238           | 0.49%  |
| Formal       | 25,880           | 99.32%        | 1,514                              | 94.39%       | 21,528                        | 97.81%        | 48,922        | 98.49% |
| Informal     | 178              | 0.68%         | 90                                 | 5.61%        | 482                           | 2.19%         | 750           | 1.51%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>26,058</b>    | <b>52.46%</b> | <b>1,604</b>                       | <b>3.23%</b> | <b>22,010</b>                 | <b>44.31%</b> | <b>49,672</b> |        |

**Table 62** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: Murrumbidgee

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Paper at other polling places |               | Total         |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP          | 394              | 1.34%         | 29                                 | 1.22%        | 319                           | 1.32%         | 742           | 1.33%  |
| ALP          | 9,821            | 33.41%        | 626                                | 26.42%       | 8,082                         | 33.56%        | 18,529        | 33.18% |
| FCI          | 3,555            | 12.09%        | 447                                | 18.87%       | 3,301                         | 13.71%        | 7,303         | 13.08% |
| FFP          | 429              | 1.46%         | 64                                 | 2.70%        | 399                           | 1.66%         | 892           | 1.60%  |
| GREEN        | 2,690            | 9.15%         | 108                                | 4.56%        | 2,405                         | 9.99%         | 5,203         | 9.32%  |
| IFC          | 1,449            | 4.93%         | 89                                 | 3.76%        | 1,202                         | 4.99%         | 2,740         | 4.91%  |
| LIB          | 10,659           | 36.26%        | 973                                | 41.07%       | 7,946                         | 32.99%        | 19,578        | 35.06% |
| UNG          | 400              | 1.36%         | 33                                 | 1.39%        | 429                           | 1.78%         | 862           | 1.54%  |
| Formal       | 29,397           | 99.31%        | 2,369                              | 94.95%       | 24,083                        | 97.57%        | 55,849        | 98.36% |
| Informal     | 204              | 0.69%         | 126                                | 5.05%        | 600                           | 2.43%         | 930           | 1.64%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>29,601</b>    | <b>52.13%</b> | <b>2,495</b>                       | <b>4.39%</b> | <b>24,683</b>                 | <b>43.47%</b> | <b>56,779</b> |        |



**Table 63** Summary of electronic/paper first preference votes by party: Yerrabi

| Party/ Group | Total electronic |               | Paper at electronic polling places |              | Paper at other polling places |               | Total         |        |
|--------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|
| AJP          | 213              | 0.64%         | 24                                 | 1.11%        | 165                           | 0.85%         | 402           | 0.73%  |
| ALP          | 10,295           | 30.75%        | 536                                | 24.75%       | 6,011                         | 31.13%        | 16,842        | 30.65% |
| BEL          | 527              | 1.57%         | 49                                 | 2.26%        | 312                           | 1.62%         | 888           | 1.62%  |
| DLP          | 865              | 2.58%         | 60                                 | 2.77%        | 389                           | 2.01%         | 1,314         | 2.39%  |
| FFP          | 605              | 1.81%         | 65                                 | 3.00%        | 446                           | 2.31%         | 1,116         | 2.03%  |
| FNP          | 845              | 2.52%         | 59                                 | 2.72%        | 613                           | 3.18%         | 1,517         | 2.76%  |
| GREEN        | 3,840            | 11.47%        | 145                                | 6.69%        | 2,408                         | 12.47%        | 6,393         | 11.63% |
| IFC          | 3,100            | 9.26%         | 199                                | 9.19%        | 2,021                         | 10.47%        | 5,320         | 9.68%  |
| LIB          | 12,657           | 37.80%        | 1,002                              | 46.26%       | 6,630                         | 34.34%        | 20,289        | 36.92% |
| UNG          | 534              | 1.59%         | 27                                 | 1.25%        | 312                           | 1.62%         | 873           | 1.59%  |
| Formal       | 33,481           | 99.14%        | 2,166                              | 92.13%       | 19,307                        | 96.90%        | 54,954        | 98.05% |
| Informal     | 292              | 0.86%         | 185                                | 7.87%        | 618                           | 3.10%         | 1,095         | 1.95%  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>33,773</b>    | <b>60.26%</b> | <b>2,351</b>                       | <b>4.19%</b> | <b>19,925</b>                 | <b>35.55%</b> | <b>56,049</b> |        |

## Appendix 2: Preference sequences on formal ballot papers

Appendix 2 shows details of preferences shown on formal ballot papers at the 2024 ACT election.

**Table 64** Sequence breaks in formal ballot papers

| Highest preference counted | Missing next consecutive number |            |            |           |           |            | Repeated next consecutive number |            |            |            |            |            |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                            | Brin                            | Ginn       | Kurr       | Murr      | Yerr      | Total      | Brin                             | Ginn       | Kurr       | Murr       | Yerr       | Total      |
| 1                          | 11                              | 12         | 7          | 12        | 9         | 51         | 31                               | 29         | 16         | 23         | 20         | 119        |
| 2                          | 7                               | 18         | 11         | 7         | 10        | 53         | 19                               | 32         | 18         | 21         | 30         | 120        |
| 3                          | 7                               | 21         | 6          | 8         | 12        | 54         | 21                               | 37         | 18         | 27         | 17         | 120        |
| 4                          | 4                               | 9          | 3          | 11        | 9         | 36         | 14                               | 12         | 16         | 15         | 10         | 67         |
| 5                          | 12                              | 11         | 14         | 11        | 11        | 59         | 5                                | 15         | 14         | 13         | 1          | 48         |
| 6                          | 1                               | 2          | 4          |           | 1         | 8          | 10                               | 15         | 15         | 19         | 12         | 71         |
| 7                          | 2                               | 5          | 5          | 6         | 4         | 22         | 6                                | 7          | 13         | 11         | 7          | 44         |
| 8                          | 2                               | 4          | 4          | 4         | 3         | 17         | 6                                | 10         | 13         | 3          | 2          | 34         |
| 9                          |                                 | 4          | 1          | 4         | 1         | 10         | 2                                | 8          | 9          | 1          | 3          | 23         |
| 10                         | 2                               | 5          | 12         | 7         | 3         | 29         | 6                                | 6          | 2          | 7          | 2          | 23         |
| 11                         | 5                               | 8          | 3          | 4         | 2         | 22         | 5                                | 4          | 12         | 5          | 3          | 29         |
| 12                         | 5                               | 2          | 2          | 2         | 1         | 12         | 6                                | 1          | 8          | 4          | 2          | 21         |
| 13                         | 2                               | 2          | 4          | 1         |           | 9          | 1                                | 6          | 6          | 6          |            | 19         |
| 14                         | 2                               | 5          | 2          | 3         | 4         | 16         | 3                                | 3          | 4          | 1          |            | 11         |
| 15                         |                                 | 1          | 5          | 1         |           | 7          | 1                                | 2          | 5          | 1          | 2          | 11         |
| 16                         | 2                               |            | 2          |           | 1         | 5          | 1                                | 1          | 7          | 6          | 1          | 16         |
| 17                         | 5                               | 2          | 2          | 2         | 2         | 13         | 1                                | 1          | 4          | 6          | 1          | 13         |
| 18                         | 1                               |            | 1          |           |           | 2          | 1                                | 4          | 4          |            | 1          | 10         |
| 19                         | 8                               | 7          | 7          | 3         | 3         | 28         |                                  |            | 4          | 5          | 3          | 12         |
| 20                         |                                 | 1          |            |           | 1         | 2          | 4                                | 3          | 2          | 5          | 1          | 15         |
| 21                         | 4                               | 5          | 4          | 2         | 9         | 24         | 1                                | 3          | 3          | 1          | 1          | 9          |
| 22                         |                                 | 3          | 1          |           | 3         | 7          |                                  | 1          | 2          | 2          | 1          | 6          |
| 23                         | 2                               | 1          |            | 1         | 2         | 6          |                                  | 3          | 8          |            | 2          | 13         |
| 24                         |                                 | 1          | 4          | 2         | 3         | 10         |                                  | 2          | 2          | 2          | 1          | 7          |
| 25                         |                                 |            | 1          | 1         |           | 2          |                                  | 1          | 1          | 1          | 3          | 6          |
| 26                         |                                 |            | 2          |           | 1         | 3          |                                  | 1          | 5          |            |            | 6          |
| 27                         |                                 | 1          |            |           |           | 1          |                                  |            |            |            |            |            |
| 28                         |                                 |            | 1          |           |           | 1          |                                  |            |            |            |            |            |
| 29                         |                                 | 2          | 1          |           | 1         | 4          |                                  | 3          | 1          |            | 2          | 6          |
| 30                         |                                 |            |            |           |           |            |                                  | 1          |            |            |            | 1          |
| 31                         |                                 | 1          | 1          |           |           | 2          |                                  | 2          |            |            |            | 2          |
| 32                         |                                 | 2          | 2          |           |           | 4          |                                  |            |            |            |            |            |
| <b>Total</b>               | <b>84</b>                       | <b>135</b> | <b>112</b> | <b>92</b> | <b>96</b> | <b>519</b> | <b>144</b>                       | <b>213</b> | <b>212</b> | <b>185</b> | <b>128</b> | <b>882</b> |

Table 65 Length of sequence — Brindabella

| Group | Total                   | 1      | 2   | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6      | 7   | 8   | 9     | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
|-------|-------------------------|--------|-----|----|----|----|--------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| AJP   | Gareth BALLARD          | 418    | 3   | 12 | 3  | 4  | 304    | 14  | 18  | 16    | 4   | 10  | 3   | 1   | 2   | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 19 |
| AJP   | Robyn SOXSMITH          | 540    | 2   | 8  | 3  | 4  | 371    | 34  | 30  | 13    | 6   | 16  | 5   | 1   | 5   | 1  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 34 |
|       | Group total             | 958    | 5   | 20 | 6  | 8  | 675    | 48  | 48  | 29    | 10  | 26  | 8   | 2   | 7   | 3  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 53 |
| ALP   | Louise CROSSMAN         | 2,790  | 12  | 1  | 7  | 7  | 2,066  | 84  | 59  | 184   | 31  | 51  | 47  | 19  | 20  | 9  | 7  | 12 | 1  | 2  | 4  | 0  | 3  | 5  | 3  |
| ALP   | Brendan FORDE           | 1,693  | 10  | 3  | 5  | 5  | 1,339  | 46  | 37  | 81    | 25  | 13  | 25  | 6   | 8   | 7  | 1  | 5  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 1  |
| ALP   | Mick GENTLEMAN          | 4,261  | 25  | 16 | 10 | 9  | 3,296  | 157 | 72  | 229   | 37  | 75  | 50  | 22  | 17  | 15 | 5  | 13 | 1  | 3  | 5  | 1  | 4  | 7  | 3  |
| ALP   | Caitlin TOUGH           | 6,085  | 32  | 8  | 9  | 21 | 4,502  | 226 | 145 | 382   | 58  | 117 | 103 | 40  | 28  | 18 | 13 | 18 | 9  | 3  | 6  | 5  | 6  | 13 | 9  |
| ALP   | Taiarus WERNER-GIBBINGS | 4,867  | 36  | 3  | 4  | 11 | 3,488  | 179 | 99  | 315   | 71  | 99  | 81  | 30  | 38  | 24 | 5  | 15 | 9  | 6  | 2  | 2  | 9  | 4  | 12 |
|       | Group total             | 19,696 | 115 | 31 | 35 | 53 | 14,691 | 692 | 412 | 1,191 | 222 | 355 | 306 | 117 | 111 | 73 | 31 | 63 | 21 | 16 | 18 | 8  | 24 | 31 | 28 |
| FFP   | Bruce GARTSHORE         | 766    | 4   | 9  | 4  | 3  | 445    | 40  | 82  | 37    | 9   | 13  | 10  | 4   | 4   | 2  | 1  | 5  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 1  |
| FFP   | Merle GRAHAM            | 667    | 2   | 8  | 2  | 2  | 390    | 26  | 68  | 27    | 14  | 22  | 6   | 6   | 4   | 2  | 2  | 4  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 76 |
|       | Group total             | 1,433  | 6   | 17 | 6  | 5  | 835    | 66  | 150 | 64    | 23  | 35  | 16  | 10  | 8   | 4  | 3  | 9  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 4  | 3  | 1  |
| FNP   | Wendy BROOKMAN          | 328    | 1   | 2  | 7  | 2  | 211    | 17  | 11  | 16    | 6   | 5   | 8   | 3   | 6   | 2  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 27 |
| FNP   | Jack McDOUGALL          | 241    | 4   | 3  | 6  | 3  | 151    | 19  | 5   | 13    | 4   | 8   | 3   | 2   | 0   | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 15 |
| FNP   | Dylan ROBB              | 177    | 2   | 0  | 8  | 1  | 116    | 7   | 7   | 11    | 3   | 3   | 4   | 1   | 1   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 11 |
|       | Group total             | 746    | 7   | 5  | 21 | 6  | 478    | 43  | 23  | 40    | 13  | 16  | 15  | 6   | 7   | 4  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 53 |
| GREEN | Sam NUGENT              | 1,140  | 6   | 2  | 13 | 4  | 658    | 70  | 35  | 116   | 22  | 31  | 42  | 11  | 14  | 9  | 4  | 2  | 0  | 3  | 8  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 87 |
| GREEN | Laura NUTTALL           | 3,244  | 8   | 4  | 30 | 12 | 1,683  | 227 | 95  | 313   | 79  | 120 | 123 | 41  | 41  | 37 | 9  | 23 | 9  | 5  | 13 | 1  | 6  | 4  | 2  |
| GREEN | Troy SWAN               | 875    | 2   | 1  | 13 | 8  | 538    | 56  | 25  | 79    | 12  | 17  | 28  | 4   | 8   | 7  | 6  | 3  | 3  | 0  | 7  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  |
|       | Group total             | 5,259  | 16  | 7  | 56 | 24 | 2,879  | 353 | 155 | 508   | 113 | 168 | 193 | 56  | 63  | 53 | 19 | 28 | 12 | 8  | 28 | 3  | 6  | 4  | 5  |
| IFC   | Riley FERNANDES         | 953    | 6   | 3  | 8  | 4  | 575    | 64  | 27  | 43    | 14  | 23  | 20  | 12  | 8   | 8  | 2  | 5  | 2  | 0  | 5  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 1  |
| IFC   | Vanessa PICKER          | 2,411  | 15  | 4  | 35 | 6  | 1,318  | 171 | 72  | 136   | 56  | 78  | 80  | 33  | 23  | 16 | 12 | 9  | 9  | 8  | 11 | 5  | 1  | 4  | 7  |
| IFC   | Elise SEARSON           | 1,055  | 3   | 2  | 24 | 8  | 651    | 62  | 23  | 47    | 24  | 30  | 35  | 12  | 12  | 7  | 2  | 5  | 3  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4  |
|       | Group total             | 4,419  | 24  | 9  | 67 | 18 | 2,544  | 297 | 122 | 226   | 94  | 131 | 135 | 57  | 43  | 31 | 16 | 19 | 14 | 10 | 19 | 5  | 3  | 7  | 12 |

| Group                     | Total  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      | 8     | 9     | 10    | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20    | 21    | 22    | 23    | 24    |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| LIB James DANIELS         | 4,062  | 27     | 9      | 9      | 12     | 3,250  | 107    | 93     | 158   | 41    | 58    | 24    | 15    | 8     | 2     | 4     | 8     | 4     | 3     | 7     | 0     | 4     | 3     | 11    | 205   |
| LIB Rosa HARBER           | 2,781  | 13     | 4      | 4      | 7      | 2,219  | 96     | 91     | 93    | 33    | 49    | 17    | 13    | 10    | 6     | 3     | 8     | 1     | 2     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 8     | 98    |
| LIB Sandi MITRA           | 2,906  | 25     | 8      | 8      | 11     | 2,277  | 114    | 94     | 99    | 22    | 50    | 18    | 14    | 12    | 8     | 7     | 3     | 8     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 119   |
| LIB Deborah MORRIS        | 5,780  | 32     | 10     | 12     | 22     | 4,737  | 170    | 132    | 188   | 48    | 78    | 23    | 16    | 17    | 9     | 10    | 17    | 7     | 0     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 6     | 10    | 231   |
| LIB Mark PARTON           | 9,606  | 58     | 16     | 14     | 26     | 7,846  | 258    | 216    | 276   | 73    | 130   | 46    | 35    | 27    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 3     | 5     | 9     | 2     | 3     | 9     | 7     | 499   |
| Group total               | 25,135 | 155    | 47     | 47     | 78     | 20,329 | 745    | 626    | 814   | 217   | 365   | 128   | 93    | 74    | 40    | 40    | 53    | 23    | 11    | 26    | 2     | 10    | 21    | 39    | 1,152 |
| UNG Emmanuel EZEKIEL-HART | 600    | 17     | 0      | 4      | 4      | 330    | 54     | 22     | 19    | 10    | 17    | 14    | 7     | 2     | 6     | 2     | 5     | 2     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 3     | 1     | 1     | 78    |
| Group total               | 600    | 17     | 0      | 4      | 4      | 330    | 54     | 22     | 19    | 10    | 17    | 14    | 7     | 2     | 6     | 2     | 5     | 2     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 3     | 1     | 1     | 78    |
| Total                     | 58,246 | 345    | 136    | 242    | 196    | 42,761 | 2,298  | 1,558  | 2,891 | 702   | 1,113 | 815   | 348   | 315   | 214   | 115   | 182   | 75    | 47    | 100   | 19    | 51    | 68    | 89    | 3,566 |
| %                         |        | 0.59   | 0.23   | 0.42   | 0.34   | 73.41  | 3.95   | 2.67   | 4.96  | 1.21  | 1.91  | 1.40  | 0.60  | 0.54  | 0.37  | 0.20  | 0.31  | 0.13  | 0.08  | 0.17  | 0.03  | 0.09  | 0.12  | 0.15  | 6.12  |
| Progressive total         | 58,246 | 57,901 | 57,765 | 57,523 | 57,327 | 14,566 | 12,268 | 10,710 | 7,819 | 7,117 | 6,004 | 5,189 | 4,841 | 4,841 | 4,526 | 4,312 | 4,197 | 4,015 | 3,940 | 3,893 | 3,793 | 3,774 | 3,723 | 3,655 | 3,566 |
| Progressive %             | 100.00 | 99.41  | 99.17  | 98.76  | 98.42  | 25.01  | 21.06  | 18.39  | 13.42 | 12.22 | 10.31 | 8.91  | 8.91  | 8.31  | 7.77  | 7.40  | 7.21  | 6.89  | 6.76  | 6.68  | 6.51  | 6.48  | 6.39  | 6.28  | 6.12  |

Table 66 Length of sequence — Ginninderra

| Group                    | Total  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5      | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9     | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33  |     |
|--------------------------|--------|----|----|----|----|--------|-----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|-----|
| AJP<br>Carolyne DREW     | 443    | 2  | 6  | 2  | 0  | 287    | 28  | 17  | 4   | 4     | 12  | 19  | 9   | 3   | 7   | 6  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 3  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 25  |     |
| AJP<br>Lara DREW         | 514    | 3  | 6  | 1  | 3  | 337    | 40  | 17  | 17  | 7     | 7   | 16  | 8   | 3   | 8   | 3  | 7  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 26  |     |
| Group total              | 957    | 5  | 12 | 3  | 3  | 624    | 68  | 34  | 21  | 11    | 19  | 35  | 17  | 6   | 15  | 9  | 9  | 0  | 2  | 4  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 51  |     |
| ALP<br>Tim BAVINTON      | 2,095  | 9  | 4  | 8  | 3  | 1,519  | 82  | 53  | 42  | 126   | 50  | 20  | 30  | 9   | 14  | 3  | 4  | 7  | 3  | 5  | 3  | 5  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 88  |     |
| ALP<br>Yvette BERRY      | 7,727  | 37 | 24 | 20 | 17 | 5,729  | 288 | 181 | 157 | 483   | 158 | 84  | 96  | 32  | 47  | 23 | 31 | 13 | 11 | 5  | 6  | 10 | 2  | 1  | 4  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 4  | 1  | 6  | 3  | 249 |     |
| ALP<br>Tara CHEYNE       | 7,813  | 32 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 5,279  | 334 | 186 | 214 | 597   | 185 | 96  | 141 | 48  | 70  | 34 | 39 | 16 | 12 | 17 | 9  | 8  | 10 | 2  | 6  | 5  | 4  | 1  | 3  | 7  | 3  | 11 | 8  | 388 |     |
| ALP<br>Heidi PROWSE      | 2,190  | 7  | 2  | 7  | 6  | 1,532  | 82  | 58  | 61  | 158   | 51  | 24  | 30  | 11  | 17  | 12 | 13 | 6  | 3  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 88  |     |
| ALP<br>Sean SADIWOEN     | 1,001  | 6  | 1  | 3  | 2  | 757    | 37  | 23  | 18  | 44    | 22  | 13  | 9   | 7   | 10  | 3  | 4  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 28  |     |
| Group total              | 20,826 | 91 | 48 | 53 | 44 | 14,816 | 823 | 501 | 492 | 1,408 | 466 | 237 | 306 | 107 | 158 | 75 | 91 | 45 | 30 | 32 | 22 | 26 | 18 | 5  | 11 | 7  | 6  | 5  | 3  | 15 | 5  | 21 | 18 | 841 |     |
| BEL<br>Angela LOUNT      | 397    | 3  | 4  | 3  | 1  | 273    | 30  | 16  | 15  | 5     | 8   | 2   | 6   | 0   | 3   | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 19  |     |
| BEL<br>Bill STEFANIAK    | 1,527  | 7  | 8  | 16 | 11 | 997    | 89  | 99  | 61  | 34    | 46  | 18  | 9   | 6   | 15  | 11 | 4  | 2  | 6  | 2  | 1  | 3  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 2   | 74  |
| BEL<br>Alan TUTT         | 696    | 4  | 4  | 11 | 3  | 489    | 41  | 35  | 21  | 13    | 16  | 5   | 7   | 1   | 3   | 5  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 28  |     |
| Group total              | 2,620  | 14 | 16 | 30 | 15 | 1,759  | 160 | 150 | 97  | 52    | 70  | 25  | 22  | 7   | 21  | 17 | 4  | 4  | 6  | 7  | 1  | 5  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 3  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 2   | 121 |
| DLP<br>Douglas COOPER    | 146    | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 120    | 6   | 4   | 2   | 2     | 1   | 2   | 1   | 0   | 1   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0   |
| DLP<br>Helen CROWE       | 233    | 2  | 0  | 3  | 1  | 187    | 8   | 7   | 4   | 8     | 4   | 0   | 0   | 1   | 1   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 3   |     |
| DLP<br>Rick HOWARD       | 129    | 2  | 2  | 0  | 3  | 92     | 8   | 2   | 4   | 3     | 4   | 1   | 2   | 2   | 0   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 3   |     |
| DLP<br>Maxwell SPENCER   | 152    | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 124    | 9   | 4   | 2   | 2     | 4   | 2   | 0   | 0   | 1   | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1   |     |
| DLP<br>John VANDERBURGH  | 149    | 1  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 108    | 11  | 4   | 2   | 6     | 3   | 1   | 2   | 2   | 1   | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 3   |     |
| Group total              | 809    | 6  | 4  | 3  | 8  | 631    | 42  | 21  | 14  | 21    | 16  | 6   | 5   | 5   | 4   | 3  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 10  |     |
| FFP<br>Sunil BABY        | 223    | 0  | 5  | 3  | 2  | 145    | 14  | 9   | 8   | 3     | 7   | 3   | 4   | 1   | 1   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 14  |     |
| FFP<br>Elizabeth KICKERT | 1,926  | 12 | 12 | 16 | 6  | 1,294  | 104 | 112 | 60  | 46    | 79  | 12  | 28  | 13  | 4   | 10 | 8  | 5  | 2  | 3  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 85  |     |
| FFP<br>Andrew WALLACE    | 445    | 5  | 0  | 6  | 1  | 285    | 23  | 26  | 13  | 11    | 12  | 2   | 5   | 4   | 5   | 3  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 36  |     |
| Group total              | 2,594  | 17 | 17 | 25 | 9  | 1,724  | 141 | 147 | 81  | 60    | 98  | 17  | 37  | 18  | 10  | 14 | 9  | 6  | 4  | 4  | 5  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 135 |     |
| GREEN<br>Jo CLAY         | 3,426  | 5  | 7  | 10 | 34 | 1,457  | 218 | 150 | 92  | 487   | 141 | 137 | 117 | 47  | 70  | 40 | 30 | 16 | 12 | 14 | 8  | 6  | 2  | 4  | 4  | 4  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 6  | 301 |     |
| GREEN<br>Dani HUNTER     | 1,238  | 3  | 0  | 3  | 14 | 637    | 81  | 50  | 22  | 166   | 53  | 32  | 24  | 7   | 27  | 11 | 6  | 8  | 1  | 5  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 3  | 73  |     |
| GREEN<br>Tim LIERSCH     | 1,126  | 4  | 1  | 3  | 16 | 632    | 56  | 48  | 19  | 126   | 41  | 31  | 26  | 6   | 16  | 4  | 5  | 3  | 3  | 4  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 72  |     |
| GREEN<br>Adele SINCLAIR  | 2,090  | 6  | 5  | 6  | 24 | 1,134  | 130 | 82  | 48  | 226   | 73  | 49  | 66  | 13  | 33  | 15 | 14 | 7  | 3  | 2  | 7  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 3  | 130 |     |
| Group total              | 7,880  | 18 | 13 | 22 | 88 | 3,860  | 485 | 330 | 181 | 1,005 | 308 | 249 | 233 | 73  | 146 | 70 | 55 | 34 | 19 | 25 | 17 | 10 | 9  | 9  | 6  | 7  | 4  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 7  | 11 | 576 |     |

| Group                      | Total  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      | 8      | 9     | 10    | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20    | 21    | 22    | 23    | 24    | 25    | 26    | 27    | 28    | 29    | 30    | 31    | 32    | 33    |
|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| IFC<br>Leanne<br>FORESTI   | 1,443  | 6      | 3      | 10     | 6      | 841    | 91     | 72     | 67     | 33    | 56    | 26    | 46    | 6     | 24    | 18    | 7     | 5     | 4     | 2     | 4     | 5     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 6     | 100   |
| IFC<br>Suzanne<br>NUCIFORA | 670    | 0      | 0      | 8      | 3      | 362    | 30     | 49     | 34     | 17    | 28    | 7     | 25    | 6     | 12    | 6     | 3     | 4     | 3     | 3     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 67    |
| IFC<br>Mark<br>RICHARDSON  | 2,116  | 7      | 6      | 23     | 8      | 1,231  | 121    | 121    | 93     | 51    | 82    | 29    | 64    | 19    | 21    | 20    | 11    | 10    | 1     | 17    | 9     | 4     | 2     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 3     | 5     | 151   |
| Group total                | 4,229  | 13     | 9      | 41     | 17     | 2,434  | 242    | 242    | 194    | 101   | 166   | 62    | 135   | 31    | 57    | 44    | 21    | 19    | 8     | 22    | 13    | 9     | 2     | 3     | 5     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 4     | 12    | 318   |
| LIB<br>Chiaka BARRY        | 3,601  | 20     | 9      | 9      | 141    | 2,419  | 195    | 311    | 84     | 65    | 79    | 25    | 26    | 12    | 13    | 16    | 6     | 5     | 2     | 8     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 2     | 4     | 5     | 129   |
| LIB<br>Peter CAIN          | 5,782  | 43     | 3      | 13     | 209    | 3,614  | 275    | 797    | 150    | 90    | 150   | 35    | 43    | 33    | 22    | 13    | 15    | 15    | 4     | 15    | 6     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 6     | 6     | 2     | 3     | 5     | 205   |
| LIB<br>Joe<br>PREVEDELLO   | 2,894  | 7      | 5      | 4      | 106    | 1,876  | 124    | 402    | 51     | 45    | 81    | 8     | 19    | 17    | 11    | 14    | 4     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 6     | 1     | 3     | 0     | 97    |
| LIB<br>Darren<br>ROBERTS   | 2,494  | 18     | 5      | 7      | 100    | 1,717  | 117    | 271    | 28     | 41    | 38    | 11    | 19    | 8     | 7     | 6     | 2     | 6     | 2     | 3     | 1     | 3     | 0     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 5     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 68    |
| Group total                | 14,771 | 88     | 22     | 33     | 556    | 9,626  | 711    | 1,781  | 313    | 241   | 348   | 79    | 107   | 70    | 53    | 49    | 27    | 30    | 8     | 27    | 10    | 7     | 7     | 7     | 6     | 2     | 2     | 2     | 14    | 17    | 7     | 11    | 11    | 499   |
| LP<br>Arved VON<br>BRASCH  | 178    | 5      | 8      | 0      | 0      | 108    | 13     | 5      | 1      | 4     | 6     | 3     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 16    |
| LP<br>Guy JAKEMAN          | 221    | 6      | 3      | 1      | 2      | 140    | 16     | 3      | 3      | 11    | 5     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 19    |
| Group total                | 399    | 11     | 11     | 1      | 2      | 248    | 29     | 8      | 4      | 15    | 11    | 4     | 7     | 2     | 3     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 35    |
| UNG<br>Mignonne<br>CULLEN  | 324    | 5      | 3      | 0      | 0      | 162    | 12     | 19     | 26     | 15    | 25    | 2     | 4     | 5     | 1     | 1     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 32    |
| UNG<br>Janine<br>HASKINS   | 643    | 5      | 4      | 2      | 1      | 308    | 32     | 30     | 19     | 16    | 37    | 17    | 16    | 13    | 14    | 11    | 5     | 7     | 6     | 4     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 3     | 79    |
| Group total                | 967    | 10     | 7      | 2      | 1      | 470    | 44     | 49     | 45     | 31    | 62    | 19    | 20    | 18    | 15    | 12    | 9     | 8     | 7     | 6     | 3     | 2     | 2     | 5     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 3     | 111   |
| Total                      | 56,052 | 273    | 159    | 213    | 743    | 36,192 | 2,745  | 3,263  | 1,442  | 2,945 | 1,564 | 733   | 889   | 337   | 482   | 295   | 227   | 147   | 85    | 129   | 74    | 63    | 45    | 35    | 35    | 21    | 15    | 10    | 27    | 42    | 17    | 47    | 61    | 2,697 |
| %                          |        | 0.49   | 0.28   | 0.38   | 1.33   | 64.57  | 4.90   | 5.82   | 2.57   | 5.25  | 2.79  | 1.31  | 1.59  | 0.60  | 0.86  | 0.53  | 0.40  | 0.26  | 0.15  | 0.23  | 0.13  | 0.11  | 0.08  | 0.06  | 0.06  | 0.04  | 0.03  | 0.02  | 0.05  | 0.07  | 0.03  | 0.08  | 0.11  | 4.81  |
| Progressive total          | 56,052 | 55,779 | 55,620 | 55,407 | 54,664 | 18,472 | 15,727 | 12,464 | 11,022 | 8,077 | 6,513 | 5,780 | 4,891 | 4,554 | 4,072 | 3,777 | 3,550 | 3,403 | 3,318 | 3,189 | 3,115 | 3,052 | 3,007 | 2,972 | 2,937 | 2,916 | 2,901 | 2,891 | 2,864 | 2,822 | 2,805 | 2,758 | 2,697 |       |
| Progressive %              | 100.00 | 99.51  | 99.23  | 98.85  | 97.52  | 32.96  | 28.06  | 22.24  | 19.66  | 14.41 | 11.62 | 10.31 | 8.73  | 8.12  | 7.26  | 6.74  | 6.33  | 6.07  | 5.92  | 5.69  | 5.56  | 5.44  | 5.36  | 5.30  | 5.24  | 5.20  | 5.18  | 5.16  | 5.11  | 5.03  | 5.00  | 4.92  | 4.81  |       |

Table 67 Length of sequence—Kurrajong

| Group                              | Total         | 1         | 2         | 3         | 4         | 5             | 6          | 7          | 8          | 9          | 10           | 11         | 12         | 13        | 14        | 15         | 16        | 17        | 18        | 19        | 20        | 21        | 22        | 23        | 24        | 25        | 26       | 27       | 28       | 29        | 30       | 31       | 32        | 33        | 34         |
|------------------------------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| AJP<br>Walter<br>KUDRYCZ           | 302           | 1         | 8         | 3         | 2         | 162           | 13         | 18         | 3          | 10         | 3            | 1          | 17         | 4         | 2         | 4          | 1         | 9         | 1         | 4         | 1         | 2         | 2         | 0         | 2         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 1         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 3         | 25         |
| AJP<br>Teresa<br>McTAGGART         | 342           | 1         | 6         | 1         | 0         | 188           | 7          | 31         | 14         | 6          | 8            | 2          | 19         | 5         | 2         | 1          | 1         | 4         | 0         | 3         | 2         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 1         | 0         | 39         |
| <b>Group total</b>                 | <b>644</b>    | <b>2</b>  | <b>14</b> | <b>4</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>350</b>    | <b>20</b>  | <b>49</b>  | <b>17</b>  | <b>16</b>  | <b>11</b>    | <b>3</b>   | <b>36</b>  | <b>9</b>  | <b>4</b>  | <b>5</b>   | <b>2</b>  | <b>13</b> | <b>1</b>  | <b>7</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>3</b>  | <b>64</b> |            |
| ALP<br>Andrew/BARR                 | 10,337        | 39        | 18        | 22        | 19        | 6,915         | 591        | 336        | 221        | 105        | 848          | 161        | 125        | 44        | 34        | 205        | 30        | 49        | 17        | 19        | 43        | 8         | 21        | 9         | 5         | 4         | 3        | 6        | 1        | 11        | 0        | 1        | 8         | 8         | 411        |
| ALP<br>Aggi COURT                  | 1,263         | 3         | 2         | 1         | 1         | 820           | 63         | 43         | 28         | 17         | 105          | 14         | 22         | 6         | 6         | 23         | 6         | 6         | 2         | 3         | 10        | 1         | 5         | 1         | 2         | 1         | 1        | 1        | 1        | 1         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 1         | 67         |
| ALP<br>Martin<br>GREENWOOD         | 1,153         | 2         | 3         | 3         | 3         | 759           | 49         | 54         | 18         | 22         | 75           | 13         | 16         | 10        | 4         | 24         | 5         | 5         | 5         | 2         | 6         | 0         | 5         | 2         | 1         | 2         | 0        | 1        | 1        | 4         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 59         |
| ALP<br>Rachel<br>STEPHEN-<br>SMITH | 3,500         | 10        | 5         | 5         | 7         | 2,252         | 185        | 129        | 96         | 55         | 249          | 63         | 57         | 19        | 10        | 71         | 20        | 20        | 9         | 13        | 12        | 3         | 8         | 7         | 2         | 4         | 1        | 0        | 1        | 0         | 1        | 0        | 2         | 3         | 181        |
| ALP<br>Marina<br>TALEYSKI          | 1,425         | 5         | 1         | 2         | 4         | 922           | 77         | 49         | 42         | 21         | 93           | 22         | 23         | 8         | 4         | 36         | 6         | 8         | 2         | 3         | 5         | 2         | 5         | 1         | 3         | 1         | 2        | 1        | 1        | 2         | 1        | 0        | 0         | 4         | 69         |
| <b>Group total</b>                 | <b>17,678</b> | <b>59</b> | <b>29</b> | <b>33</b> | <b>34</b> | <b>11,668</b> | <b>965</b> | <b>611</b> | <b>405</b> | <b>220</b> | <b>1,370</b> | <b>273</b> | <b>243</b> | <b>87</b> | <b>58</b> | <b>359</b> | <b>67</b> | <b>88</b> | <b>35</b> | <b>40</b> | <b>76</b> | <b>14</b> | <b>44</b> | <b>20</b> | <b>13</b> | <b>12</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>9</b> | <b>5</b> | <b>18</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>10</b> | <b>16</b> | <b>787</b> |
| DLP<br>Belinda HALEY               | 87            | 2         | 4         | 1         | 0         | 58            | 5          | 6          | 2          | 3          | 0            | 0          | 1          | 0         | 0         | 1          | 0         | 1         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 2          |
| DLP<br>Boston WHITE                | 73            | 1         | 2         | 1         | 0         | 46            | 1          | 4          | 3          | 2          | 2            | 0          | 3          | 0         | 0         | 0          | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 8          |
| <b>Group total</b>                 | <b>160</b>    | <b>3</b>  | <b>6</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>104</b>    | <b>6</b>   | <b>10</b>  | <b>5</b>   | <b>5</b>   | <b>2</b>     | <b>0</b>   | <b>4</b>   | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>1</b>   | <b>0</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b>  | <b>10</b> |            |
| FFP<br>Andrew<br>Charles ADAIR     | 299           | 3         | 4         | 0         | 0         | 161           | 16         | 38         | 7          | 17         | 9            | 2          | 9          | 1         | 1         | 1          | 1         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 1         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 1        | 0        | 2         | 2        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 21         |
| FFP<br>Jenny<br>HENTZSCHEL         | 309           | 5         | 6         | 2         | 0         | 193           | 17         | 36         | 6          | 7          | 4            | 1          | 6          | 1         | 2         | 2          | 1         | 3         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 2         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 1         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 1         | 11         |
| <b>Group total</b>                 | <b>608</b>    | <b>8</b>  | <b>10</b> | <b>2</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>354</b>    | <b>33</b>  | <b>74</b>  | <b>13</b>  | <b>24</b>  | <b>13</b>    | <b>3</b>   | <b>15</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>3</b>   | <b>2</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>1</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>2</b>  | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>0</b>  | <b>1</b>  | <b>32</b>  |
| FNP<br>Rhannon<br>CONNORS          | 88            | 0         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 50            | 4          | 1          | 2          | 0          | 6            | 2          | 0          | 0         | 1         | 3          | 0         | 4         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 3         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 1        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 1         | 0         | 7          |
| FNP<br>Thaddeus<br>CONNORS         | 89            | 1         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 48            | 3          | 1          | 3          | 1          | 7            | 0          | 4          | 2         | 0         | 3          | 1         | 1         | 1         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 1         | 0         | 10         |
| FNP<br>Paul Girrawah<br>HOUSE      | 962           | 2         | 2         | 0         | 1         | 426           | 50         | 40         | 23         | 13         | 60           | 30         | 25         | 17        | 8         | 37         | 13        | 15        | 14        | 6         | 22        | 5         | 15        | 2         | 7         | 8         | 5        | 4        | 0        | 1         | 2        | 0        | 1         | 0         | 108        |
| FNP<br>Harrison PIKE               | 85            | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 56            | 2          | 3          | 0          | 0          | 5            | 0          | 2          | 0         | 2         | 5          | 1         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 5          |
| FNP<br>Jessica<br>SPENCER          | 99            | 0         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 42            | 4          | 5          | 4          | 2          | 8            | 2          | 3          | 0         | 0         | 8          | 2         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 1         | 0         | 1         | 1         | 0         | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0        | 0        | 0         | 0         | 15         |
| <b>Group total</b>                 | <b>1,323</b>  | <b>3</b>  | <b>4</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>2</b>  | <b>622</b>    | <b>63</b>  | <b>50</b>  | <b>32</b>  | <b>16</b>  | <b>86</b>    | <b>34</b>  | <b>34</b>  | <b>19</b> | <b>11</b> | <b>56</b>  | <b>17</b> | <b>21</b> | <b>15</b> | <b>6</b>  | <b>26</b> | <b>5</b>  | <b>20</b> | <b>3</b>  | <b>8</b>  | <b>9</b>  | <b>6</b> | <b>4</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>1</b>  | <b>2</b> | <b>0</b> | <b>3</b>  | <b>0</b>  | <b>145</b> |

| Group                    | Total  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      | 8      | 9      | 10    | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20    | 21    | 22    | 23    | 24    | 25    | 26    | 27    | 28    | 29    | 30    | 31    | 32    | 33    | 34    |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| GREEN James CRUZ         | 456    | 0      | 0      | 1      | 1      | 250    | 21     | 14     | 7      | 2      | 57    | 7     | 11    | 3     | 7     | 14    | 2     | 8     | 0     | 0     | 5     | 1     | 7     | 1     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 29    |
| GREEN Isabel MUDFORD     | 1,126  | 2      | 2      | 1      | 0      | 503    | 61     | 46     | 27     | 20     | 145   | 24    | 32    | 12    | 9     | 37    | 7     | 23    | 6     | 5     | 9     | 3     | 11    | 2     | 7     | 4     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 2     | 2     | 117   |
| GREEN Shane RATTENBURY   | 4,087  | 5      | 3      | 5      | 3      | 1,791  | 222    | 168    | 123    | 65     | 564   | 122   | 155   | 46    | 29    | 178   | 30    | 71    | 20    | 15    | 46    | 7     | 26    | 10    | 13    | 13    | 2     | 6     | 0     | 4     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 0     | 339   |
| GREEN Jillian REID       | 668    | 1      | 0      | 2      | 0      | 366    | 35     | 28     | 16     | 12     | 90    | 11    | 12    | 4     | 5     | 22    | 2     | 12    | 1     | 0     | 3     | 0     | 3     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 35    |
| GREEN Rebecca VASSAROTTI | 2,296  | 4      | 3      | 4      | 7      | 977    | 134    | 116    | 58     | 41     | 277   | 62    | 71    | 23    | 15    | 83    | 21    | 24    | 16    | 13    | 33    | 8     | 21    | 9     | 7     | 10    | 4     | 5     | 3     | 7     | 4     | 0     | 3     | 1     | 232   |
| Group total              | 8,633  | 12     | 8      | 13     | 11     | 3,887  | 473    | 372    | 231    | 140    | 1,133 | 226   | 281   | 88    | 65    | 334   | 62    | 138   | 43    | 33    | 96    | 19    | 68    | 24    | 31    | 30    | 8     | 13    | 4     | 15    | 8     | 2     | 9     | 4     | 752   |
| IFC Thomas EMERSON       | 4,817  | 13     | 8      | 4      | 8      | 2,454  | 292    | 248    | 198    | 107    | 260   | 117   | 118   | 69    | 41    | 172   | 31    | 60    | 30    | 20    | 53    | 14    | 24    | 13    | 13    | 12    | 5     | 7     | 3     | 9     | 5     | 0     | 5     | 2     | 402   |
| IFC Ben JOHNSTON         | 527    | 1      | 0      | 0      | 0      | 312    | 32     | 22     | 16     | 13     | 31    | 3     | 11    | 5     | 4     | 11    | 6     | 1     | 2     | 2     | 7     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 38    |
| IFC Tenzin MAYNE         | 183    | 0      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 110    | 9      | 5      | 5      | 1      | 12    | 2     | 4     | 4     | 2     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 15    |
| IFC Sara POGUET          | 618    | 2      | 2      | 1      | 2      | 344    | 33     | 24     | 26     | 10     | 30    | 11    | 11    | 9     | 6     | 18    | 2     | 6     | 2     | 3     | 7     | 4     | 2     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 3     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 50    |
| IFC Sue READ             | 476    | 3      | 2      | 4      | 0      | 261    | 25     | 23     | 14     | 12     | 21    | 8     | 18    | 4     | 4     | 10    | 1     | 5     | 3     | 2     | 3     | 2     | 3     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 46    |
| Group total              | 6,621  | 19     | 12     | 10     | 10     | 3,481  | 391    | 322    | 259    | 143    | 354   | 141   | 162   | 91    | 57    | 214   | 41    | 72    | 38    | 28    | 71    | 20    | 32    | 16    | 19    | 18    | 5     | 10    | 3     | 14    | 5     | 0     | 7     | 5     | 551   |
| LIB Ramon BOUCKAERT      | 899    | 2      | 2      | 0      | 3      | 693    | 32     | 30     | 14     | 12     | 27    | 3     | 8     | 0     | 6     | 6     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 45    |
| LIB Ethimios CALATZIS    | 764    | 3      | 0      | 1      | 0      | 607    | 29     | 32     | 7      | 13     | 21    | 2     | 4     | 3     | 3     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 27    |
| LIB Elizabeth LEE        | 6,861  | 25     | 10     | 10     | 13     | 5,346  | 243    | 231    | 104    | 59     | 211   | 33    | 83    | 29    | 21    | 47    | 8     | 15    | 14    | 9     | 10    | 4     | 8     | 6     | 6     | 3     | 2     | 4     | 2     | 11    | 0     | 0     | 2     | 12    | 280   |
| LIB Sarah LUSCOMBE       | 1,143  | 4      | 2      | 5      | 6      | 944    | 41     | 25     | 14     | 9      | 36    | 2     | 8     | 0     | 3     | 5     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 28    |
| LIB Patrick PENTONY      | 2,219  | 10     | 2      | 4      | 6      | 1,819  | 62     | 82     | 20     | 19     | 44    | 10    | 19    | 5     | 8     | 6     | 2     | 3     | 0     | 3     | 3     | 4     | 2     | 1     | 4     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 72    |
| Group total              | 11,886 | 44     | 16     | 20     | 28     | 9,409  | 407    | 400    | 159    | 112    | 339   | 50    | 122   | 37    | 41    | 68    | 11    | 22    | 16    | 15    | 15    | 11    | 12    | 8     | 14    | 6     | 6     | 4     | 4     | 19    | 1     | 1     | 3     | 14    | 452   |
| STR Ann BRAY             | 524    | 1      | 2      | 2      | 1      | 251    | 26     | 39     | 27     | 23     | 25    | 10    | 12    | 16    | 8     | 5     | 5     | 8     | 4     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 3     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 43    |
| STR Peter STRONG         | 607    | 2      | 3      | 0      | 1      | 303    | 40     | 56     | 28     | 16     | 17    | 6     | 22    | 6     | 3     | 7     | 5     | 12    | 1     | 3     | 2     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 66    |
| Group total              | 1,131  | 3      | 5      | 2      | 2      | 554    | 66     | 95     | 55     | 39     | 42    | 16    | 34    | 22    | 11    | 12    | 10    | 20    | 5     | 5     | 3     | 1     | 4     | 1     | 4     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 4     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 109   |
| UNG Marlina DAMIANO      | 238    | 7      | 2      | 2      | 0      | 128    | 20     | 4      | 12     | 2      | 7     | 7     | 2     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 24    |
| Group total              | 238    | 7      | 2      | 2      | 0      | 128    | 20     | 4      | 12     | 2      | 7     | 7     | 2     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 24    |
| Total                    | 48,922 | 160    | 106    | 88     | 89     | 30,557 | 2,444  | 1,987  | 1,188  | 717    | 3,357 | 753   | 933   | 358   | 251   | 1,054 | 213   | 382   | 155   | 136   | 293   | 75    | 184   | 74    | 93    | 78    | 34    | 41    | 22    | 72    | 18    | 4     | 35    | 45    | 2,926 |
| %                        |        | 0.33   | 0.22   | 0.18   | 0.18   | 62.46  | 5.00   | 4.06   | 2.43   | 1.47   | 6.86  | 1.54  | 1.91  | 0.73  | 0.51  | 2.15  | 0.44  | 0.78  | 0.32  | 0.28  | 0.60  | 0.15  | 0.38  | 0.15  | 0.19  | 0.16  | 0.07  | 0.08  | 0.04  | 0.15  | 0.04  | 0.01  | 0.07  | 0.09  | 5.98  |
| Progressive total        | 48,922 | 48,762 | 48,656 | 48,568 | 48,479 | 17,922 | 15,478 | 13,491 | 12,303 | 11,586 | 8,229 | 7,476 | 6,543 | 6,185 | 5,934 | 4,880 | 4,667 | 4,285 | 4,130 | 3,994 | 3,701 | 3,626 | 3,442 | 3,368 | 3,275 | 3,197 | 3,163 | 3,122 | 3,100 | 3,028 | 3,010 | 3,006 | 2,971 | 2,926 |       |
| Progressive %            |        | 100.00 | 99.67  | 99.46  | 99.28  | 99.09  | 36.63  | 31.64  | 27.58  | 25.15  | 23.68 | 16.82 | 15.28 | 13.37 | 12.64 | 12.13 | 9.98  | 9.54  | 8.76  | 8.44  | 8.16  | 7.57  | 7.41  | 7.04  | 6.88  | 6.69  | 6.53  | 6.47  | 6.38  | 6.34  | 6.19  | 6.15  | 6.14  | 6.07  | 5.98  |



Table 68 Length of sequence — Murrumbidgee

| Group                               | Total  | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5      | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27    |
|-------------------------------------|--------|-----|----|----|----|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| AJP<br>Gwenda<br>GRIFFITHS          | 389    | 1   | 10 | 3  | 2  | 229    | 38  | 14  | 8   | 5   | 11  | 7   | 6   | 3   | 2   | 2  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 36    |
| AJP<br>Ashleigh GRIF<br>FITHS-SMITH | 353    | 4   | 5  | 2  | 3  | 217    | 26  | 14  | 9   | 11  | 10  | 10  | 7   | 0   | 6   | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 24    |
| Group total                         | 742    | 5   | 15 | 5  | 5  | 446    | 64  | 28  | 17  | 16  | 21  | 17  | 13  | 3   | 8   | 4  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 60    |
| ALP<br>Noor ELASADI                 | 1,476  | 18  | 7  | 6  | 4  | 1,021  | 80  | 46  | 31  | 82  | 41  | 16  | 13  | 8   | 7   | 3  | 2  | 3  | 3  | 2  | 4  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 74    |
| ALP<br>Marisa<br>PATERSON           | 5,176  | 29  | 12 | 11 | 16 | 3,457  | 293 | 160 | 141 | 209 | 176 | 57  | 73  | 35  | 36  | 21 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 9  | 6  | 4  | 4  | 2  | 1  | 9  | 18 | 356   |
| ALP<br>Chris STEEL                  | 6,345  | 32  | 12 | 9  | 13 | 4,466  | 312 | 206 | 154 | 305 | 165 | 61  | 63  | 32  | 39  | 29 | 13 | 15 | 14 | 4  | 11 | 3  | 8  | 0  | 1  | 10 | 10 | 358   |
| ALP<br>Nelson TANG                  | 3,542  | 18  | 6  | 9  | 17 | 2,483  | 188 | 110 | 83  | 182 | 69  | 43  | 26  | 15  | 19  | 8  | 7  | 6  | 14 | 0  | 15 | 0  | 1  | 3  | 1  | 8  | 7  | 204   |
| ALP<br>Anna<br>WHITTY               | 1,990  | 12  | 4  | 2  | 10 | 1,429  | 81  | 66  | 62  | 89  | 43  | 27  | 13  | 4   | 14  | 5  | 4  | 4  | 3  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 106   |
| Group total                         | 18,529 | 109 | 41 | 37 | 60 | 12,856 | 954 | 588 | 471 | 867 | 494 | 204 | 188 | 94  | 115 | 66 | 40 | 43 | 46 | 18 | 37 | 7  | 17 | 5  | 5  | 30 | 39 | 1,098 |
| FCI<br>Fiona<br>CARRICK             | 6,691  | 37  | 13 | 61 | 21 | 3,130  | 616 | 292 | 496 | 211 | 251 | 124 | 144 | 138 | 78  | 62 | 35 | 54 | 45 | 22 | 39 | 4  | 13 | 12 | 8  | 22 | 14 | 749   |
| FCI<br>Marea<br>FATSEAS             | 341    | 0   | 1  | 9  | 0  | 141    | 43  | 14  | 38  | 11  | 12  | 2   | 3   | 9   | 2   | 2  | 0  | 3  | 1  | 4  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 2  | 37    |
| FCI<br>Bruce PAINE                  | 271    | 2   | 0  | 6  | 1  | 120    | 33  | 11  | 18  | 6   | 13  | 7   | 4   | 3   | 6   | 2  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 28    |
| Group total                         | 7,303  | 39  | 14 | 76 | 22 | 3,391  | 692 | 317 | 552 | 228 | 276 | 133 | 151 | 150 | 86  | 66 | 35 | 57 | 48 | 27 | 42 | 4  | 16 | 13 | 8  | 27 | 19 | 814   |
| FFP<br>Andrew COPP                  | 503    | 6   | 6  | 2  | 0  | 295    | 22  | 63  | 20  | 4   | 10  | 4   | 6   | 2   | 2   | 2  | 4  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 46    |
| FFP<br>Andy VERRI                   | 389    | 2   | 2  | 1  | 2  | 239    | 26  | 36  | 14  | 3   | 6   | 2   | 2   | 3   | 1   | 4  | 7  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 34    |
| Group total                         | 892    | 8   | 8  | 3  | 2  | 534    | 48  | 99  | 34  | 7   | 16  | 6   | 8   | 5   | 3   | 6  | 11 | 3  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 80    |
| GREEN<br>Michael BREWER             | 605    | 3   | 2  | 1  | 12 | 340    | 29  | 15  | 15  | 56  | 16  | 14  | 6   | 2   | 5   | 5  | 4  | 10 | 4  | 1  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 59    |
| GREEN<br>Sam<br>CARTER              | 840    | 3   | 0  | 2  | 11 | 468    | 58  | 23  | 16  | 71  | 22  | 18  | 18  | 5   | 12  | 7  | 4  | 6  | 3  | 1  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 83    |
| GREEN<br>Emma<br>DAVIDSON           | 2,967  | 10  | 1  | 8  | 35 | 1,386  | 166 | 111 | 100 | 293 | 118 | 78  | 66  | 38  | 42  | 23 | 12 | 30 | 18 | 25 | 16 | 3  | 7  | 1  | 4  | 8  | 4  | 364   |
| GREEN<br>Harini<br>RANGARAJAN       | 791    | 9   | 2  | 1  | 10 | 396    | 52  | 35  | 15  | 85  | 17  | 11  | 12  | 6   | 18  | 6  | 4  | 6  | 3  | 5  | 5  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 4  | 2  | 83    |
| Group total                         | 5,203  | 25  | 5  | 12 | 68 | 2,590  | 305 | 184 | 146 | 505 | 173 | 121 | 102 | 51  | 77  | 41 | 24 | 52 | 28 | 32 | 27 | 4  | 10 | 2  | 7  | 15 | 8  | 589   |
| IFC<br>Kathleen BOLT                | 356    | 1   | 1  | 1  | 3  | 231    | 12  | 6   | 14  | 9   | 13  | 5   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 2  | 1  | 3  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 33    |
| IFC<br>Anne-Louise<br>DAWES         | 624    | 2   | 0  | 1  | 3  | 368    | 40  | 18  | 30  | 23  | 28  | 5   | 10  | 12  | 4   | 3  | 2  | 4  | 4  | 4  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 57    |
| IFC<br>Robert KNIGHT                | 375    | 1   | 1  | 1  | 4  | 244    | 20  | 9   | 13  | 10  | 8   | 4   | 3   | 6   | 4   | 1  | 1  | 2  | 4  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 37    |
| IFC<br>Paula McGRADY                | 792    | 7   | 6  | 1  | 2  | 372    | 58  | 31  | 30  | 29  | 34  | 9   | 17  | 21  | 18  | 9  | 7  | 10 | 8  | 3  | 4  | 0  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 103   |
| IFC<br>Nathan NAICKER               | 593    | 3   | 0  | 2  | 1  | 328    | 46  | 20  | 29  | 15  | 20  | 9   | 10  | 11  | 10  | 4  | 3  | 9  | 6  | 0  | 3  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 59    |
| Group total                         | 2,740  | 14  | 8  | 6  | 13 | 1,543  | 176 | 84  | 116 | 86  | 103 | 32  | 44  | 55  | 42  | 19 | 14 | 28 | 25 | 8  | 7  | 1  | 10 | 7  | 3  | 4  | 3  | 289   |

| Group | Total               | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      | 8      | 9      | 10     | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20    | 21    | 22    | 23    | 24    | 25    | 26    | 27    |       |
|-------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| LIB   | Ed COCKS            | 4,027  | 23     | 3      | 10     | 17     | 3,250  | 174    | 100    | 80     | 38     | 75    | 19    | 17    | 17    | 12    | 5     | 8     | 8     | 11    | 2     | 2     | 1     | 5     | 4     | 3     | 1     | 3     | 139   |
| LIB   | Jeremy HANSON       | 7,380  | 36     | 11     | 12     | 17     | 5,879  | 282    | 210    | 177    | 50     | 116   | 24    | 24    | 45    | 26    | 20    | 19    | 9     | 14    | 7     | 4     | 3     | 7     | 7     | 3     | 4     | 8     | 366   |
| LIB   | Elyse<br>HESLEHURST | 1,666  | 8      | 4      | 2      | 11     | 1,348  | 57     | 36     | 37     | 12     | 34    | 5     | 7     | 11    | 8     | 5     | 2     | 4     | 3     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 66    |
| LIB   | Amardeep SINGH      | 4,019  | 32     | 8      | 11     | 4      | 3,082  | 215    | 123    | 100    | 35     | 84    | 25    | 24    | 24    | 18    | 18    | 9     | 4     | 13    | 1     | 6     | 1     | 2     | 5     | 1     | 3     | 5     | 166   |
| LIB   | Karen WALSH         | 2,486  | 16     | 5      | 5      | 9      | 1,999  | 100    | 51     | 58     | 20     | 35    | 9     | 11    | 20    | 7     | 9     | 7     | 3     | 6     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 5     | 3     | 2     | 2     | 100   |
|       | Group total         | 19,578 | 115    | 31     | 40     | 58     | 15,558 | 828    | 520    | 452    | 155    | 344   | 82    | 83    | 117   | 71    | 57    | 45    | 28    | 47    | 11    | 14    | 7     | 18    | 22    | 10    | 10    | 18    | 837   |
| UNG   | Rima DAB            | 862    | 20     | 8      | 1      | 2      | 450    | 65     | 38     | 22     | 34     | 35    | 8     | 7     | 4     | 10    | 5     | 8     | 1     | 2     | 4     | 6     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 126   |
|       | Group total         | 862    | 20     | 8      | 1      | 2      | 450    | 65     | 38     | 22     | 34     | 35    | 8     | 7     | 4     | 10    | 5     | 8     | 1     | 2     | 4     | 6     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 126   |
|       | Total               | 55,849 | 335    | 130    | 180    | 230    | 37,368 | 3,132  | 1,858  | 1,810  | 1,898  | 1,462 | 603   | 596   | 479   | 412   | 264   | 179   | 214   | 197   | 103   | 138   | 24    | 75    | 55    | 34    | 90    | 90    | 3,893 |
|       | %                   |        | 0.60   | 0.23   | 0.32   | 0.41   | 66.91  | 5.61   | 3.33   | 3.24   | 3.40   | 2.62  | 1.08  | 1.07  | 0.86  | 0.74  | 0.47  | 0.32  | 0.38  | 0.35  | 0.18  | 0.25  | 0.04  | 0.13  | 0.10  | 0.06  | 0.16  | 0.16  | 6.97  |
|       | Progressive total   |        | 55,849 | 55,514 | 55,384 | 55,204 | 54,974 | 17,606 | 14,474 | 12,616 | 10,806 | 8,908 | 7,446 | 6,843 | 6,247 | 5,768 | 5,356 | 5,092 | 4,913 | 4,699 | 4,502 | 4,399 | 4,261 | 4,237 | 4,162 | 4,107 | 4,073 | 3,983 | 3,893 |
|       | Progressive %       |        | 100.00 | 99.40  | 99.17  | 98.85  | 98.43  | 31.52  | 25.92  | 22.59  | 19.35  | 15.95 | 13.33 | 12.25 | 11.19 | 10.33 | 9.59  | 9.12  | 8.80  | 8.41  | 8.06  | 7.88  | 7.63  | 7.59  | 7.45  | 7.35  | 7.29  | 7.13  | 6.97  |

Table 69 Length of sequence — Yerrabi

| Group                     | Total  | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5      | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  | 11 | 12  | 13  | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31  |    |
|---------------------------|--------|-----|----|----|----|--------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|
| ALP Suzanne ORR           | 4,906  | 41  | 12 | 14 | 15 | 3,633  | 214 | 164 | 260 | 85  | 94  | 31 | 59  | 29  | 18 | 11 | 11 | 16 | 6  | 4  | 0  | 3  | 6  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 12 | 2  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 160 |    |
| ALP Michael PETERSSON     | 6,495  | 49  | 26 | 26 | 25 | 4,966  | 281 | 162 | 284 | 111 | 112 | 28 | 64  | 39  | 21 | 22 | 9  | 10 | 8  | 7  | 5  | 7  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 7  | 2  | 2  | 5  | 4  | 210 |    |
| ALP Mallika RAJ           | 2,689  | 32  | 8  | 7  | 14 | 1,991  | 126 | 71  | 156 | 42  | 70  | 13 | 36  | 18  | 6  | 7  | 1  | 3  | 3  | 4  | 0  | 5  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 3  | 5  | 63  |    |
| ALP Ravinder SAHNI        | 1,073  | 24  | 3  | 2  | 13 | 843    | 50  | 27  | 25  | 19  | 14  | 3  | 7   | 5   | 2  | 2  | 0  | 3  | 1  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 20  |    |
| ALP Pradeep SORNARAJ      | 1,679  | 11  | 3  | 6  | 3  | 1,249  | 80  | 52  | 83  | 31  | 33  | 8  | 17  | 11  | 3  | 5  | 3  | 6  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 63  |    |
| Group total               | 16,842 | 157 | 52 | 55 | 70 | 12,682 | 751 | 476 | 808 | 288 | 323 | 83 | 183 | 102 | 50 | 47 | 24 | 38 | 20 | 16 | 8  | 16 | 9  | 6  | 4  | 0  | 24 | 7  | 5  | 10 | 12 | 516 |    |
| BEL Gregory BURKE         | 304    | 0   | 3  | 2  | 3  | 216    | 22  | 16  | 7   | 8   | 3   | 3  | 3   | 2   | 2  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 12  |    |
| BEL Jason TAYLOR          | 584    | 6   | 9  | 1  | 5  | 426    | 31  | 35  | 12  | 6   | 18  | 5  | 0   | 3   | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 20  |    |
| Group total               | 888    | 6   | 12 | 3  | 8  | 642    | 53  | 51  | 19  | 14  | 21  | 8  | 3   | 5   | 3  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 32  |    |
| DLP Michael HANNA         | 821    | 20  | 11 | 6  | 10 | 618    | 45  | 36  | 20  | 14  | 11  | 0  | 0   | 0   | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 21  |    |
| DLP Collin JORY           | 493    | 10  | 15 | 5  | 3  | 367    | 21  | 23  | 10  | 10  | 11  | 2  | 3   | 1   | 4  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4   |    |
| Group total               | 1,314  | 30  | 26 | 11 | 13 | 985    | 66  | 59  | 30  | 24  | 22  | 2  | 3   | 1   | 5  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 25  |    |
| FFP Greg AMOS             | 706    | 9   | 10 | 3  | 4  | 459    | 23  | 53  | 18  | 28  | 11  | 7  | 12  | 4   | 3  | 3  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 47  |    |
| FFP Henry KIVIMAKI        | 410    | 10  | 7  | 4  | 2  | 263    | 26  | 31  | 12  | 8   | 6   | 6  | 4   | 3   | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 20  |    |
| Group total               | 1,116  | 19  | 17 | 7  | 6  | 722    | 49  | 84  | 30  | 36  | 17  | 13 | 16  | 7   | 4  | 3  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 67  |    |
| FNP Lisa BARNES           | 191    | 0   | 2  | 3  | 0  | 140    | 7   | 3   | 7   | 3   | 6   | 1  | 3   | 7   | 0  | 2  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 6   |    |
| FNP Michael DUNCAN        | 142    | 1   | 1  | 1  | 1  | 110    | 6   | 5   | 5   | 0   | 2   | 1  | 1   | 3   | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4   |    |
| FNP Kye MOGGIDGE          | 88     | 2   | 0  | 0  | 1  | 61     | 4   | 1   | 2   | 2   | 2   | 0  | 2   | 1   | 2  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4   |    |
| FNP Cooper PIKE           | 969    | 12  | 4  | 0  | 1  | 612    | 49  | 26  | 38  | 32  | 35  | 19 | 9   | 25  | 11 | 6  | 3  | 15 | 6  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 59  |    |
| FNP Tyson POWELL          | 127    | 2   | 0  | 3  | 1  | 88     | 6   | 1   | 5   | 2   | 3   | 0  | 1   | 4   | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 6   |    |
| Group total               | 1,517  | 17  | 7  | 7  | 4  | 1,011  | 72  | 36  | 57  | 39  | 48  | 21 | 16  | 40  | 13 | 9  | 5  | 20 | 8  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 1  | 79  |    |
| GREEN Andrew BRADDOCK     | 3,308  | 12  | 10 | 40 | 19 | 2,029  | 173 | 97  | 252 | 160 | 111 | 23 | 53  | 38  | 27 | 22 | 6  | 20 | 13 | 6  | 8  | 3  | 5  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 5  | 4  | 163 |    |
| GREEN Soeliy CONSEN-LYNCH | 1,853  | 3   | 4  | 17 | 15 | 1,069  | 75  | 56  | 170 | 71  | 60  | 16 | 30  | 38  | 17 | 13 | 8  | 18 | 7  | 6  | 6  | 1  | 3  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 138 |    |
| GREEN Alex GIAS           | 1,232  | 5   | 4  | 16 | 6  | 799    | 62  | 35  | 89  | 60  | 32  | 6  | 21  | 15  | 4  | 11 | 4  | 6  | 3  | 2  | 4  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 4   | 42 |
| Group total               | 6,393  | 20  | 18 | 73 | 40 | 3,897  | 310 | 188 | 511 | 291 | 203 | 45 | 104 | 91  | 48 | 46 | 18 | 44 | 23 | 14 | 18 | 5  | 8  | 2  | 4  | 3  | 5  | 3  | 0  | 7  | 11 | 343 |    |

| Group             | Total                  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6      | 7      | 8     | 9     | 10    | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17    | 18    | 19    | 20    | 21    | 22    | 23    | 24    | 25    | 26    | 27    | 28    | 29    | 30    | 31    |       |
|-------------------|------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| IFC               | Sneha KC               | 1,642  | 24     | 6      | 8      | 28     | 1,018  | 105    | 58    | 42    | 64    | 49    | 20    | 35    | 14    | 18    | 10    | 4     | 5     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 4     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 112   |
| IFC               | Vikram KULKARNI        | 449    | 4      | 3      | 2      | 11     | 277    | 36     | 26    | 10    | 19    | 19    | 7     | 4     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 16    |
| IFC               | David POLLARD          | 2,769  | 30     | 9      | 10     | 33     | 1,790  | 179    | 92    | 74    | 81    | 58    | 33    | 56    | 19    | 22    | 19    | 4     | 16    | 11    | 11    | 9     | 5     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 0     | 5     | 0     | 3     | 2     | 4     | 189   |
| IFC               | Trent POLLARD          | 460    | 1      | 2      | 1      | 14     | 332    | 13     | 14    | 14    | 16    | 10    | 0     | 8     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 25    |
| Group total       |                        | 5,320  | 59     | 20     | 21     | 86     | 3,417  | 333    | 190   | 140   | 180   | 136   | 60    | 103   | 34    | 42    | 32    | 9     | 24    | 15    | 15    | 16    | 12    | 2     | 3     | 4     | 2     | 5     | 1     | 6     | 4     | 7     | 342   |
| LIB               | Leanne CASTLEY         | 6,745  | 40     | 15     | 25     | 16     | 5,619  | 230    | 189   | 75    | 99    | 69    | 37    | 31    | 11    | 22    | 10    | 9     | 5     | 4     | 6     | 3     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 4     | 0     | 1     | 3     | 4     | 211   |
| LIB               | Ralitsa DIMITROVA      | 1,110  | 10     | 8      | 4      | 8      | 936    | 27     | 30    | 14    | 9     | 10    | 4     | 6     | 2     | 5     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 2     | 0     | 26    |
| LIB               | John MIKITA            | 4,032  | 36     | 8      | 12     | 12     | 3,376  | 137    | 111   | 53    | 50    | 49    | 19    | 17    | 8     | 8     | 7     | 8     | 4     | 1     | 4     | 3     | 1     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 5     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 5     | 91    |
| LIB               | James MILLIGAN         | 5,681  | 60     | 19     | 13     | 19     | 4,797  | 155    | 169   | 73    | 63    | 75    | 17    | 26    | 5     | 14    | 5     | 14    | 3     | 6     | 2     | 3     | 5     | 1     | 3     | 1     | 0     | 4     | 0     | 2     | 3     | 7     | 117   |
| LIB               | Krishna NADIMPALLI     | 2,721  | 27     | 9      | 21     | 23     | 2,173  | 138    | 78    | 49    | 46    | 62    | 14    | 13    | 8     | 5     | 5     | 3     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 3     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 31    |
| Group total       |                        | 20,289 | 173    | 59     | 75     | 78     | 16,901 | 687    | 577   | 264   | 267   | 265   | 91    | 93    | 34    | 54    | 29    | 35    | 15    | 15    | 13    | 10    | 13    | 3     | 8     | 5     | 1     | 15    | 0     | 5     | 12    | 16    | 476   |
| UNG               | Mohammad Munir HUSSAIN | 371    | 13     | 8      | 5      | 6      | 257    | 19     | 9     | 10    | 10    | 12    | 1     | 1     | 1     | 1     | 3     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 11    |
| UNG               | Fuxin LI               | 502    | 11     | 2      | 3      | 3      | 372    | 38     | 12    | 13    | 7     | 4     | 5     | 2     | 0     | 2     | 2     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 19    |
| UNG               | Joanne MCKINLEY        | 402    | 9      | 3      | 3      | 2      | 266    | 22     | 11    | 14    | 13    | 8     | 3     | 1     | 6     | 3     | 3     | 4     | 0     | 2     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 21    |
| Group total       |                        | 1,275  | 33     | 13     | 11     | 11     | 895    | 79     | 32    | 37    | 30    | 24    | 9     | 4     | 7     | 6     | 8     | 6     | 1     | 2     | 4     | 4     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 2     | 3     | 0     | 0     | 1     | 51    |
| Total             |                        | 54,954 | 514    | 224    | 263    | 316    | 41,152 | 2,400  | 1,693 | 1,896 | 1,169 | 1,059 | 332   | 525   | 321   | 225   | 176   | 104   | 142   | 84    | 67    | 62    | 53    | 23    | 20    | 23    | 9     | 53    | 15    | 19    | 34    | 50    | 1,931 |
| %                 |                        |        | 0.94   | 0.41   | 0.48   | 0.58   | 74.88  | 4.37   | 3.08  | 3.45  | 2.13  | 1.93  | 0.60  | 0.96  | 0.58  | 0.41  | 0.32  | 0.19  | 0.26  | 0.15  | 0.12  | 0.11  | 0.10  | 0.04  | 0.04  | 0.04  | 0.02  | 0.10  | 0.03  | 0.03  | 0.06  | 0.09  | 3.51  |
| Progressive total |                        | 54,954 | 54,440 | 54,216 | 53,953 | 53,637 | 12,485 | 10,085 | 8,392 | 6,496 | 5,327 | 4,268 | 3,936 | 3,411 | 3,090 | 2,865 | 2,689 | 2,585 | 2,443 | 2,359 | 2,292 | 2,230 | 2,177 | 2,154 | 2,134 | 2,111 | 2,102 | 2,049 | 2,034 | 2,015 | 1,981 | 1,931 |       |
| Progressive %     |                        | 100.00 | 99.06  | 98.66  | 98.18  | 97.60  | 22.72  | 18.35  | 15.27 | 11.82 | 9.69  | 7.77  | 7.16  | 6.21  | 5.62  | 5.21  | 4.89  | 4.70  | 4.45  | 4.29  | 4.17  | 4.06  | 3.96  | 3.92  | 3.88  | 3.84  | 3.83  | 3.73  | 3.70  | 3.67  | 3.60  | 3.51  |       |

